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Building cybersecurity capacity has become increasingly a subject of global concern in both 
stable countries and those countries in a transitional phase. National and international 
Research & Technology Organisations (RTOs) have developed a plethora of guidelines and 
frameworks to help with the development of a national cybersecurity framework. Current 
state-of-art literature provides guidelines for developing national cybersecurity frameworks 
but, relatively little research has focused on the context of cybersecurity capacity building 
especially for countries in the transitional stage. Countries in a transition phase are typically 
characterised by civil war; political and economic upheaval; the absence of law. This has 
resulted in a critical knowledge gap that must be addressed through empirical research to 
guide these countries to develop and implement cybersecurity capacity platform.  
This thesis proposes a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) that 
relies on a variety of existing standards, guidelines, and practices to enable countries in a 
transitional phase to transform their current cybersecurity posture by applying activities that 
reflect desired outcomes. The NCCBF provides stability against unquantifiable threats and 
enhances security by embedding leading and lagging performance security measures at a 
national level.  
The NCCBF is inspired by a Design Science Research methodology (DSR) and guided by 
utilising modelling approach IDEF0. Developing this framework resulted in two qualitative 
studies, Interactive Management (IM) and Focus groups as the main data elicitation approach. 
These studies involving government officials, private sector, managers and general 
employees participating in security development from areas such as defence, e-services, the 
private sector, banking, the Digital Crime Unit, the Immigration and Foreigners Affairs 
Authority, the oil and gas sector and intelligence agencies. A set of objectives was derived 
from these studies to identify the key initiatives for the development of national cybersecurity 
capacity in the country. This research also used secondary data sources such as government 
reports, global indices, to validate the results of the research study. 
The findings suggest that countries in a transitional phase are vulnerable to cybersecurity 
risks, such as cybercrime and cyber terrorism, and that they lack of cybersecurity capacity 
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areas such as; an adequate knowledge and awareness of cybersecurity, cybersecurity 
strategies and policies, technical controls, and incident response capabilities. 
Based on the research findings and analysis, a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Framework (NCCBF) was constructed and evaluated, highlighting the key areas necessary 
for improving cybersecurity capacity of countries that are in a transitional phase. 
Furthermore, the NCCBF was evaluated by a structured set of criteria conducted within focus 
groups with experts from different countries including those from countries that were in a 
transitional phase. The evaluation demonstrated the valuable contribution of the NCCBF’s in 
representing the challenges in National Cybersecurity Capacity Building and the complexities 
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1. CHAPTER 1 i 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the motivation for undertaking research on developing a National 
Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) for countries in transitional phase, in 
particular, by using Spring Land as a case study. This chapter outlines and explains the 
details of the research, its objectives, and the research questions whilst further providing 
details on the scope, rational of this research study and an overview of its innovation and 
impact of this research. 
1.2 The Rationale of the Study  
Over decades, the global cybersecurity environment has been characterised by several 
security insufficiencies, which have been defined as government’s inability to meet their 
national security obligations. Consequentially, security failures can lead to state instability. 
Unstable and countries in a transition phase often demonstrate dramatic clear examples of 
unsuccessful governance and public supervision failure (DeRouen Jr et al. 2012). Generally, 
an unstable country or those in a transition state are characterised by civil war; political and 
economic upheaval; the absence of law and the lack of a reliable body representing the state 
beyond its borders at the inter-national level.  
Transition phase refers to the intermediate phase that begins with the dissolution of an old 
regime and ends with the establishment of a new one (Guo and Stradiotto 2014). There are a 
number of factors affecting the success or failure of transition stage. These factors include, 
the type of regime prior to the transition stage, the characteristics of the new leader of the 
transitional government and the influence of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) (Strachan and Anna 2017). For example, we have witnessed the “Arab Spring” states 
and their reoccurring transitions. These transitioning states have tentatively gained 
independence but lack stability towards national solidarity and good governance. It is 
possible for a group of people with tacit experience to organise these states and lead them to 
stability (Kaplan, 2012). According to Mohamed and Abdulmajid H (2017) “these states are    
historically    less    developed    and    lack    even basic infrastructure despite the huge 
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wealth generated out of it. This problem  is  witnessed  by  the  current  drastic  disruption  of  
oil  production  and  its  logistics  along  the  areas  involved  in  the conflict.  In other words, 
we regard the lack of socio-economic development   as   the   root   cause   of   the   
continuing   violent, political conflict”. 
Many countries with poor infrastructure and poor governance are rapidly starting to establish 
their presence in the cyberspace, the 5th Domain of modern warfare (Richardson 2012). The 
impact of expanding non-secure ICT infrastructure in these nations also threatens the global 
community and many economically stronger nations (Garlock 2018). As globally, connected 
networks facilitate rapid globalisation they also enable cybercriminals to freely operate across 
borders. Many of developing or those in a transition state attract global attention as the major 
source of cyber-attacks, with the insecure ICT infrastructure being used as an instrument for 
committing international cybercrime (Kshetri 2019). Recent study from Business Software 
Alliance, two countries with the world’s highest software piracy rates in 2017 were from 
developing nations: Libya now referred as Spring Land in this Thesis and Zimbabwe. The 
proportions of unlicensed software in the two countries were 90% and 89% respectively. 
Since pirated software products cannot take advantage of updates from manufacturers, they 
accelerate the spread of malware (Kshetri 2019). Spring Land considered as one of countries 
in a transition stage due to political and armed conflict after the socio-political storm named 
Arab Spring.  
The increased prevalence cyber-attacks and cybercrime in these countries can be credited to 
defenceless systems and their lack of cybersecurity practices (Kshetri, 2019). One more 
problem is linked to the lack of skills among Internet users to protect themselves from rapidly 
escalating cyber-threats and with most people inexperienced and not technically savvy. A 
majority of users in these countries also lack English language, a key component of coding 
and technical standards (Kshetri 2019). 
The situation in developing and countries in transitional phase is more complicated and needs 
bigger attention due to the absence of local expertise and limited resources. As many these 
nations increase reliance on ICT to enable economic growth, they fail to commit an 
equivalent level of investment into cybersecurity. There is little clarification given regarding 
what the appropriate required level is based upon risk and resources (Pawlak 2014). The use 
of Cyberspace and Information Communication Technologies in developing countries and 
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those countries in a transitional phase has grown significantly over recent years. This growth 
has been accompanied by particularly increased susceptibility to cyber-attacks (Brechbühl et 
al. 2010).  
Building cybersecurity capacity has become increasingly a subject of global concern in both 
stable countries and those countries in a transitional phase. National and international 
Research & Technology Organisations (RTOs) have developed a plethora of guidelines and 
frameworks to help with the development of a national cybersecurity framework  (Hameed et 
al. 2018). Although extensive research has been carried out on CCB, to our knowledge no 
other single study exists which focuses on countries in a transitional phase. In addition, there 
are presently no other published research linking existing frameworks and initiatives with 
benchmarking models, and thus this effort from the CCMM is presented (Hameed et al. 
2018).  
Therefore, this research hypothesis that, there is a demonstrable gap (an extensive and vibrant 
chasm!) between the assurance of a stable, self-assured State that adheres to ISO Standards, 
Policies, Procedures and Good Practice, underpinned by security technologies, training and 
skills as opposed by States in a transitional phase that exhibit little Governance, Risk 
Management and Compliance of their 5th Domain -Cyberspace. 
Can a collaborative research study bridge this gap?   
Will building cybersecurity capacity to States in a transitional phase, be grounded in 
conducting, evaluating, and building a reliable National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Framework (NCCBF)? 
Recently, researches have shown that comprehensive frameworks to cybersecurity are highly 
problematic around the world  (Oltramari et al. 2014; Donaldson et al. 2015). Although there 
are many efforts undertaken at national and international level, building capacities of 
individual countries in cybersecurity remains a challenge and facing various problems such as 
lack of strategy, duplication of initiatives and cyber capacity gap between favored and 
neglected countries includes countries in a transitional phase (Pawlak et al. 2017; Hameed et 
al. 2018). Pawlak et al. (2017), identified that when development communities decides to get 
involved with Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB), they often lack security expertise 
27 
 
,methodological toolkits and know-how to tackle cyber related crime. There is also the ‘dual-
use challenge’ of cybersecurity according to Hohmann et al. (2017) where they articulated 
highlighted that, cybersecurity capabilities and technologies can hypothetically be used 
harmfully to increase surveillance and social control and to empower repressive governments 
as well as cyberwarfare, espionage and cybercrime.  
This double-edged phenomenon is supported by Muller (2015) who argued that, methods to 
date have not managed to cover Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) as a whole on a 
global scale or else they argue for CCB, but without indicating how to go about implementing 
it. Some approaches set out a scope that is either too broad or too narrow, while others focus 
on different ways of highlighting the problems that come with increased access to 
cyberspace, but without indicating solutions (Muller 2015).  
The hypothetical gap presents an opportunity for exploring current global trends in CCB 
efforts and identifying the principles for successful CCB framework. This research study 
aims to bridge this gap by collecting and analysing a variety of existing standards, guidelines, 
and practices and link it with well-known benchmarking model the Cybersecurity Capacity 
Maturity Model (CCMM). The output of the study proposes a National Cybersecurity 
Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) for countries in a transitional phase using Spring 
Land as a case study. Spring Land is a fictional name given to a country to provide a case 
study. The NCCBF progress is guided and managed by utilising modelling approaches. 
The choice of Spring Land for this research was justified by several facts and it was decided 
to use Spring Land as a metaphor to a country in a transitional state rather than the real state 
of Libya. Firstly, Spring Land is in the transitional phase with an unstable environment, 
which set Spring Land critical infrastructure under Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and 
the associated threats of Cyber space. Secondly, Spring Land is in early stages of adopting 
the use of the online services platform. Thirdly, Spring Land does not have a cogent National 
Cybersecurity framework (ITU 2015). Fourthly, existing literature concentrates on the 
challenges and factors of adopting e-services in Spring Land only, e.g., e-government (Sweisi 
2010; Seema et al. 2012; Ahmed et al. 2013; Abuzawayda 2016; Darbok 2016), e-banking 
(Farag and Hilles; Elgahwash et al. 2014; MTMC 2016; Ward et al. 2017), e-commerce 
(Moftah et al. 2012; NISSA 2013; GCSCC 2017) and e-learning (Kitzinger 1995a; Warfield 
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et al. 2002; Gill et al. 2008; Goldman 2010; Herrington and Aldrich 2013; DOE 2014; Hult 
and Sivanesan 2014). 
Hence, no scholarly research has currently been completed on Spring Land’s posture to 
implementing appropriate Cybersecurity Capacity Building frameworks. In addition, there 
are no studies addressing the factors that influence the development of a National 
Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework NCCBF in a chaos ecosystem. Finally, access 
to the information and collected data is more straightforward, as the researcher is a Libyan 
citizen and sponsored by the Libyan government. Thus, this research seeks to create a 
framework for countries in a transition stage against stable threats that will contribute to the 
protection of the metaphorical Spring Land critical infrastructure. This Research Study will 
further comprise of a social technical analysis (e.g. using Interactive Management Technique) 
and Focus Group discussion to contextualize and assess the Spring Land problem space. This 
contextualisation analyses the Cybersecurity capacity of the state by applying a modified 
version of the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations Model (CCMM) - V1.2. 
The original model had been designed by Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre, University 
of Oxford (GCSCC 2017). 
1.4 Research Questions   
This PhD research will question, how protected data within situations in countries in a 
transitional phase is under Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), and the associated challenges 
of Cybersecurity. The impact of E-government, e-banking and e-commerce are currently 
being analysed in depth, but there is yet to be a coherent proposal for a resolution to 
effectively protect the metaphorical Spring Land information infrastructure, and for all intents 
and purposes, the Spring Land government itself.  
The research proposition is to develop a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Framework (NCCBF) as an outcome for countries in a transitional phase, the assurance and 
exploitation of its capabilities within the 5th Domain - Cyberspace. This research study will 
comprise of a Social-Technical Analysis (e.g. using soft systems) that builds conceptual 
models to determine and contextualise the hypothetical problem space. To achieve this 
research aim and provide an outcome to the study’s hypothesis a number of  objectives have 
evolved from the following research questions: 
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The main question is: How can we develop a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Framework that supports the National Security for countries in a transitional phase? 
In order to validate and resolve the challenge of the main research question, further analytical 
questions developed the notions posed in the main question. 
Q1- What are the known challenges in delivering effective Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Platform? 
Q2- What are the key elements of a successful Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
and consequentially what are the possible modelling approaches for better and effective 
guiding Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework?  
Q3- What are the current issues of cybersecurity capacity within a metaphorical Spring Land 
and what would be done to address cybersecurity across Spring Land? 
Q4- How do we measure the current maturity levels of cybersecurity capacity in a 
metaphorical Spring Land? 
Q5- How to translate the finding of Q2, Q3 and Q4 into a transformative design method 
which could help to develop a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
(NCCBF) for countries in a transitional phase? 
1.5 Aims and Objectives    
The aim of this research is to develop a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Framework (NCCBF) for countries in a transitional phase using Spring Land as a case study 
to ensure and exploit its capabilities. This will comprise of two qualitative studies such as 
Interactive Management (IM) and Focus groups to assess and contextualise the Spring Land 
problem space. To achieve this research aim, fives objectives are formulated using the 
acronymic SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, Timely) criteria: 
Objective 1 – (S) To investigate a state of the art cybersecurity frameworks and 
cybersecurity capacity building frameworks, with a view to challenges, key elements of a 
successful Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework and possible modelling approaches 
for better and effective guiding Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework. (M) The 
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performance of this investigation will be measured by the quality of the research and use of 
its literature review and supporting references. (A) This objective will be attained by a 
comprehensive literature review. (R) The realistic outcome of State of Art will reinforce the 
suspension that the Cybersecurity Capacity Building Frameworks is wholly inadequate to 
resist APTs. (T) the literature review should be finished within 4 years.  
Objective 2 – (S) To contextualise the problem space that is centred on the current Spring 
Land National security state. (M) The contextualisation will analyse the security operations 
of the state by the use of qualitative approach called Interactive Management. The outputs are 
to be aligned with the Cybersecurity capability and risk of current defences. (A) The 
contextualisation will be enhanced through a risk impact analysis and based on the CCMM 
for nations. (R) This will feed into requirement analysis for NCCBF and the possibility to 
organise and test the Spring Land Cyber Defence. (T) This objective is will be completed by 
2018. 
Objective 3 – (S) To assess the current maturity levels of cybersecurity capacity in Spring 
Land. (M) The evaluations will analyse the maturity levels of the Spring Land cybersecurity 
capacity of the state by the use of focus group discussion. The outputs are determining areas 
of capability that are required by the Spring Land Government in order to improve 
cybersecurity capacity of the state. (A) The assessment will be enhanced based on the 
CCMM for nations. (R) This will feed into requirement analysis for NCCBF and the 
possibility to organise and test the Spring Land Cyber Defence. (T) This objective is will be 
completed by 2018. 
Objective 4 – (S) To develop the NCCBF framework. (M) The NCCBF will be managed and 
guided by modelling functions techniques. (A) The framework will be attained through 
acceptance of NCCBF in the Spring Land National Defence. (R) Realistically NCCBF will be 
developed for National Security. (T) This will be ready by 2019. 
Objective 5 - (S) To evaluate the NCCBF for countries in a transitional stage. (M) The 
NCCBF will be evaluated against a set of criteria (Completeness, Correctness, Acceptability 
and the Overall Evaluation of the framework. (A) The NCCBF will be evaluated by 
conducting a focus group with experts from different countries including experts from 
countries that in transitional phase. (R) Realistically an enhanced NCCBF for countries in 
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transitional stage will be developed. (T) The evaluation will be completed by 2020.These 
objectives are mapping with the research questions and thesis chapters and presented in Table 
1.1.  
Research Objectives Research Question Chapters 
Objective 1 
Q1- What are the known challenges in 
delivering effective Cybersecurity Capacity 
Building Platform? 
Q2- What are the key elements of a successful 
Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
and consequentially what are the possible 
modelling approaches for better and effective 




Q3- What are the current issues of cybersecurity 
capacity within a metaphorical Spring Land and 
what would be done to address cybersecurity 
across Spring Land? 
Chapter 4 
Objective 3 
Q4- How do we measure the current maturity 
levels of cybersecurity capacity in a 
metaphorical Spring Land? 
 
Chapter 5 
Objective 4  
Objective 5 
Q5- How to translate the finding of Q2, Q3 and 
Q4 into a transformative design method which 
could help to develop a National Cybersecurity 
Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) for 
countries in a transitional phase? 
Chapter 6 and  
Chapter 7 
Table  1.1 Mapping the objectives with research questions and thesis chapters 
1.6 Mapping the thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter has outlined the scale of the study, 
explains the details of the research objectives and the research questions. Furthermore, 
provides details on the scope, rational of the study.  
Chapter 2 addresses the background of this multi-disciplinary research from literature. The 
chapter articulates definitions, facts and theories associated with the related disciplines. A 
special attention was given to Global Cybersecurity Capacity Frameworks and Global and 
Organisational Cybersecurity frameworks. Additionally, deliberate the Cybersecurity 
Maturity Models that are used to identify the Cybersecurity capacity maturity levels. In 
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additional, IDEF0 function model and Observe, Orient, Decide, Act model are discussed in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 3 details the methodology and research design along with the instruments of data 
collection methods used in the study. It explains all research methods used within this 
research, which include two qualitative methods (focus group and interactive management). 
Additionally, provides brief details about the development of the framework using a Design 
Science Research methodology (DSR) and modelling functions technique (IDEF0). Data 
analysis, Ethical considerations and evaluation of the proposed framework are also presented. 
Chapter 4 explores qualitative findings and delivers a contextualisation of Spring Lands’ 
current situation based on the CCMM. This chapter also presents the set of objectives derived 
from the IM approach that employed to support the management of a national cybersecurity 
capacity. 
Chapter 5 explores qualitative findings of focus group and delivers an assessment of Spring 
Lands’ current NCB maturity levels based on the CCMM. 
Chapter 6 describes the development of the proposed NCCBF framework. The framework 
consists of five main dimensions which represent the outcome of literature review and based 
on CCMM. These dimensions are: build strategic capacity; build cyber cultural and society 
capacity; build cybersecurity Education, Training and skills capacity; build legal and 
regulations capacity and build technical capacities. These dimensions are decomposed to 
three activities used to improve the capacity of each dimension. These activities are 
representing using IDEF0 modelling function.  
Chapter 7 highlights a critical phase of this research where the framework and its associated 
activities are evaluated and validated by conducting a focus group with experts from different 
countries including experts from countries that in transitional phase. The evaluation has been 
done against set of requirements and questions about the completeness, the correctness, and 
the acceptability of the framework.  
Chapter 8 draws the research to conclusion by recapitulating and discussing the research 
outcomes with research questions, reflecting on the strengths and weakness of the research, 
and the directions of the future research. 
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1.7 Chapter Summary  
Building cybersecurity capacity has become increasingly a subject of global concern in both 
stable countries and those countries in a transitional phase. This chapter presented an 
introduction to topics related to the area focus of this thesis and its hypothesis. The research 
aims to develop a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework for countries in 
transitional phase. A set of five SMART objectives were defined to be achieved by this 
research as well as five questions to be answered through Investigation. The outcome of a 
designed, developed and validated framework is proposed as the main contribution to 













2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of literature in key areas related to the present study. These 
include national security perspectives to the 5th Domain - Cyberspace; Cyber threats impact 
on National Security; Cybersecurity in the context of (Spring Land); Cybersecurity Threats 
impact on Spring Land National Security; Models of Cybersecurity Capacity Building; 
Global and Organisational Cybersecurity frameworks; overview of national Cybersecurity 
strategies in a further three selected countries. 
2.2 Cybersecurity Definition   
Security is usually the state of free from, or degree of defence against, risks, harm, failure or 
attacks. Security is “a type of protection where a distinction is established between the assets 
and the hazard” (Herzog 2010). In other words, security is about safeguard of assets from 
numerous threats posed by certain inherent vulnerabilities (ISO27002 2005; Von Solms and 
Van Niekerk 2013). Ullman in the 1980s has defined security as “ An action or sequence of 
events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relative brief span of time to degrade the 
quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range 
of policy choices available to the government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental 
entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state” (Ullman 1983).  
Over the last decades, the global security (Physical, Personnel and Information) threats are 
continuing to evolve and spread across our hyperconnected world, irrespective of any 
international borders, in both their elaboration and scale of impact (Richardson 2012). 
Modern cyberspace is an intertwined domain of public, government, and private companies, 
all of which utilise its affordances to operate and communicate in daily life. The growing 
dependency on extant information and communication infrastructures makes them 
particularly attractive to cyber-attackers (Choo 2011).  
The persistent challenge to national security in the 5th Domain (Shashi 2016) is exacerbated 
by an ever-escalating threat landscape and the growing attack surfaces that represent State 
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Critical Infrastructures. According to Klimburg (2012) in the past two decades, around 50 
countries have become concerned with cyberspace, cybercrime and cybersecurity. 
The concept of cybersecurity ranges from national to international organisations to scholars, 
based on their needs, viewpoints, goals and the environment. For instance, the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) defined cybersecurity as: the collection of tools, policies, 
security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, 
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organisations and user’s assets. Organisations and user’s assets include 
connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, 
telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the 
cyber environment. Meanwhile, ENISA declared “there is no universally accepted not 
straightforward definition of cybersecurity (ENISA 2016). This view is supported Dunn 
(2005) by who writes that “there is no generally accepted definition of cybersecurity, and 
several different terms are in use that have related meanings, such as information assurance, 
information or data security, critical information infrastructure protection”. 
2.3 Cyber Threats Landscape on National Security  
The threat from the 5th Domain cyberspace to national security is viewed as a potential 
interruption to a common way of life, one built on information technology and vital 
infrastructure services, with very little direct human interest (Cavelty 2014). For most of the 
countries, the potential risks and threats posed to the cyberspace revolve around organised 
cybercrimes, state- sponsored attacks, cyber terrorism, unauthorised access to and 
interception of digital information, electronic forgery, vandalism and extortion etc (Shafqat 
and Masood 2016). Cyber threats are regarded as a form of hybrid threat that has only 
relatively recently emerged and has subsequently received considerable attention from 
various parties. Cyber threats are sometimes referred to as cyber warfare and they present 
challenges in the fifth domain of warfare when they entail prolonged and concerted attempts 
to attack the digital systems of a foreign territory. This can result in widespread disruption to 
the network of that country, possibly involving the use of malware and spam. 
What distinguishes these cyber warfare attacks from conventional cybercrime is the extent 
and veracity of their operations. In cyber warfare, ‘success’ entails not only denying the 
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operation of IT infrastructure and the associated disturbance but also defacement and 
deception for political purposes rather than monetary gain (e.g. fraud) (Bachmann and Dov 
2012).  
This is a relatively new form of conflict that occurs in the fifth domain, posing hybrid threats 
requiring innovative, holistic countermeasures spanning counter intelligence, counter 
cybersecurity and law enforcement to ensure a dynamic response when required (Bachmann 
and Gunneriusson 2014). Hoffman (2010) states that hybrid threats are those posed by an 
adversary that entail the simultaneous deployment of conventional weapons, terrorism, 
haphazard tactics and criminal behaviour in an attempt to realise political objectives. The 
Arab Spring uprisings that gripped several countries across the Maghreb and the Middle East 
during 2010 and 2011 provide an excellent example of how cyberspace can present threats 
capable of shifting the political landscape. A range of hybrid threats resulted during this 
period including widespread civil unrest, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, failed 
states, regional extremism and weapons of mass destruction (Bachmann and Dov 2012).  
Previously, the World Wide Web was merely an e-commerce outlet, whereas nowadays it is 
entrenched in the dissemination of critical information infrastructure (Singer  and Friedman 
2014). Fred (2015) states that the broader scope of Internet usage has added a new field of 
warfare after mainland, sea, air, and space domain. More recent global attention has focused 
on the provision of safeguarding strategies for enhancing critical infrastructures. Razzaq et al. 
(2014) warn that with the growing use of World Wide Web, users started storing and sharing 
a lot of data and information, however the web applications used for data storing are very 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks and therefore unsafe. 
In the USA, President Obama said, “Our Nation's critical infrastructure is central to our 
security and essential to our economy. Technology, energy, and information systems play a 
pivotal role in our lives today, and people continue to rely on the physical structures that 
surround us” (Obama 2015). Obama stressed that, we must remain vigilant and ensure 
resilience of our complex critical infrastructure systems whether physical or cyber by 
mitigating the threats and stresses that can weaken them (Obama 2015). 
From the European perspective, the EU has taken into account the significance of Critical 
Information Infrastructure (CIIs). Roman et al. (2007) pointed out in their study, CIIs include 
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energy, banking, transportation and these constitute the prosperity of many spheres such as 
economy, security and standards of living. Said organisation has sought to solidify the CII 
cyber situation awareness and neutralise terrorist cells, as well as serious and organised crime 
syndicates (Argomaniz 2015). Nowadays, one of the core methods, which aid terrorist's 
prosperity, is based on the aggressive application of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) in a virtual space (Sahyoun 2015).  
World Economic Forum (WEF) issues annually Global Risks reports which identifies the 
most serious and vital risks that the world faces. The analysis of Global Risks reports helps 
place the global risk landscape into context and point out which areas should be ready either 
for some action or protection. According to the Global Risks report from 2007 shows that 
highest risk in that year was the breakdown of critical information infrastructure. Such 
breakdown may have a detrimental effect on large part of the population. In 2012 and 2014 
cyber-attacks were considered fairly serious and posed danger to the society. However, 
according to the Global Risks in Terms of Likelihood issued for year 2018, cyber attacks and 
data fraud or theft appeared on 3rd and 4th place. This shows the increasing risk of misusing 
the cyber space and also higher cyber crime. Furthermore, The Global Risks report from 2015 
addressed the risks of increasing cyber attacks and the need for better privacy protection and 
prevention against cyber crime. The 2018 Global Risks Interconnections Map in Figure (2.1) 
shows that Data fraud and theft is directly linked to cyberattacks, which are a linkage to 
Terrorist Attacks and Failure of critical infrastructure (Weforum 2018). When considering the 
view of Figure (2.1), it is vital that interconnecting systems work within a coherent protocol 
so they are not subject to breach from dangerous sources. This will maintain essential 
interoperability and minimise potential inefficiency and ambiguity as information sharing is 





Figure  2.1 Global Risk Map 2018 (Weforum 2018) 
Today, cyberspace has become an intertwined domain which public, government and private 
companies utilise to operate and communicate in daily life. The growing dependence on the 
national information and communication infrastructures (ICT) make these infrastructures 
particularly susceptible to cyber-attacks (Choo 2011). Furthermore, this growth has been 
accompanied by an increase in the number of malicious attackers who pursue to conduct all 
types of nefarious deeds in cyberspace (Jasper and Wirtz 2017). For instance, the majority of 
cybersecurity issues today comprise of e-mail spam, malware, phishing, and denial of service 
attack. Razzaq et al. (2014) differentiate three main types of cybercrimes: Cybercrimes 
against persons, cybercrimes against all forms of property, cybercrimes against Government. 
The threats in cyberspace can be criminals, hackers, terrorists, and nation-states. Cyberattacks 
cause great damage to national security and hit major harm on the world economy (Hipp 
2017). As illustrated in Figure (2.2), the motivation behind most attacks in 2017 were 




Figure  2.2 Cyber-attack motivations (Passeri 2017). 
According to Gordon and Ford (2006) despite the fact that cybercrime is a widely used term, 
it is rather challenging to find a fitting definition. For instance, The Council of Europe's 
Cybercrime Treaty describes this phenomenon as offences that vary from ‘criminal activity 
against data to content and copyright infringement (Krone 2005). Nevertheless, some 
academics and researchers agree that Krone’s definition is too broad and for instance The 
United Nations (UN) extended the definition by adding ‘fraud, forgery, and unauthorised 
access’ as part of cybercrime (1995). 
Cybercrime has also been defined as a group of illegal hackers focussing on economic gains 
through illegal penetration of computer networks, replacing traditional forms of crime, and 
affecting the global economy (Kim et al. 2009). Cybercrime is a global issue; no country is 
invulnerable. According to Graham (2017), cybercrime cost the global economy over $450 
billion in 2016, with over 2 billion personal records stolen in the U.S. alone, and over 100 
million Americans having had their medical records stolen. In the UK during the same year, 
the influence of cybercrime on UK businesses was enormous, with 2.9 million British 
companies being hit by some sort of cybercrime at a total cost of £29.1 billion (Samarati 
2017). Over the years, the risk of malicious attack affecting the financial sector has increased. 
If we should focus on unstable countries, recently, a Bangladesh Bank official's computer 
was hacked and $81 million was stolen by an organised group from North Korean (Hipp 
2017). Metaphorically Spring Landis, increasingly open to exploitation by cyber-criminal 
groups due to the growing level of Internet connectivity. With the launch 4G-LTE network in 
many cities to enhance the coverage and performance and to get more customers by 
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providing a high-speed internet connection which also leads to all sort of problems related to 
cybercrime (BenIbrahim 2017). 
Cyber Warfare is another threat of cyber space in the national security realm that is going to 
be discussed in this study and which the US Department of Defense (DoD) has termed as the 
5th Domain (DoD 2008). There is an increasing body of evidence suggesting that Cyber 
warfare has been conducted as an act of war. Nation-states directly employ Cyber weapons to 
disrupt the nation-state’s critical infrastructure and computer systems. The most-known 
Cyber malware was used by Russia in 2007. Russia launched an enormous Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) on Estonia’s internet infrastructure that shut down service to major 
websites and communication across the country (Bryson 2018). Yet again, in 2008 the 
physical war between Georgia and Russia that turned into cyber war and DDoS attacks 
applied to shut down communication systems in Georgia. 
Another example is the attack on Iran’s nuclear program via the Stuxnet worm in 2010 
(Shafqat and Masood 2016). In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
Cybercrime and cyber warfare has so far been politically or ideologically motivated (Pahl and 
Richter 2007). Conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years turned to using cyber 
warfare. Johnson et al. (2008) states that a self-proclaimed hacker from Saudi Arabia calling 
himself "Da3s" apparently attacked the websites of Iran's Statistical Centre and Registration 
Office. A day after Da3s's attacks, a group calling itself the "Iran Security Team" retaliated 
by targeting Saudi Arabia's General Authority for Statistics and King Abdulaziz University. 
Recently, a large cyber-attack was launched using the WannaCry virus. This virus has 
infected more than 230,000 computers in 150 countries that use Microsoft Windows systems 
in a few days (Ehrenfeld 2017). Similar to the WannaCry virus, a new ransomware called 
Petya has infected many countries around the world (Symantec 2017). 
Spring Land is at risk from cyber warfare for a range of reasons; the U.S debated whether to 
expose the mission with a new kind of warfare: a cyber offensive to disrupt and even disable 
the Spring Land air-defense system in 2011 (Libicki 2011). Additionally, disruptive 
aggrieved political parties whose agenda will not form a cohesive government which affect 
political sensibilities of another nation. As an example, a vote page of Egypt’s Ministry of 
Information (moinfo.gov.eg) has been attacked by a group called the Spring Land Cyber 
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Army (The GreaT TeAm) and hackers posted a picture of the Spring Land flag, the message 
“Hacked by The GreaT TeAm,” and a link to their Facebook page (Segura Serrano 2015). 
Likewise, Cyber Espionage has become an ever-more significant factor in the art of war 
due to cyber technology development, turning traditional intelligence into cyber espionage. 
Obama (2013), argues that the US intelligence agencies have a long-held view that the 
Chinese government has a national policy of economic cyber-espionage. According to 
Grierson (2017), the GCHQ’s Cybersecurity chief has said that Britain is being hit by dozens 
of cyber-attacks a month, including attempts by Russian state-sponsored hackers to steal 
defence and foreign policy secrets. Ciaran Martin, Head of GCHQ’s National Cybersecurity 
Centre (NCSC), warned there had been a “step change” in Russia’s online aggression against 
the West, as well as more attacks on “soft targets” such as local councils and charities to steal 
personal data, and universities to steal research secrets (Kerbaj 2017). 
In October 2011, CrySyS Lab in Budapest, Hungary discovered Duqu, a malware with 
striking similarities to Stuxnet, but seemingly with a different motive. Certainly, Duqu does 
not intend to cause physical destruction, but it is an information-gathering malware used for 
cyber espionage (Obama 2013). Flame is another method for collecting information using a 
malware tool. Flame has received worldwide attention in security expertise due to its 
advanced spreading techniques based on masquerading as a proxy for Windows Update 
(Obama 2013). 
In the case of Spring Land, the malware named the "Book of Eli", has been targeting mainly 
Spring Land entities. It was first discovered in 2012, and is known for scattering via social 
networks such as Twitter and Facebook (Patton 1990). Patton (1990) clarifies that the "Book 
of Eli" malware is a classic information-stealing Trojan that attempts to collect various 
information. It can be deployed in various configurations. The full-featured version of the 
malware can log keystrokes, collect profile files of Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome 
browsers, record sound from the microphone, grab desktop screenshots, capture photo from 
the webcam, and collect information about the version of the operation system and installed 
anti-virus software. 
Hacktivism is also considered as one of the main motivations behind the exposed attacks. 
According to Ho (2014), the term “hacktivism” has been denoting a range of political 
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practices that make creative use of information technologies or, conversely, technical 
inventions and software hacks that have explicitly political goals. A good example of 
hacktivism is a group that identifies itself as LulzSec, who hacked into SonyPictures.com and 
compromised the personal information of more than 1 million users (Myers 1997a). 
With the increase of cyber attacks, another threat has occurred. It can be referred to as ‘cyber 
terrorism’. However, as it is quite complicated to define the term ‘terrorism’, there has been 
no consensus on what the definition of cyber terrorism should be (Wilson 2005).  
According to Caruso (2002), cyber terrorism has been defined in the United States as 
“Cyberterrorism meaning the use of cyber tools to shut down critical national infra- 
structures (such as energy, transportation, or government operations) for the purpose of 
coercing or intimidating a government or civilian population is clearly an emerging threat.” 
Denning (2001) defines cyberterrorism accordingly ‘politically motivated hacking operations 
intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic damage.’ Wilson (2005) 
combines several definitions and suggests the following definition ‘the use of computers as 
weapons, or as targets, by politically motivated international, or sub-national groups, or 
clandestine agents who threaten or cause violence and fear in order to influence an audience, 
or cause a government to change its policies. ‘ 
Nevertheless, as Prichard and MacDonald (2004) noted, cyber terrorism is computer-based 
terrorism, yet it still demonstrate the four elements that are shared by all acts of terrorism:  
1.They are planned and premeditated and therefore not just acts of rage. 
2.There is political motivation behind the act whose aim is to corrupt or completely 
destroy the system; in this instance computer system as pointed out by (Galley 
1996). 
3.They are targeted at civilians and they result in violence against people, which 
generates fear 
4.They are conducted by ad hoc groups, not by national armies. 
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The last point distinguishes cyber terrorism form cyber warfare in the sense that cyber 
warfare, which according to Prichard and MacDonald (2004) are attack conducted by agents 
of a nation-state. 
2.4 Cybersecurity in Context (Spring Land) 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in using the online communication 
platform in states such as Spring Land.  Spring Land metaphorical is a fictitious name given 
to the country of Libya, where the present case study was conducted. According to the 
Internet World Stats (2017), Spring Land’s population is approximately 6 million and the 
number of Internet users is around 2.8 million, which forms 44% of the population 
(InternetWorldStats 2017). The telecom sector consists of an operator, owned by the state, 
which provides postal services and telecommunications (Spring Land Post, 
Telecommunication and Information Technology Company “LPTIC”, General Post and 
Telecom Company "GPTC”). Spring Land Telecommunication and Technology (LTT) 
Corporation provide Internet service, and two mobile phone networks in Spring Land. 
Meanwhile, the online security in Spring Land has not been reinforced and enhanced in the 
same way that it has evidently been in other countries like the UK and the US. Moreover, it 
was in 2013 when the Spring Land government officially established the National 
Cybersecurity Authority (NCSA). NCSA’s primary mission is to encourage and sustain 
secure use of ICTs as well as to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to the associated 
cyber risks (NISSA 2013). In the same year, with the support of (ITU), Spring Land-CERT 
has been established with national-level responsibilities and is charged with prevention, 
detection, and mitigation of cyber threats (Matsubara 2014). 
Due to the current political conflict and the austerity measures, NCSA faces lack of funding 
which hindered most of the attempts of advancing cybersecurity in the context (Matsubara 
2014). Thus, Spring Land’s ability to address cybersecurity concerns is currently not at a 
level that inspires sufficient public confidence; hence, a cogent methodology to optimise its 
IT resources is most necessary. The onus is on the Spring Land national security to prevent 
any possible terrorist threats and protect the country’s critical infrastructure, which can only 
be achieved by coherent strategising between all relevant departments. This would provide 
assurances of streamlined, secure and resilient intelligence sharing, both internally and 
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internationally in order to safeguard the essential national infrastructures. It has to be noted 
that Spring Land’s cyber offensive and defensive capabilities clearly demonstrate a relative 
lack of security with respect to most of the Spring Land communications network and 
infrastructure (CSFI 2011). 
According to the Cyberwellness Profiles report, many countries like Spring Land do not have 
a cogent National Cybersecurity and information assurance framework. Therefore, its 
suitability to conduct effective and efficient information sharing is severely compromised 
(ITU 2015). Its main weakness is a lack of national or sector-specific research and 
development (R&D) programs/projects for cybersecurity standards, practices and guidelines 
need to be applied in either the private or the public sector. The Global Cybersecurity Index 
(GCI) project ranks such countries like Spring Land’s preparedness for cyber threats at 105 
out of 134 worldwide countries (ITU 2017a). According to El-Guindy (2013) the lack of 
security measures, coupled with poor security awareness and other ICT vulnerabilities in the 
Middle East, may lead to potentially harmful attacks from the underground market. 
2.4.1 Cyber Threat Impacts on Spring Land   
Spring Land like any country in the world is under constant, persistent, sometimes 
overwhelming online attacks. Attacker employ wide range of attackers vectors to hack 
government agencies, private organisations, as well as influential and political figures. Spring 
Land is well-known for its unstable political system, civil war and militant groups fighting 
for land and oil control, however, the global community knows very little about the country’s 
malicious cyber activities, cyber espionage or hacking groups (Cyberkov 2016). 
Nevertheless, Cyberkov observed that a high-profile Spring Land influential and political 
figure was attacked by malware, which spreads extremely fast using the Telegram messenger 
application in smartphones. Microsoft Security Intelligence Report discloses that our 
metaphorical Spring Land has the highest percentage of unprotected computers and also the 
highest infection rate (Microsoft 2016). 
Furthermore, the report from Kaspersky Lab Solutions gathering information about malicious 
attacks from online resources located in 190 countries all over the world, shows that Spring 
Land rounded off the top 3 for the highest proportion of users attacked by banking Trojans in 
the world (Kaspersky 2017). Moreover, according to Matsubara (2014) Spring Land 
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classified as one of the top ten Source of Phishing Hosts and Command and Control servers 
(C&C servers) in Africa during 2016. Abuzawayda (2016), reported that, a hacker belonging 
to a group calling itself the Spring Land Worms provided statistics which showed that the 
worms group was able, in a short period, to control over 99% of the Spring Land government 
websites. In addition, the hacker declared that they got access to the systems of the Central 
Bank of Spring Land, civil registration and national figures. Another cyber-attack targeted the 
website of the Civil Registry Authority, the attack affected the authority's daily services to the 
people(libyaobserver 2016). Many of these activities, because of their motive, origin, or 
objective, threaten Spring Land National Security and public safety. 
2.5 Global and Organisational Cybersecurity Frameworks  
In the new global economy, Cyberspace challenges impact every facet of society including 
economic, social, cultural and political developments. Developing national securities is one 
of the greatest challenges that we are facing. However, national and international 
organisations as well as researchers have developed a multiplicity of guidelines and 
frameworks to help in the development of a Cybersecurity framework. In this section presents 
some of the common Cybersecurity frameworks. 
2.5.1 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) guide 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has published guide to developing a 
national cybersecurity strategy. The guide aimed to enhance security and assurance in cyber 
space. In addition, to build confidence and trust that critical information infrastructure would 
work dependably and continue to sustain national welfares even when under attack (ITU 
2018b). According to ITU (2018b) the guide is built on five strategic pillars, the first three, 
i.e. legal framework, technical measures, and organizational structures need to be undertaken 
at national and regional levels but also harmonized at the international level. The last two 
pillars, e.g. capacity building and international cooperation, crosscut in all areas. In addition 
to this and based on the GCA, the ITU developed a National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide 
which provides a holistic view of the Cybersecurity. 
46 
 
This guide focuses on the strategic pillars that typically assist nations to create coherent 
national and globally companionable programs for protecting critical infrastructure against 
cyber threats (Segura-Serrano 2015; ITU 2018b). 
2.5.2 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proposes a National Cybersecurity 
Framework Manual in 2012 to address national Cybersecurity in NATO Member States or 
NATO partner countries. This framework, according to Klimburg (2012), will serve as a 
guide to develop, improve or confirm national policies, laws and regulations, decision-
making processes and other aspects relevant to national cybersecurity. Furthermore, the 
manual has three pillars (Dimensions, Mandates and Dilemmas), that should be considered in 
developing a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS). Three Dimensions of NCS; a Whole of 
Government approach (Governmental), a Whole of System approach for improving 
international and national coordination (International), and a Whole of Nation approach for 
cooperating with non-state actors (National).  
Five mandates that should be considered also in the 5th Domain cyberspace are: Military 
Cyber, Counter Cyber-Crime, Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and National Crisis Management, and Cyber Diplomacy and Internet Governance 
(Klimburg 2012). Moreover, the Five Dilemmas that try to control costs and benefits that will 
have consequences on inhabitant freedoms, economic development (Sabillon et al. 2016). 
Klimburg (2012) states that, the framework provides the elements of the six Cybersecurity 





Figure  2.3 the Five Mandates and the Six Elements of the Cybersecurity Incident Cycle 
(Klimburg 2012)  
2.5.3 The European Union (EU) Guide      
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) had created a 
practical guide on national Cybersecurity strategies (NCSS) and updated it in 2016, to 
support Europe Member States in developing robust national cyber resilience capability. 
Additionally, ENISA had created an Evaluation Framework in 2014 to provide guidance and 
practical tools to the Member States for evaluating their NCSS (ENISA 2016). According to 
ENISA (2016), the aim of the present good practice guide is to provide a comprehensive 
overview of different steps and objectives in order to develop and implement NCSS. 
Klimburg (2012) says that this guide indicates that Cybersecurity actions should extend 
across three key pillars, e.g. Network and Information Security (NIS), law enforcement, 
information and defence. The NIS directive has been adapted by the European Parliament, to 
ensure a high-level of network and information security across the Union, by pushing 
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member states to have a proper CSIRT, as well as a capable national network and information 
systems authority (Matania et al. 2017). In addition, the EU organised the level of 
coordination among different EU and National agencies to respond and prevent cyber threats 
based on Cybersecurity, law enforcement and defence divisions as shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure  2.4 Coordination between EU and National Agencies (Sabillon et al. 2016) 
2.5.4 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guide 
This guide was released in 2015 by (OECD) to provide guidance for creating a national 
strategy to manage digital security risk and enhance the economic and social benefits 
anticipated from digital realm (OECD 2015). According to OECD (2015), this guide 
recommends that cyber risks should not be treated as technical problems, but should be 
approached as economic and social activities. In addition, this guide has put forward general 
and operational principles. The general principle focused on: Awareness, skills and 
empowerment, Stakeholders responsibility, Human Rights and fundamental values, Public 
and Private Partnership. The operational principle includes Risk assessment and treatment 
cycle, Security measure, Innovation, and Preparedness and continuity. Additionally, this 
guide encourages governments to include crucial elements in implementing the national 
Cybersecurity strategy. These measures include the previous principles and create a national 
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Computer Security Incident Emergency Response Team (CSIRT), implementing a 
comprehensive framework to tackle cybercrime, and Strengthen international co-operation 
and mutual assistance (OECD 2015). 
2.7.5 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework  
In February 2013, US president Obama issued an executive order which required the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a non-regulatory agency of the Department of 
Commerce, to develop a "Cybersecurity framework" to identify and mitigate cyber risks that 
could possibly affect national and economic security (Obama 2013). According to Segura 
Serrano (2015) the order takes a holistic approach that is meant to address the three main 
areas of concern: information sharing, a risk-based framework of core practices based on 
existing standards, and privacy protections. 
In February 2014, the NIST put out its Cyberseurity framework, titled "Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” as the result of a collaborative process 
between the government and the private sector (Shackelford et al. 2015). According to NIST 
(2014a) the Framework consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile, 
and the Framework Implementation Tiers as shown in Figure 2.5. The Framework Core is a 
set of communal cybersecurity performances and anticipated results, and involves five 
simultaneous and continuous tasks, e.g. identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. After 
assessment, these functions provide a sophisticated, strategic vision of business requirements, 
risk tolerance, and resources. The framework implementation tiers evaluate the extent of 
which an entity's Cybersecurity risk management practices display the features defined in the 




Figure  2.5 (NIST) Cybersecurity framework (NIST 2014a) 
2.5.6 Microsoft Approach for Developing a National Cybersecurity Strategy  
Microsoft has published a set of recommendations that support governments on developing a 
national Cybersecurity and handling cyber threats on national critical infrastructures 
(Goodwin and Nicholas 2013). Microsoft recommends six foundational principles as the 
basis for a national Cybersecurity strategy. It must be: Risk-based, Outcome-focused, 
Prioritised, Practicable, Respectful of privacy and civil liberties, and globally relevant. 
Goodwin and Nicholas (2013) said that, Microsoft approach recommends thinking 
holistically and realistically about dangers and threats to a nation and set up strong practices 
to prevent, detect, contain, and recover from an incident. The approach also suggests creating 
a clear role for national CERT, as well as raising public awareness and public-private 
partnership. 
2.5.7 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO 27032:2012) Guidance 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) provides technical guidance for 
tackle well-known Cybersecurity risks, including: social engineering attacks, hacking, 
malware proliferation, spyware and unwanted software Furthermore, the guide includes 
controls for addressing these risks like preparing for attacks, detecting and monitoring, and 
responding to cyber-attacks. The Standard also provides an explanation of stakeholders’ 
definitions and their roles in Cybersecurity. Moreover, this International Standard also 
delivers a framework for information sharing, coordination and incident handling (ISO 2012). 
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2.5.9 Primarily Attributes of Global Selected Frameworks 
The previously discussed Global Selected frameworks are each generally concerned with 
developing a Cybersecurity framework, nevertheless individual approaches, strategies and 
focuses chosen for the development of such frameworks vary. This section is going to 
highlight the main differences. The ITU Global Security framework attempts to strengthen 
Cybersecurity through engaging its five pillars that operate on three levels: international, 
national and regional. This framework not only does improve security but also build 
confidence and trust in order to sustain national welfares even when under attack. The main 
focus is global domain and the global cyberspace protection. On the other hand, National 
Cybersecurity Framework Manual works as a guide for NATO member states in order to 
strengthen and improve the national policies, law and regulations that are related to national 
Cybersecurity. It was introduced in 2012 and operates on international and national level with 
the main emphasis on the national coordination and policies. Another framework is the 
European Union Guide which was created in 2014 and revised in 2016 and whose aim is to 
provide assistance and a guide to help EU member states to assess their national 
Cybersecurity space security and finds solutions for improvements of individual tools in 
individual states. Additionally, OECD guide was published 2015 and its main target is to 
establish national strategy in order to eliminate digital security risk. The guide suggests that 
cyber risks should be managed through economic and social activities, and not treated as 
technical problems. NIST Cybersecurity Framework was developed in 2013 in the United 
States and is primarily concerned with managing and mitigating cyber risks that could affect 
national and economic security and how individual cyber risks should be identifies, 
approached and dealt with. In 2013, Microsoft published guidelines that instruct governments 
how to develop and strengthen national Cybersecurity. Microsoft suggests that Cybersecurity 
should be approached holistically and nations should be prepared to prevent, detect, contain 
and recover from an accident. With the main focus on the national level, Microsoft believes 
that public should be aware and prepared to stand up to cyber risks. Lastly, ISO created a 
framework focussing on the international level and raises the awareness and encourages 
nations to be prepared to fights various types of cybercrime. Despite the various perspectives 
and contexts for the frameworks there are similarities shared across the frameworks (Azmi et 
al. 2018). Some of these include criteria such as, involving as many stakeholders as possible 
and centralising competence (Inclusive), promoting Fundamental of Human Rights by 
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recognising current International Standards, Protocols and Interoperability (Coherent). The 
framework should include Domestic and International Tools such as Budapest Convention to 
enhance international cooperation in tackling cybercrime. Moreover, these frameworks 
encourage states and organisations to develop cyber culture programmes and adopt risk based 
approaches in their national cybersecurity capabilities (Klimburg 2012; ENISA 2016; ITU 
2018b). These shared criteria and others are used to evaluate the proposed framework in this 
study.  
2.6 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models (CCMMs)   
Increased attention to the potential risks and threats of cyber space to the national critical 
infrastructure, has created a high demand to assess and report on the readiness of the 
organisations and countries using the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models (CCMMs) 
(Miron and Muita 2014). The CCMMs deliver the stages for an evolutionary pathway to 
developing strategies and policies for the security and reporting of cybersecurity readiness of 
critical infrastructure. This section explores main attributes of the common existing CCMMs 
which has been designed and used in different organisations and nations. These CCMMs 
models such as, the International Organization for Standardization's Systems Security 
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE- CCMM), the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity framework the U.S. Department of Energy’s 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2). 
2.6.1 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2)  
The C2M2 has been designed by the Department of Energy’s in the U.S. to analyse and 
improve organisation Cybersecurity programs (DOE 2014). This model according to the U.S. 
Department of Energy, enables the organisations to; define its current state, determine its 
future, more mature state and identify the capabilities it must attain to reach that future state. 
The said model has 10 domains consist of a structured set of Cybersecurity practices. These 
domains include: Risk Management, Asset Change and Configuration Management, Identify 
and Access Management, Threat and Vulnerability Management, Situational Awareness, 
Information Sharing, Event and Incident Response, Supply Chain and Eternal Dependencies 
Management, Workforce Management, and Cybersecurity Program Management. In addition, 
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the model has four maturity indicator levels (MILs), MIL0 through MIL3 that applied 
individually to each domain. 
2.6.3 Cyber Resilience Review (CRR) Assessment Model   
The CRR is an assessment technique that was moulded by the Department of National 
Security (DHS) for the purpose of evaluating the cybersecurity and resilience of critical 
infrastructure owners and operators (US-CERT 2016). This model is based on the Cyber 
Resilience Evaluation Method and the CERT -Resilience Management Model (CERT- 
RMM), both has been developed at Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering 
Institute. The CRR contains ten domains of practices that represent vital capabilities that 
contribute to the cyber resilience of the institution. These domains are: Asset Management, 
Controls Management, Configuration and Change Management, Vulnerability Management, 
Incident Management, Service Continuity Management, Risk Management, External 
Dependencies Management, Training and Awareness and Situational Awareness. For each 
domain a set of goals and linked practice questions, and a standard set of maturity indicator 
level questions look at the institutionalisation of practices contained by an organisation. 
These domains are scored on a six levels (Incomplete, Performed, Planned, Managed, 
Measured, Defined) (US-CERT 2016). This model helps organisations to recognise their 
Cybersecurity posture and measure their development in improving cyber resilience. 
2.6.4 Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations   
The Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CCMM) has been developed by 
Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre in the University of Oxford through collaboration with 
international stakeholders. These include the Organization of American States (OAS), World 
Bank, Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation (CTO) and the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU)(GCSCC 2017). According to GCSCC (2017), this model is 
an academic politically neutral expertise offering a comprehensive analysis of cybersecurity 
capacity through five different dimensions: 
• Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy 
• Cyber Culture and Society. 
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• Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills. 
• Legal and Regulatory Frameworks. 
• Standards, Organisations, and Technologies. 
Each dimension has a multiple factors and attributes, with significant aspect for capacity 
building within each dimension. In each factor, there are five stages of maturity, where the 
lowest indicator would imply a non-existent or inadequate level of capacity, and the highest 
level both a strategic approach and an ability dynamically to enhance against environmental 
considerations (operational, threat, socio-technical and political) (GCSCC 2017). According 
to CCMM the five levels of maturity are: 
1- Start-up: this level shows that either nothing exists, or it is very embryonic in nature. 
2- Formative: in this level indicate that some features are formulated but poorly 
defined. 
3- Established: at this level the element of sub-factors are in place, and defined. 
4- Strategic: in this level the selections of which parts of indictors are vital or less 
important, have been made for particular institution / nation based on certain 
conditions. 
5- Dynamic: At the Dynamic level, there are clear mechanisms in place to modify 
strategy subject to the prevailing circumstance 
This model has been deployed to review cybersecurity capacity in over 40 countries 
including UK, Kosovo, Bhutan, Uganda, Senegal and Indonesia (GCSCC 2017).  
2.7 National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCSs) Case Studies   
In this section, a review of selected national Cybersecurity strategies and policies of the UK, 
Egypt, and Turkey was performed. These countries were chosen as they have different views 
of creating Cybersecurity strategies and frameworks. Furthermore, all selected countries are 
members of The International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The ITU has developed the 
National Cybersecurity Guide that addresses security challenges facing the digital world and 
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is accepted by the majority of countries. In addition, some selected Islamic countries (Egypt 
and Turkey) sharing the same cultural and religious values as Spring Land. On the other 
hand, the UK has been chosen as it has ranked fifth in a global survey ranking of 
Cybersecurity development (Mack 2010). Moreover, according to Archick et al. (2006) 
Spring Land governments made a few agreements with Great Britain since 2012 for 
developing the communications infrastructure in Spring Land. The two governments agreed 
that Spring Land should accept the model of E-government of Great Britain, which contains 
three main points: Information and Communication Technology (ICT), ICT applications, 
particularly E-government, E-commerce and E-learning, and Regulatory framework. 
2.7.1 The United Kingdom (UK) Cybersecurity Strategy  
The UK Cybersecurity Strategy 2016-2021 focuses on keeping the nation safe and delivering 
a competent government. It has the vision that by 2021 the UK will be secure and resilient to 
cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world. Three main objectives were 
indicated in the strategy (Defend, Deter, and Develop). Defend the UK against cyber threats 
and respond effectively to any cyber incidents, to ensure the UK infrastructure networks and 
information systems are fully protected and resistant to any cyber-attacks. Deter aims to 
make the UK government a hard target for attacks. It also seeks to detect, understand, 
investigate and disrupt any hostile actions in cyberspace against the UK. Furthermore, the 
government will reinforce the national cyber offensive capabilities in virtual space. The 
Develop objective aims to build essential knowledge and skills in a growing UK 
Cybersecurity industry. It correspondingly supports IT training and education on 
Cybersecurity in schools and other learning institutions. All previous objectives are 
reinforced by international action and investing in partnerships that shape the global 
evolution of cyberspace in a manner that advances economic and security interests (Heath 
Kelly 2013). 
2.7.2 Egypt Cybersecurity Strategy       
The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) of Egypt has released 
the Egyptian National ICT Strategy for 2012-2017 (MCIT 2013). According to MCIT, the 
strategy focused on develop an appropriate legislative and regulation framework for 
cybersecurity with the participation of the private and public sectors; enhance confidence in 
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online services; build human capacity program; raising awareness and promote cooperation 
with other countries and international organisations. 
2.7.3 Turkey Cybersecurity Strategy     
Turkey in its 2016-2019 National Cybersecurity action plan has focused on two key 
objectives (MTMC 2016). First, secure cyber space is a part of national security. Second, 
getting the capability that will allow taking organisational and technological protection 
measures for sustaining the absolute security of all critical infrastructures in national cyber 
space. In addition, it provides the action plan to achieve these objectives such as; ensuring the 
security, confidentiality and privacy of all e-services, enhance national incident response, 
domestically developing critical technologies and products for assuring Cybersecurity. Yet, 
the action plan targeted to cover all technical dimensions, an integrated approach including 
legal, organisational, economic, political and social dimensions. 
2.7.4 Primarily Attributes of Reviewed NCSs Case Studies   
The output of this analysis presents that the content of the national cyber strategy differs 
broadly. Despite of common cyber threats affects these nations, each of them has a different 
approach to minimise and prevent cyber threats. For instance, the UK cybersecurity strategy 
considered cyber-attacks as a Tier one threat to the national security and Turkey identified 
cybersecurity as a part of national security. Meanwhile, Egypt considered cybersecurity 
strategy as a part of the National ICT Strategy for 2012 – 2017. Each country has a paradigm 
of the strategy based on specific needs linked to protection of national infrastructure. These 
strategies comprehensively address national issues related to cybersecurity such as the public 
and private partnership, develop cybersecurity defence capability, capacity building; legal 
and regulation frameworks, cyber resilience, stockholders involves, cyber awareness 
program, international cooperation and cyber intelligence gathering. As such, safeguarding 
cyberspace is a main concern today for every country. Thus, Spring Land, which is gradually 
providing e- services, needs a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework to 
address the challenges of cyber threats. 
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2.8 Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) Dimensions from World 
Perspective  
Cyberspace has become an essential part of the development of any country. A robust 
cybersecurity capacity is vital for states to progress and develop in economic, political and 
social spheres (Muller 2015; Pawlak 2016). Capacity according to Goodman et al. (1998) is 
“the  ability  to  carry  out  stated objectives”. Capacity is supposed to develop in “stages of 
readiness” which indicate improvements or decline (Goodman et al. 1998; Mackay and 
Horton 2002; LaFond and Brown 2003)  
Capacity building is commonly viewed as a mechanism to bridge the gap between the 
problems of poor governance and what is considered to be an adequate level of state capacity 
to deliver its main functions (Beesley and Shebby 2010; Pawlak 2016). Generally, capacity 
building is a process or activity that improves the ability of a person or organisations to 
“carry out stated objectives” (Goodman et al. 1998; LaFond and Brown 2003). Capacity 
building is influenced directly and indirectly by contextual factors or elements of the external 
environment. Contextual influences include cultural, social, economic, political, legal, and 
environmental variables.   The  impact   of these factors may be critical to the success of 
capacity building, nevertheless they are often difficult to control or measure (Mackay and 
Horton 2002; LaFond and Brown 2003).  
Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) viewed as a way to achieve developmental goals by 
reducing cybersecurity risks (Hohmann et al. 2017). CCB is also considered as a 
transformation process and ‘dynamic field’ since it is connected to technological, political 
and social developments, which are constantly growing (Bellasio et al. 2018). Transformation 
is considered the main component of capacity building (United-Nations 2018). Through 
transformations, countries can invent, develop, and maintain institutions and organizations 
that are capable of contributing to the development of capacity building. Capacity building is 
not a matter of “one-time effort to improve short-term effectiveness”, but rather a continuous 
improvement strategy (Hohmann et al. 2017). 
Governments, international organisations, and non-state actors all recognise that CCB is 
crucial to mitigating the negative cross-border externalities of increasing connectivity and 
maximizing the benefits of cyberspace (Hohmann et al. 2017). However, national and 
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international organisations as well as academics have developed a multiplicity of guidelines 
and frameworks of CCB to reduce and handle the risks of cyber threats. States such as the 
UK, Netherlands, or the US, international and regional organisations including the OAS, 
ITU, and the EU and other actors like Oxford University or Microsoft are slowly lending 
support and resources to building capacity. For some, CCB has even become a tool for 
foreign policy as a means to advocate for a particular model of internet governance, create 
market access for domestic companies, or promote specific technical standards. This section 
provides an offer view of existing global frameworks that used to measure CCB efforts and 
initiatives for countries. The organisational models are out of scope in this section as it 
focuses on institutional levels not on national level. 
2.8.1 Global Indices Models of Cybersecurity Capacity Building  
Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) models purposed to provide states with theoretical 
and practical support that help to categorise the cybersecurity requirements, as well as the 
opportunities for action in each country (Hohmann et al. 2017). These models provide a 
benchmark for states to enable them to identify where they are along that path. Numerous 
frameworks and models have been developed worldwide. Yet, it is worth to take into 
account, that there is not a perfect and unique model that has been developed or that has been 
recognized as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution that is able to afford an all-in solution to 
cybersecurity issues (Pawlak 2014). According to Pawlak (2014), each model considers each 
state’s specific requirements and resources although taking into consideration the different 
cultural, political and social environments. These models look at, among others, policy and 
regulatory aspects, organisational measures, national strategies, and cooperative efforts. 
Some frameworks simply compare and contrast measures amongst countries, while others 
provide an index scoring based on indicators. Others provide rankings based on the scoring. 
All offer valuable information on cybersecurity practices and gaps at the nation state level 
(ITU 2017b). Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) is complex and challenging 
(Trimintzios 2017).  
Table (2.1) presents different metrics, areas of focus, research method, number of countries 
and contents of global CCB models. The formation of such models is beneficial for countries 
to assess and scale the maturity of their cybersecurity capacity, empowering decision makers 
to identify future priorities (Pawlak 2014; Hohmann et al. 2017). According to Muller (2015), 
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existing models and assessments of CCB are successful in evaluating national levels of CCB 
in individual countries, however the ability to aid countries in how to improve their cyber 
capacities is still lacking. Developing Countries especially countries in transitional stage will 
need to deal with challenges in all types of activities connected to CCB from human resource 
development, institutional reform, organizational adaptions, to the support provided to 
increase their access to, and ability to benefit fully from, the Internet and other elements of 
cyberspace (Muller 2015). 
These frameworks and approaches indicate that there are five main pillars that build 
cybersecurity capabilities and capacity: human, organisational, infrastructure, technology, 
law and regulation (Azmi et al. 2018). CCB aims to help states to escalate their access and 
ability to benefit from cyberspace and advanced technology. CCB includes progress in 
technical, political and legal frameworks. For instance, technical improvement can be 
achieved by building national incident response capabilities. Political progress is achieved 
through cybersecurity policies and strategies. Legal progress is achieved through effective 
legislation that addresses “the issues that affect the order and good governance” (Hohmann et 
al. 2017). These models to date have not managed to cover CCB as a whole on a global scale 
or else they argue for CCB, but without indicating how to go about implementing it (Muller 
2015). Some approaches set out a scope that is either too broad or too narrow, while others 
focus on different ways of highlighting the problems that come with increased access to 














Secondary data based on data 
provided by the (ITU). A set of 11 
indicators has been produced and 
each state’s level of cyber maturity 
has been measured against the 
benchmark provided with each 
indicator. 
The index is focused on Cyber Maturity of 
countries in five topics governance; financial 
cybercrime enforcement; military application; 
digital economy and business; and social 
engagement. 
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National Cybersecurity Index 
(NCSI), developed by Estonian 
e-Governance Academy & 
Estonian Foreign Ministry. 
(https://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index)  
Data is collected using both primary 
& secondary sources. The NCSI has 
organised into 3 categories, 12 
capacities and 46 indicators. 
The index measures the preparedness of 
countries to prevent cyber threats and manage 
cyber incidents. The NCSI focuses on 
measurable aspects of cybersecurity 
implemented by the central government: 
Legislation in force, Established units such as 
existing organisations, Cooperation, and 
Outcomes such as policies, exercises, 
technologies. 
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A total of 194 countries have been 
analysed, 135 of which have been 
subjected to both primary and 
secondary research and only 59 a 
subject of secondary research. The 
index has 25 main indicators 
The index aims to provide insight into the 
cybersecurity engagement of sovereign nation 
states. Rooted in the ITU’s Global 
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA), the GCI looks 
at the level of commitment in five strategic 







ybersecurity/Pages/gca.aspx)  Capacity building and Cooperation measures 
Cyber Readiness Index (CRI 
2). The CRI 2.0 is developed 
by the Potomac Institute for 
Policy Studies.  
(https://potomacinstitute.org/i
mages/CRIndex2.0.pdf)  
Data is collected using both primary 
& secondary sources. The CRI 2.0 
blueprint identifies over seventy 
unique data indicators across seven 
essential features 
The CR 2.0 aims to evaluate nation state’s 
cyber maturity as well as their overall 
commitment to cyber issues. The index is 
mainly focused on national strategy, incident 
response, e-crime and law enforcement, 
information sharing, investment in R&D, 
diplomacy and trade, and defense and crisis 
response. 
125 country  Score 
Asia-Pacific Cybersecurity 
Dashboard. The Dashboard is a 
publication developed by BSA 




This study is based on an assessment 
of 31 criteria across six themes. Each 
criteria is given a “Yes,” “No,” 
“Partial,” or “Not Applicable” status. 
The data is collected using a desk- 
technique based on publicly available 
information, and did not involve 
direct interviews with national 
agencies.  
Dashboard examines the cybersecurity policy 
environment with a focus on five key areas: 
Legal foundations for cybersecurity; 
Operational capabilities; Public-private 
partnerships; Sector-specific cybersecurity 
plans and Education. The aim of this 
cybersecurity dashboard is to provide a 
reference base, which allows the evolution of 
countries’ cybersecurity policies by comparing 








Cyber Power Index and is 
developed jointly by the 
Economist’s Intelligence Unit 
and sponsored by Booz Allen 
Hamilton.  
The data is collected using secondary 
sources. in the index are: the 
Economist Intelligence Unit; the UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO); the 
International Telecommunications 
The goal of the index is to benchmark the 
ability of the G20 countries to withstand 
cyber-attacks and to deploy the digital 
infrastructure needed for a productive and 
secure economy. The index consists of four 
categories and 39 sub-indicators. These 
19 countries 
of the Group 











Union (ITU); and the World Bank.  categories are Legal and Regulatory 
Framework; Economic and Social Context; 
Technology Infrastructure; and Industry 
Application  
CyberGreen Index Version 2.0. 
The index is developed by 
Cyber Green Initiative 
supported by JPCertCC, CSA 






The index is based on open source 
intelligence (secondary data) 
collection then put into the Collective 
intelligence Framework (CIF) and 
stored in an elastic search database.  
The CyberGreen project seeks to collect and 
present comprehensive data on infections or 
vulnerable systems on the Internet, measure it 
based on six metrics, visualise it, and re-
distribute it to countries, CERTs, or ISPs. The 
index focused on helping to improve the health 
of the global Cyber Ecosystem. The v2.0 
CyberGreen Index equates risk to others to the 
size of unmet mitigation tasks required to zero 
the country’s, the AS’s, or the alternate 
entity’s risk to others. 
145 countries Rank and Score 
Table  2.1 Global CCB models (ITU 2017b)
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The Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) at Oxford University has taken a 
step towards closing the gaps between the works of these organisations, with the 
foundation of the Cyber Security Capacity Maturity Model (CCMM)  (Muller 2015; 
GCSCC 2017). This model has been developed through collaboration with international 
stakeholders, this academic model is politically neutral, offering a comprehensive 
analysis of CCB through five different dimensions: (i) Cybersecurity Policy and 
Strategy; (ii) Cyber Culture and Society; (iii) Cybersecurity Education, Training, and 
Skills; (iv) Legal and Regulatory Frameworks; and (v) Standards, Organisations, and 
Technologies. Each dimension includes multiple factors and attributes, each making a 
significant contribution to CCB.  
Alongside with these concepts Pawlak (2014) proposing some principles, which bring 
an overview of how CCB should be understood (Hameed et al. 2018). These principles 
include:  
• Increase education and awareness across all government sectors by establishing 
Cyber knowledge agency. 
• Principles-based CCB models, principle-based approach solutions, and best 
practices. 
• Closing the ’cyber capacity gap’ developed vs developing countries. 
• Identify substantial overlaps or gaps by conducting continuous mapping of 
CCB activities. 
• Enhance Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), forensics 
capabilities, law enforcement capacity and strategies. 
• Consider human rights 
•  Seek advice from regional and global champions who are mature and willing 
to engage. 
These principles are important to perceive how the countries in a transitional stage are 
understanding, approaching CCB and how these principles are manipulating CCB 
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models as will be studied later in this study. Since this study is aiming to assess and 
contextualise the problem space of cybersecurity capacity in counties that are in a 
transitional phase based on five areas: Organisational, Technical, Legal, Cultural, and 
Education. Based on the given criteria, the applicable models for measurements were 
the GCI index and the CCMM (GCSCC 2017; ITU 2018a). 
The GCI index examines levels of commitment on five distinct pillars (ITU 2017a, 
2018a): 1. Legal. 2. Technical. 3. Organisational. 4. Capacity building, and 5. 
Cooperation. The index applying different mechanisms for assesses cyber maturity to 
derive rankings and scores that empower comparisons between states and regions. In 
this study, direct one-to-one mapping between the CCMM Dimensions and the GCI 
Areas, such as in the areas of strategy, legal and technical, there are GCI pillars such as 
Capacity Building and Cooperation that cut across all CCMM Dimensions. This 
mapping is adapted from analysing trends and success factors of international 
cybersecurity capacity building initiatives study by Hameed et al. (2018). The study 
shows that, the results of mapping CCB to the CCMM AND GCI. The gathered CCB 
initiatives, it noticeably reveals that about half of the initiatives 47% are geared towards 
the first dimension of the CCMM model, Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy; followed 
by the fourth dimension: Legal and Regulatory Frameworks 33%. The third dimension: 
Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills concerns 14% of the initiatives, followed 
by the fifth dimension: Standards, Organisations, and Technologies with 7%, and lastly 
the lowest number of initiatives are focused on the second dimension Cyber Culture and 
Society 7% (Hameed et al. 2018). Table (2.2) the results of mapping CCMM dimension 
with GCI pillars.  
The reason for mapping the CCMM dimensions with ITU GCI Pillars is to validate and 
verify the results of focus group discussion in Chapter 5. The GCI reports 2017and 
2018  (ITU 2017a, 2018a) along with other official government or ministry websites 
will provide further information used to define the particular stages of maturity for each 





CCMM Dimensions ITU GCI Pillars 







Cyber Culture and Society - 
Cybersecurity Education, Training and 
Skills Capacity building 
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks Legal  
Standards, Organizations, and Technologies Technical 
Table  2.2 mapping CCMM dimension with GCI pillars. 
2.8.2 Dimensions of Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB)  
This section presents an overview on dimensions of cybersecurity capacity building. 
These dimensions are chosen based on main pillars of ITU GCI and the CCMM that 
build cybersecurity capabilities: human capacity, strategies and organisational, 
infrastructure protection, technology, law and regulation. 
2.8.2.1 Cybersecurity Strategies  
Over the past decade, national regimes have been developing national cybersecurity 
strategies (NCS) to address emerging threats associated with the rapidly expanding use 
of ICT. These cybersecurity issues have evolved into significant national-level problems 
that require government consideration, including the protection of assets, systems, and 
networks vital to the operation and stability of a nation, and the livelihood of its people. 
Threats against these critical resources target corporations and citizens and include 
cybercrime such as identity theft and fraud, politically motivated -hacktivism, and 
sophisticated economic and military espionage (Goodwin and Nicholas 2013; Asadli 
2018). 
In many countries, NCS has become a priority supported by stronger leadership and 
establishment of a National Council for Cybersecurity with a clear mandate, appropriate 
statutory powers, and an organisational structure is required (Goodwin and Nicholas 
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2013; GCSCC 2017). The rationale for creating the council is to perform a crucial 
function in coordinating across different organisations in the public and private sectors. 
Also, forming a strong leadership role at the highest level contributes to recognition of 
the NCS. Many countries around the world have established, or are looking to establish, 
agencies or other administrative bodies to manage their cybersecurity strategy . For 
instance, the organisational structure in France is highly centralised and is consistent 
with France’s wider political structure. Meanwhile, in Finland the organisational 
structure reflects the existing separation of duties between the authorities .  From 
orgnistational prespective, Microsoft has accumulated a set of good practices for 
structuring and organising an authority. Based on Microsoft an ideal national 
cybersecurity agency would be composed of five component parts includes: Policy and 
planning unit; Regulatory unit; Outreach and partnership unit; Communications unit; 
Operations unit / Computer emergency response team (Paul Nicholas and Kaja Ciglic 
2017).  
To some extent, the national cybersecurity council will be expected to steer a complex 
environment that spans other government sectors, national legislatures, established 
regulatory authorities, civil society groups, public and private sector organisations, and 
international partners. It is therefore important that all stakeholders have a clear 
expectation of what the mandate of the national cybersecurity agency is, so they know 
what to expect and who to talk to. It is also critical that the responsibilities of the 
national cybersecurity agency are distinct from those of other governmental groups 
involved in cybersecurity (Paul Nicholas and Kaja Ciglic 2017; ITU 2018b).  
The roles and responsibilities can be defined using an assignment chart such as the 
RACI matrix that maps out every task, and assigns roles are responsible for each action 
item, the personnel who are Accountable, and, who needs to be Consulted or Informed 
(CTO 2015). This matrix can be used with the Enterprise governance of IT, as defined 
through COBIT 5. Another asspect related to develop NCS is human capital. The 
rational for develop a human capital is to close the cybersecurity skills gap and 
strengthening cybersecurity skills and competences in the state. According to Evans and 
Reeder (2010), a critical element of a robust cybersecurity framework is having the right 
people at every level to identify, build and staff the defenses and responses. The 
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shortage of cybersecurity professionals to address this risk, and a lack of education 
programs to train these professionals, has led to a human capital crisis in cybersecurity 
(Evans and Reeder 2010, p.1).  
Many states around the world have instituted initiatives for determining the combined 
necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) of cybersecurity such as cybersecurity 
competency program. Competency is defined by Draganidis and Mentzas (2006, p.52) 
as: “a specific, identifiable, definable, and measurable knowledge, skill, ability and/or 
other deployment-related characteristic (e.g. attitude, behaviour, physical ability) which 
a human resource may possess and which is necessary for, or material to, the 
performance of an activity within a specific business context”. The term KSAs covers 
all possible knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform a specific job function. 
KSAs are also directly linked to specific actions that are required to complete job tasks 
(Baranowski and Anderson 2005; Baker 2013).  
In the extent of cybersecurity, the most relevant effort in this direction was put in 
practice by the US government that through the National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Education (NICE) and the Department of Labor (DOL) developed standardized 
professional requirements for cybersecurity (Newhouse et al. 2017). The NICE 
suggested a National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, that defines seven groups of 
typical job duties, covering cybersecurity work in 31 speciality areas across industries, 
organizations, and job types as shown in Figure 2.6. For each of such areas, the 
Framework clearly identifies knowledge, skills, and abilities that professionals must 
demonstrate to perform their job tasks effectively. The seven categories, that correspond 
to typical cybersecurity professional positions, are the following: 
• Securely provision : responsible for conceptualizing, designing, and building 
secure IT systems. 
• Operate and maintain : responsible for providing support, administration and 
maintenance necessary to make IT systems secure without affecting 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
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• Protect and defend: responsible for identification, analysis, and mitigation of 
threats internal to IT systems or networks. 
• Investigate: responsible for investigation of IT systems and networks aimed at 
identifying suspect events, potential crimes and digital evidences. 
• Collect and operate : responsible of specialized denial and deception operations 
and collection of cyber security information that may turn useful to develop 
intelligence. 
• Analyse : responsible for highly specialized review and evaluation of incoming 
cyber security information to determine its usefulness for intelligence. 
• Oversee and Govern: responsible of providing leadership, management, 
direction, and development needed to allow individuals and organisations to 
effectively conduct cybersecurity work. 
For instance, to build skills required in this dimension, the Oversee and Govern 
category is used (NICE 2016). This category provides details about the knowledge, 
skills and abilities that needed to manage cybersecurity. These knowledges such as; 
Knowledge of cyber threats and vulnerabilities; Knowledge of cybersecurity and 
privacy principles used to manage risks related to the use, processing, storage, and 





Figure  2.6 NICE Cybersecurity Competency Model (NICE 2016) 
The skills required such as; creating policies that reflect system security objectives; 
Skill in determining how a security system should work (including its resilience and 
dependability capabilities) and how changes in conditions, operations, or the 
environment will affect these outcomes. The abilities for example; ability to identify 
critical infrastructure systems with information communication technology that were 
designed without system security considerations; ability to integrate information 
security requirements into the acquisition process; using applicable baseline security 
controls as one of the sources for security requirements; ensuring a robust software 
quality control process; and establishing multiple sources (e.g., delivery routes, for 
critical system elements). 
To develop NCS, guiding principles are used to guide the preparation and enforcement 
of cybersecurity policies. Many existing frameworks such as ITU, ENISA, Microsoft 
and Commonwealth approach  (Goodwin and Nicholas 2013; CTO 2015; ENISA 2016; 
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ITU 2018b) provides principles, which taken together in the development of NCS. 
These guiding principles are; 
•  Risk-based. Assess risk by identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences, then manage it through mitigations, controls, costs, and similar 
measures; 
• Outcome-focused. Focus on the desired end state, rather than prescribing the 
means to achieve it, and measure progress towards that end state; 
• Prioritised. Adopt a graduated approach to criticality, recognizing that 
disruption or failure are not equal among critical assets or across critical 
sectors; 
• Practicable. Optimise for adoption by the largest possible group of critical 
assets and implementation across the broadest range of critical sectors; 
• Respectful of privacy and civil liberties. Include protections for privacy and 
civil liberties based upon the established privacy and civil liberties policies, 
practices, and frameworks; 
• Globally relevant. Integrate international standards to the maximum extent 
possible, keeping the goal of harmonization in mind wherever possible. 
• Appropriate set of policy instruments. The Strategy should utilise the most 
appropriate policy instruments available to realise each of its objectives, 
considering the country’s specific circumstances. 
2.8.2.2 Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection  
Building a risk management approach is another important factor in this dimension. 
Risk defined as “future situations or circumstances that exist outside of the control of 
the project team that will have an adverse impact on the project if they occur (Dey et al. 
2007). It is defined also as the influence of uncertainty on the attainment of goals 
(ISO31000 2009; Purdy 2010). Barata et al. (2015) provided what a definition for risk 
includes (i) when the expected outcome of an event differs from the real outcome and 
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(ii) the impact that is connected with the outcome. Furthermore, the risk is gained more 
attention in information system researches for example, in business process 
management (BPM) and enterprise modelling (Barata et al. 2015). 
The literature has discussed different stages of the risk management process. In (Guiling 
and Xiaojuan 2011; Avdoshin and Pesotskaya 2016) they mentioned that most of the 
methods of risk management divided into risk identification, risk analysis, risk planning 
or mitigation, risk monitoring and control. Boehm (1991), categorised the risk 
management process into risk identification, analysis, prioritisation and control. 
According to NIST (2014b), the risk management framework delivers a process that 
integrates security and risk management activities into the system development life 
cycle. The risk-based approach to security control selection and specification considers 
effectiveness, efficiency, and constraints due to applicable laws, directives, Executive 
Orders, policies, standards, or regulations. On the national level there are several high-
level guidance documents concerning the process of establishing a National-level Risk 
Assessment. These range from generic guidance, which applies to Risk Analysis at the 
national level, to specific guidance looking at Critical Information Infrastructures (CII) 
(ENISA 2013).  
Identify the Critical Infrastructures (CI) assets and critical National Information 
infrastructure (CNI), are crucial to develop measures and procedures for the protection 
of CNI and reduce the risk of cyberattacks. The Critical Infrastructures (CI) is a term 
used to describe assets that are essential to the functioning and security of a society and 
economy in any given nation; and Critical Information Infrastructures (CII) are IT and 
ICT systems that operate key functions of the critical infrastructure of a nation (ITU 
2018b). States addressing the topic of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) are 
sometimes hampered because of their confusion and lack of clarity about the key 
concepts, related definitions and terminology. In the CIIP area, such confusion is 
sometimes caused by the fact that a relatively small group of experts tries to convey the 
CIIP concept to government policy-makers in unnecessarily complex terminology 
(Luiijf et al. 2016). 
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According to Luiijf and Klaver (2019), most of the CI-related efforts stem from the 
national homeland security, antiterrorism and all hazard disaster approaches. In 
addition, the economic pillar responsible ministry in nations often covers the digital 
domain and cyber security policies. Societies critically depend on the proper functioning 
of the CI such as energy supply, telecommunications, financial systems, drinking water, 
and governmental services. In turn, these CI often critically depend on the proper 
functioning of CII. CII is a complex concept and includes information and 
communication technologies (ICT), and operational technologies (OT). OT is also 
known as industrial control systems and SCADA systems that monitor and control 
critical cyber-physical processes. The CII comprises (1) critical ICT infrastructures (e.g. 
mobile telephony and internet services), (2) critical ICT and OT systems that are part of 
each CI, and (3) new CII services beyond these established domains (Luiijf et al. 2016).  
CIIP is a critical component of cybersecurity systems and is most frequently stated or 
written about in relation to cybersecurity, in particular as regards National 
Cybersecurity Strategies (NCS) and National Cybersecurity Centres (NCSC) (Luiijf and 
van Schie 2017). Based on literature, four methodological methods offer a systematic 
approach to the identification process. These steps were inspired by the European 
Critical Infrastructure Directive which starts bottom-up from within a sector that 
potentially may be critical (Klaver et al. 2011; Luiijf and van Schie 2017) : 
• Apply sector-specific criteria, a first selection of CI and CI services within a 
sector can be made based on sector-specific criteria. Such criteria may be the 
market share, the transport capacity, cross-border connectivity, and supply of 
critical services to government, industry or population. This step also narrows 
down the number of potential CI operators in the case where the sector has 
multiple operators. Be aware that sector-specific criteria may be treated as 
classified information by some nations as they could reveal dependencies, 
vulnerabilities and sensitivities. This leads to a short-list of CI from which 
further deliberations are to be made. This method clearly favours objective, 
quantifiable criteria rather than subjective, qualitative criteria (Luiijf and van 
Schie 2017). Table (2.3) provides an example on how Criticality Scale for 




Criticality Scale Description 
Cat. 5 This is infrastructure the loss of which would have a catastrophic 
impact on the UK. These assets will be of unique national 
importance whose loss would have national long-term effects and 
may impact across a number of sectors. Relatively few are 
expected to meet the Cat 5 criteria. 
Cat. 4 Infrastructure of the highest importance to the sectors should fall 
within this category. The impact of loss of these assets on 
essential services would be severe and may impact provision of 
essential services across the UK or to millions of citizens. 
Cat. 3 Infrastructure of substantial importance to the sectors and the 
delivery of essential services, the loss of which could affect a 
large geographic region or many hundreds of thousands of people. 
Cat. 2 Infrastructure whose loss would have a significant impact on the 
delivery of essential services leading to loss, or disruption, of 
service to tens of thousands of people or affecting whole counties 
or equivalents. 
Cat. 1 Infrastructure whose loss could cause moderate disruption to 
service delivery, most likely on a localised basis and affecting 
thousands of citizens. 
Cat. 0 Infrastructure the impact of the loss of which would be minor (on 
national scale). 
Table  2.3 Example: Criticality Scale for national infrastructure (CabinetOffice 2010) 
• Assess criticality; this step is to assess criticality of the short-list from the 
previous step based on the nation’s CI definition. 
• Assess dependencies; this step is used to identify CI dependencies. CI sectors 




Assess crosscutting criteria; crosscutting criteria may support the criticality of certain 
infrastructure services to a nation, both under normal circumstances and during 
emergencies. Conducting risk assessment is part of risk management. The rational of 
conducting risk assessment is to identify the threats to national security on cyberspace. 
According to Dorfman (2007), a distinction is often made between risk analysis (or risk 
assessment) and risk management (i.e. the implementation of measures to address the 
risk identified, which might be to avoid, reduce, share or retain the risks). Definitions 
used in a particular risk assessment will need to take into account that, from an 
operational perspective, it may be possible to significantly reduce a risk (rendering the 
chances of it occurring infinitesimally small), but that statistically it may not be possible 
to eliminate it entirely (ENISA 2013). Risk assessments can be implemented for many 
reasons and have many purposes. The purpose of risk assessment according to 
(ISO31000 2009) is to “provide evidence-based information and analysis to make 
informed decisions on how to treat particular risks and how to select between options”.  
The use of a consistent risk assessment process allows an organisation to understand 
risk levels, compare those risks, and address those with the greatest risk first. Literature 
shows that there are some useful guidance on the practice of risk assessment in the 
context of national and international risks, but much of the of them concerns risk 
analysis in the context of organisational ICT risks, rather than national-level risk 
assessment (ENISA 2013). These guidance and standards such as; ISO 27005: 2008, 
ISO 15408: 2009 and ISO 31010:2009 (reference). In addition, some guidance was 
identified on conducting cybersecurity and CII-related Risk Assessments at the 
organisational level. As an example NIST risk assessment technique from the US 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the UK HMG Technical 
Risk Assessment IA Standard No. 1. In addition, ENISA has an extensive inventory of 
the most common Risk Analysis methods (HMG 2009; ENISA 2011; NIST 2012). 
According to ENISA (2013), in some of the countries, cyber National-level risk 
assessments sometimes sit alongside risk assessments done in other sectors. Figure (2.7) 
demonstrates the national-level structures when this is the case.  
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Figure  2.7 Risk inputs to senior decision-makers adapted from (ENISA 2013) 
Moreover, ENISA (2013) study has presented findings oh research conducted to 
identify how countries have implemented their National-level Risk Assessment, key 
challenges and lessons learned in domain of cybersecurity. Based on these findings 
ENISA have provided the possible inputs to the National-level Risk Assessment as 
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Figure  2.8 National-level Risk Assessment adapted from (ENISA 2013) 
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A list of commonly used component-driven cyber risk management and assessment 
frameworks can be found at (NCSC 2016). The list also includes a brief description, an 
overview of how they work, who should use it, and an indication of cost and 





What is it? How does it work? Who is it for? Cost and prerequisites 
ISO/IEC 
27005:2011 
An international standard 
providing guidelines for 
information risk 
management. Although it 
does outline a generic risk 
assessment process, it leaves 
the choice of that risk 
assessment technique to the 
business. 
ISO 27005 is part of the ISO 
27000 family of standards. 
The standard is not prescriptive about 
which risk management technique 
should be used. As such, this could 
encompass system-driven as well as 
component-driven techniques. 
However, ISO 27005 requires that a 
risk assessment takes into account 
threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, 
which emphasises a component-
driven approach. 
The principles of ISO 
27005 can be applied 
to a variety of types 
and sizes of 
organisation. 
Given the broad nature of the 
guidance, specialist skilled 
resources are needed to tailor 
the implementation to the 
requirements of the business. 
The cost of these resources 
should be considered along with 






The ISF's risk management 
methodology is intended to 
help organisations better 
understand and manage 
information risks. 
This approach uses a number of 
phases to identify, evaluate and treat 
risks through the analysis and 
assessment of risk components 
(threat, vulnerability and impact). 
IRAM 2 is aimed at 
organisations. 
IRAM 2 is only provided to 
members of the ISF and 
organisations will need to have 
in place information risk 
management expertise to use it 
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effectively. This should be 
factored into the cost. 
ISACA 
COBIT 5 for 
Risk 
COBIT 5 for Risk is 
provided by ISACA and 
provides guidance covering 
the governance of and 
understanding of enterprise 
IT risk. 
COBIT 5 for Risk provides risk 
management and governance 
framework in the form of principles 
and guidance. 
COBIT 5 for Risk is 
likely to suit 
organisations seeking 
to improve their 
approach to security 
risk management and 
governance 
The COBIT 5 for Risk book is 
available for purchase on the 
ISACA website. An 
organisation looking use 
COBIT 5 for Risk will also 
need to take into account any 
specialist resources necessary to 
implement its guidance and 
principles. 
 
Table  2.4 Examples of Risk Assessment and Management Methods (NCSC 2016)
79 
 
2.8.2.3 Cyber Defence and Military Capabilities   
Develop cyber defence capabilities is another important factor in the international indexes. 
With the development of the cyber as a new tool for politics, espionage and military 
activities, cybersecurity has become central topic for national and international security. The 
states addressed in this primary assessment were selected by looking at their levels of military 
spending and the degree of internet connectivity, assuming that those states with low military 
spending and little internet connectivity would be less likely to have cyber capabilities (Lewis 
and Timlin 2011). Many states has recognised that cyberspace has emerged as a war-fighting 
domain in its own right and will enhance deterrence in air, space, and cyberspace by 
improving the state's ability to attribute and defeat attacks on systems or supporting 
infrastructure (Pernik et al. 2016).  
Lewis and Timlin (2011) in their study, “Preliminary Assessment of National Doctrine and 
Organisation” identified that 33 states have included cyberwarfare in their military planning 
and organisation. These range from states with very advanced statements of doctrine and 
military organisations engaging hundreds or thousands of individuals to more basic 
preparations that incorporate cyberattack and cyberwarfare into existing capabilities for 
electronic warfare. Common elements in military doctrine include the use of cyber 
capabilities for reconnaissance, information operations, the disruption of critical networks 
and services, for “cyberattacks”, and as a complement to electronic warfare and information 
operations. Some countries include specific plans for informational and political 
operations(Lewis and Timlin 2011).  
Others tie cyberwarfare capabilities with existing electronic warfare planning. The linkages 
between electronic warfare and cyberwarfare are likely to be an area of expanded attention as 
computer networks (or their access points) become increasingly mobile and wireless. In 
addition, NATO has recognised cyberspace as a domain of military operations, with the 
Cyberspace Operations Centre as the focal point for coordinating and directing effects in 
cyberspace in the context of Alliance operations and missions (Bigelow 2019). A NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established in Tallinn in Estonia. 
Nearby, at the NATO Cyber Range in Tartu, cyber experts can develop their capabilities 
through realistic exercises. In United States, the Department of Defence (DoD) defines 
cyberspace as an operational sub-domain within the information environment, formed of 
technology infrastructures and data. The allocation of ‘domain’ status to cyberspace 
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(alongside maritime, land, air, and space) serves a bureaucratic purpose to ensure that CO 
receives sufficient financial and material support. The US has established on 1 October 2010 
and was intended to be the Army's single point of contact for external organizations regarding 
information operations and cyberspace (Bellasio et al. 2018).  
From academic literature perspective, a framework for a cyber defence doctrine has been 
developed and identifies five questions, presented in Figure 2.9 below, that should be 
considered when developing a cyber defence doctrine. Each concept builds upon the other. 
The intent is to define a single solid and comprehensive baseline framework upon which 
more complex concepts can be developed in the future. A consistent international military 
language would also assist in communication between multinational partners and the creation 
of integrated doctrine across services and nations  (Ormrod and Turnbull 2016). 
 
Figure  2.9 Basic framework for a cyber doctrine (Ormrod and Turnbull 2016) 
2.8.2.3 National Incident Response Capabilities 
Building a National Incident Response Capabilities also considered as crucial part in 
developing CCB. Launching a national cybersecurity incident management capability can be 
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an important step in managing cyber threats (Haller et al. 2010; Bellasio et al. 2018). Often, 
this capability takes the form of one or more National Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (National CSIRTs) or Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs hereinafter 
referred to collectively as CSIRTs responsible for managing incident response in the event of 
natural or man-made cyber-related disasters that affect critical services and information 
infrastructures (Demchak et al. 2015). Establish a national-level CSIRT not only from a 
technical viewpoint but also through the development of appropriate organisational and 
communication measures (Bellasio et al. 2018). According to Bellasio et al. (2018) several 
guides exist that outline activities required to establish a CSIRT such as:  
• Defining a mission (what does the CSIRT intend to do?); 
• Identifying relevant stakeholders; 
• Defining the CSIRT’s position in the wider institutional framework; 
• Defining a constituency (for whom does the CSIRT act?); 
• Establishing a CSIRT through legal frameworks; 
• Defining capabilities and services offered by the CSIRT (consistent with the 
mission); 
• Establishing an organisational structure, both internally and in relation to other 
organisations. 
The National CSIRTs and organisations like them ideally act as critical components of the 
national cybersecurity strategy (Haller et al. 2010; CTO 2015). The implementation of 
CSIRTs is considered one of the best starting points for countries in transitional stage in the 
effort to secure cyberspace. Since they collect and analyse information about computer 
security incidents on a daily basis, National CSIRTs are an excellent source of lessons 
learned and other information that can help stakeholders mitigate risk. National CSIRTs can 
also help catalyse a significant national discussion about cybersecurity and awareness by 
interacting with private and governmental sectors (Haller et al. 2010). Establishing an 
organisational structure, both internally and in relation to other organisations is vital because 
it provides clear delegation of roles and responsibilities in a CSIRT (Haller et al. 2010; 
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Bellasio et al. 2018). The following elements are recommended as a minimum initial 
structure (ENISA 2015; Bellasio et al. 2018):  
• Management: This includes strategy, budget, operational organisation, liaison and 
communication with external stakeholders, and media relations. 
•  Operations: This includes incident management and monitoring of threats. 
• IT: This includes maintenance of the IT infrastructure, and support to operations and 
research and development (R&D). 
• R&D: This includes research into developing technology, statistical analysis of 
threat and incident trends, development of systems and tools, training, and support to 
operations. 
• Support services: This includes marketing, legal support, media relations, 
administration and finance. 
The most crucial point in establishing national CSIRT is identifying relevant stakeholders 
who may both support and benefit from its existence. Most literature (Haller et al. 2010; Bada 
et al. 2014; Bellasio et al. 2018) indicates that In the case of a national CSIRT, the 
community of stakeholders engaging with it typically includes: 
• Government and government agencies 
• Law enforcement agencies 
• Defence establishment 
• Academic sector 
•  Internet service providers (ISPs) 
• Financial and other critical sectors 
• National and international organisations working groups. 
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In addition to the identifying relevant stakeholders, the capabilities and role of a national 
CSIRT should also be defined (Haller et al. 2010; Bellasio et al. 2018). According to (ENISA 
2015), these capabilities can be broken down into four categories as follows :  
• Formal capability refers to the official mandate of the CSIRT 
• Operational-technical capability refers to the technical services that the CSIRT 
provides to both external and internal organisations. 
• Operational-technical capability refers to the technical services that the CSIRT 
provides to both external and internal organisations. 
• Operational-technical capability refers to the technical services that the CSIRT 
provides to both external and internal organisations. 
Maintain trust and cooperation relationships is important factor after identify relevant 
stakeholders. On a national level, national / governmental CSIRTs cooperate with numerous 
organisations, first and foremost with their constituencies. And, depending on the country, a 
national / governmental CSIRT will also have cooperative relationships with stakeholders 
such as law enforcement agencies, the military and intelligence community, policymakers, 
other CSIRTs (ENISA 2010). According to Haller et al. (2010), by forming relationships and 
partnerships with owners and operators of national critical infrastructure and other key 
constituents, the National CSIRT gains access to information crucial to its operations. These 
relationships and partnerships are directly with the National CSIRT and among constituents. 
The National CSIRT may act as a trusted communications channel between key constituents. 
If organisations and end users do not specifically trust the CSIRT, they will not be able to 
exchange the data with the CSIRT and will not be able to access all the facilities on offer. 
Trust is important for partner organisations and the organisations themselves would want 
assurance that the CSIRT will treat confidential information safely (Bada et al. 2014). 
Define, document and operate incident response processes are main responsibility of national 
CSIRT. An incident-handling response process is a set of defined steps that a CSIRT will 
follow to successfully counter a cybersecurity incident. It is a method that is defined and 
developed independent of a specific incident, with the aim of developing a framework that 
enables a structured, coordinated, methodical and consistent approach to incident response. 
(Bellasio et al. 2018). Cyber incident response (IR) according to (NCSC 2019) is complicated 
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by two factors. Firstly, no two incidents are ever the same. Secondly, all responses require 
people, process and technical elements to work together in order to be successful. Incident-
handling response processes are regularly established at a high level, and then refined into 
more specific procedures for particular types of attack (Bellasio et al. 2018). A good example 
of an incident response process is from the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). NIST framework structures incident handling response process into four key stages 
as shown in Figure (2.10) (Cichonski et al. 2012). These processes are: 
• Preparation refers to the period before an incident occurs; 
• Detection and analysis aims to identify and understand a cyber-attack once it has 
occurred;  
• Containment, eradication and recovery refers to the period after the initial 
identification and analysis of a cyber-attack.; and 
•  Post-incident activity that involves collecting and storing information and evidence 
from the incident, and identifying lessons learned from the response in order to 
improve future incident-handling processes. 
 
Figure  2.10 NIST Incident Response Life Cycle (Cichonski et al. 2012) 
The National CSIRT / CERT will provide the most up- tools and guidance and the guidance 
they offer must be sound that demands high standards of professional competence in order to 
retain this benefit. This may lead to the CSIRT having only a small number of good quality 
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capabilities in the beginning, rather than lots of poor quality capacities (Haller et al. 2010; 
Bada et al. 2014; Bellasio et al. 2018). A variety of tasks can be needed by the CSIRT team to 
ensure that incidents are handled and organised effectively. It is crucial to insure that the 
CSIRT is equipped with an adequate number of personnel with the appropriate qualifications 
to execute its incident response functions (Haller et al. 2010; Bellasio et al. 2018).  
The set of basic skills of CSIRT staff are separated into two broad groups: personal skills and 
technical skills. The staff of the CSIRT, who are technologically skilled and have outstanding 
leadership skills, will improve the reputation of the team and increase the confidence of the 
team (both the public and those with whom the team interacts) (Bada et al. 2014; SE-Institute 
2017). The personal skills required such as, Communication skill, Ability to Follow Policies 
and Procedures, Team Skills, and Problem Solving. Meanwhile, the specific technical skills 
required by CSIRT members have been split into two categories: technical base skills and 
incident management skills (Bada et al. 2014; SE-Institute 2017). Technological foundation 
skills include a clear knowledge of the fundamental technology utilised by the CSIRT and the 
electoral district, as well as an awareness of the problems surrounding the department or part.  
Incident management capabilities require an understanding of the procedures, decision points 
and support mechanisms (software or applications) needed for the day-to-day operation of 
CSIRT operations (SE-Institute 2017). There are several frameworks developed by 
international organisations such as Cybersecurity Workforce Framework from the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States (US) Department of Commerce, 
through the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) (Newhouse et al. 2017). 
This framework can be used to map the knowledge, skills and competences required for 
different types of cybersecurity professional roles, including those pertaining to CSIRTs and 
incident response more broadly (Bellasio et al. 2018).  
2.8.2.4 Cyber Culture and Awareness  
Cybersecurity culture is referred to the beliefs, expectations, behaviours, values, opinions and 
awareness that people have about information security and how they communicate with 
technology (ENISA 2017). According to Gcaza et al. (2015), technology alone cannot be a 
shield against cyber-attacks, but humans can take centre stage across the culture of 
cybersecurity. Security of valuable information, infrastructure and individuals from cyber-
attacks has become crucial, because most countries, particularly countries in transformation 
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phases, are transforming into information societies. For these reasons, bulling cybersecurity 
culture capacity is needed among society at the individual and governmental level. A solid 
cybersecurity culture is transforming people's mind-sets and technology habits, which should 
serve as a human shield against threats without coercion (ENISA 2017). 
To improve national cybersecurity culture and awareness capacity many factors and aspect 
needs to be considered.  These aspects such as, cybersecurity mind-set and behavior change 
among the public sector, the private sector, individual users and other actors present in the 
cyber ecosystem. Improve e-services, in order to promote the required level of trust including 
using government e-services and e-commerce platforms. Develop an evaluation criterion and 
reporting mechanisms to promote information sharing and Effectively communicate the 
benefits of paying attention to threats and vulnerabilities  (Bellasio et al. 2018). 
Develop a national awareness program is to influence the implementation of secure behaviour 
online. However, effective influencing requires more than simply notifying people about 
what they should and should not do: they need, first of all, to accept that the information is 
relevant, secondly, understand how they ought to respond, and thirdly, be willing to do this in 
the face of many other demands (Bada et al. 2019a).  Awareness is not training. Security 
awareness activities are designed to change behavior or reinforce good security practices 
(Wilson and Hash 2003). The purpose of awareness program is simply to focus attention on 
security and  allow individuals to recognize IT security concerns and respond accordingly 
(Bada et al. 2019a).   
To develop the awareness program, the agency’s awareness and training needs to be 
identified, and wide awareness and training plan is developed, organisational buy-in is 
required and secured, and priorities are established. According to Bada et al. (2019a), 
following factors can be extremely helpful at enhancing the effectiveness of current and 
future campaigns: (1) security awareness has to be professionally prepared and organised in 
order to work. (2) Invoking fear in people is not an effective tactic, since it could scare people 
who can least afford to take risks. (3) Security education has to be more than providing 
information to users it needs to be targeted, actionable, doable and provide feedback. (4) 
Once people are willing to change, training and continuous feedback is needed to sustain 
them through the change period. (5) Emphasis is necessary on different cultural contexts and 
characteristics when creating cybersecurity awareness campaigns.   
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An awareness campaign should use simple consistent rules of behaviour that people can 
follow. This way, people’s perception of control will lead to better acceptance of the 
suggested behaviour (Bandura et al. 1999; Ajzen 2002). There is a numerous behaviour 
change techniques are useful and can be used in awareness program. These techniques such 
as, Behaviour change wheel  by (Michie et al. 2011) and Johnson and Scholes’ Cultural Web 
Model (Johnson and Whittington 2009) as shown in Figure (2.11). 
 
Figure  2.11 Johnson and Scholes’ Cultural Web (Johnson and Whittington 2009) 
An awareness campaign also needs to be monitored and evaluated.  Based on literature a set 
of criteria has been suggested to evaluate the effectiveness of the awareness campaign. These 
criteria such as; benchmarks must be declared; success indicators must be defined; and 
periodic status reports must be generated (Kortjan and Von Solms 2014; Bellasio et al. 2018; 
Bada et al. 2019a). Focusing on the design and implementation of awareness raising 
programs, literature suggests that successful awareness programs need to be a “learning 
continuum” (Kritzinger et al. 2017; Bada et al. 2019b). 
Improve e-services, in order to promote the required level of trust including using 
government e-services and e-commerce platforms are another vital factor in this dimension.  
According to Fakhoury and Aubert (2015), Trust has become a key area in e-government 
literature since it is a factor for the adoption of e-government. Citizens are reluctant to use e-
government services mainly for security, privacy and transparency issues. Trust in 
government is “based on the individual’s prior experience when dealing with government” 
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,while trust in the Internet is associated with user  perceptions of the institutional 
environment, including whether the associated structure, regulation, and legislation make an 
environment feel safe (Hussein et al. 2010; Fakhoury and Aubert 2015). 
This factor considers the trust and confidence of the society in their ability to use the Internet 
in a secure and private way. It concentrates on trust and confidence in government e-services 
and private and public sector e-commerce, but it also includes broader use of the Internet 
outside of these two categories (Juell-Skielse and Perjons 2009; GCSCC 2017). In order to 
increase the trust and confidence on the cyber space different steps are required. These steps 
includes, creating an e-government strategy, governance structure, a strategic plan for e-
government that includes government eservices, launch and continuously develop 
government e-services and define benchmarks, success indictors for initiatives and publish 
periodic. In addition, the setting up of a legal framework is considered essential for its 
sustainable growth (GCSCC 2017; Bellasio et al. 2018). 
Privacy compliance framework is important factor to secure the personal data they process on 
cyber space.  Privacy is a fundamental human right recognized in the United Nation (UN) 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
in many other international and regional treaties (Finn et al. 2013; Rotenberg and Jacobs 
2013).  Many countries such as European countries have recognised privacy as fundamental 
right for many years (Rotenberg and Jacobs 2013).  European countries have created toughest 
privacy and security law in the world the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
(European 2018). This framework defines an array of legal terms such as; Personal data, Data 
processing and Data controls.  
Reporting mechanisms are another fundamental factor in this dimension. Reporting 
mechanisms let individual citizens and businesses to report cybercrime and cyber-attacks 
directly to relevant public authorities. Reporting mechanisms are important for users to report 
cyber-enabled crimes, including online fraud, cyber-bullying, child abuse, identity theft, 
privacy and security breaches, and other incidents (Kortjan and Von Solms 2014; Bellasio et 
al. 2018). Many countries and international organisation have created useful frameworks for 
reporting mechanisms. For instance, Action Fraud in the UK , Internet  Signalement, France 
and Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN), USA (GLACY 2014; Gercke 2016).  
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In case of developing countries, practically those countries in a transitional phase do not have 
proper cyber culture awareness programs in place.  These countries include many Arab spring 
countries that considered in a transitional stage (Kortjan and von Solms 2012). Recent Arab 
spring has also brought into highlight another dimension of cyberspace exploitation i.e. 
destabilising the governments (Zareen et al. 2013). Unlike in developed countries, 
cybersecurity awareness is not included in the schools and academic curriculum. The lack of 
awareness in these countries is noticeable in the literature such as in the ITU Cybersecurity 
Work Program for Developing Countries  (Tagert 2010; ITU 2014; Newmeyer 2015).  
Existing literature highlighted that many these countries are facing many challenge in 
adopting  e-services in, e.g e-government  (Ahmed et al. 2013; Karaim and Inal 2019), e-
banking (Farag and Hilles; Elgahwash et al. 2014; MTMC 2016; Ward et al. 2017), e-
commerce (Moftah et al. 2012; NISSA 2013; GCSCC 2017) and e-learning (Kitzinger 1995a; 
Warfield et al. 2002; Gill et al. 2008; Goldman 2010; Herrington and Aldrich 2013; DOE 
2014; Hult and Sivanesan 2014). In addition, Many of these countries  suffer  from  the  
digital,  and  they  are  not  able  to deploy the appropriate ICT infrastructure for  e-
government  deployment (Alshehri and Drew 2010; Forti et al. 2014). Government 
departments in some of these countries such as Spring Land are using different ICT tools, 
which make it difficult to centralise the services from various departments and avail to 
citizens through e-Government platform (Forti et al. 2014). 
2.8.2.5 Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills  
Cybersecurity education aspects have  been  considered  as part  of  national  capacity  
building  strategies,  workforce  development, and education-specific studies (Bellasio et al. 
2018; Švábenský et al. 2020).  Based on literature review, to develop national cybersecurity 
education program there are many steps required. These steps include select the task owner 
and the audience of the cybersecurity education programme, map the existing cybersecurity 
education landscape and identify gaps in provision, foster research and development in 
cybersecurity and combine the education with practical training and Preparing future cyber 
security workforce (McGettrick 2013; Newhouse et al. 2017; Bellasio et al. 2018). According 
to Bellasio et al. (2018), cybersecurity education is relevant to many different areas of 
society, from industry and government to academia, primary and secondary education. A 
designated task owner should be able to engage with each of these sectors, both internally 
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through collaboration with other government departments that operate in these areas, and 
externally through engagement with private stakeholders. 
Once the task owner is nominated and the audience has been classified mapping and 
identifying gaps in provision are needed. It is also important to understand present and future 
requirements in the professional atmosphere, and map these to educational requirements, 
primarily at secondary and tertiary levels of education (Newhouse et al. 2017; Bellasio et al. 
2018). Cybersecurity program cybersecurity should also decide how this programme would 
actually be delivered (Bellasio et al. 2018). However, develop national cybersecurity 
education and cybersecurity curriculum guidelines are needed for schools and universities.  
There   is   need   for   a   range   of   academic   degree   programs in cybersecurity from the 
technical aspects to courses based on psychology, psychiatry, criminal justice, business (i.e.  
policy and economics) and more (McGettrick et al. 2014).  Many countries have combined 
education of cybersecurity and skills at all levels of education. For instance, in the UK cyber 
strategy has incorporated a schools program to create a step change in specialist cybersecurity 
education and training for talented 14-18 year olds.  These steps involving, classroom-based 
activities, after-school sessions with expert mentors, challenging projects, and summer 
schools (HMGovernment 2016). Current strategy include, supporting schools (e.g., “Girls get 
coding”), providing resources (e.g., The Open University), apprenticeships, support for 
undergraduate and postgraduate research, cybersecurity career opportunities, and internships 
(Švábenský et al. 2020). In addition, many international organisation such as; Association for 
Computing Machinery (ACM); IEEE Computer Society (IEEE CS); Association for 
Information Systems Special Interest Group on Security (AIS SIGSEC) and International 
Federation for Information Processing Technical Committee on Information Security 
Education (IFIP WG 11.8),  have developed comprehensive curricular guidance in 
cybersecurity education that will support future program development and associated 
educational efforts (AMC 2017).  
Developing and implementing a professional cybersecurity training platform at a national 
level is considered an important aspect to possess leadership skills to manage security 
policies, as well as managerial and communications skills (Yang and Wen 2017).  Developed 
countries such as the United States, structures a holistic  framework called the National 
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), under  the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) (Newhouse et al. 2017). Said framework would foster a corporation 
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between government, academia, and the private sector, as it focuses on cybersecurity 
education, training, and workforce development. Moreover, a cybersecurity career path 
framework (CyberSeek) by NIST for professionals in this field has been created to cover 
technical cybersecurity areas (including computer science skills development), non-technical 
elements (including management and policy) and communication (including skills for 
communicating technical issues to non-technical audiences) (CyberSeek 2016). An example 
on how to use this framework is presented in Figure 2.12.  
 
Figure  2.12 an example of CyberSeek career paths (CyberSeek 2016) 
In the UK, the National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) 2016-2021 has defined one of the 
main key initiatives to deliver as: “developing the cyber security profession, including 
through achieving Royal Chartered status by 2020, reinforcing the recognised body of cyber 
security excellence within the industry and providing a focal point which can advise, shape 
and inform national policy” (HMGovernment 2016). A career framework for security 
professionals in the UK government (CyBOK) has been created to build the capacity and 
capabilities of security specialists across government, covering Physical, Personnel, Cyber, 
Technical Security and Corporate Enablers  based on their national strategy  (GSF 2020 ). 
Figure (2.13), shows the knowledge areas that are the foundation of the discipline of 
cybersecurity in the CyBOK framework (DCMS 2018). In addition, the European agency for 
cybersecurity ENISA has established roadmap and introduces steps that can be implemented 
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in order to be in line with best practice in the area of Network and Information Security (NIS) 
(Berendt et al. 2014).  
 
Figure  2.13 the knowledge areas that are the foundation of the discipline of cybersecurity in 
the CyBOK framework (DCMS 2018). 
Among countries in a transitional phase , the literature addresses some aspect of  
cybersecurity  capacity  building challenges ,  including  cyber education  for  children,  
specific  areas  of  teaching,  and  regional cybersecurity practices. For instance, some Arab 
Spring countries are facing many issues due to current political unrest and the austerity 
measures that affect local government. These issues such as, lack of funding has hindered 
most of the attempts of advancing cybersecurity including education (Symantec 2016).  
Muller (2015), stated that cybersecurity capacity is challenge in these countries due to many 
reasons including institutional stability, and building knowledge. Cyber education in these 
countries is concisely mentioned as a part of the discussion and as an crucial part of securing 
cyberspace (Muller 2015).  In addition, these countries are facing other challenges such as, 
lack of awareness and fear of the consequences of technology in educational bases, lack of 
training courses for academic staff and increased emigration of academics due to political 
situation (Othman et al. 2013). However, building education capacity and foster research and 
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development in cybersecurity are needed. This can be done by adopted international 
formworks as base line to develop their cybersecurity capacity. 
2.8.2.6 Legal and Regulations    
A legal and regulations framework is a set of guidelines that governs the rights and 
obligations of government, companies and citizens. It encompasses national legislation, 
policy, regulations, agreements and  where applicable  a country’s constitution (Bellasio et al. 
2018). Cyberspace, as the fifth common domain after land, sea, air and outer space, is in great 
need for coordination, cooperation and legal measures among all nations (Schjolberg and 
Ghernaouti-Helie 2011). Lacking a clear legal basis, it can be difficult or impossible to carry 
out these functions, which in turn places significant limitations on a country’s ability to 
successfully secure cyberspace (Bellasio et al. 2018).  Building legal capacity to tackle cyber 
threats requires from nation states to address many challenges. These challenges according to 
the WorldBank (2017), limited understanding and experience with cyber laws among 
different stakeholders, a scarcity of both human and financial resources, developing 
legislation takes time and enforcing and prosecuting cybercrime is particularly difficult.  
Cyber-attacks particularly cybercrime have become increasingly affect national security and 
stability (Appazov 2014). According to Tikk (2011), attacks with national security 
implications test the limits of the existing legal framework for data protection, electronic 
communications and access to public information around the world. The same author 
suggests ten principles for creating national laws and regulation on cyber space. These rules 
are including;  
• the territoriality principle empowers nations to impose their sovereignty on 
information infrastructure located within their territory or otherwise subject to their 
jurisdiction;  
• the responsibility principle if the cyber-attacks launched in state's territorial 
sovereignty;  
• the cooperation with other states rule;  
• the self-defence rule which means every country has the right to self-defence; 
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•  the Data Protection Rule;  
• the Duty of Care Rule, every state has the responsibility to implement a reasonable 
level of security in their information infrastructure;   
• the Early Warning Rule; 
• the Access to Information Rule, the public has a right to be informed about threats to 
their life, security and well-being; 
• The Criminality Rule, every nation has the responsibility to include the most 
common cyber offences in its substantive criminal law; 
• the Mandate Rule, an organisation's capacity to act (and regulate) derives from its 
mandate; 
These ten principles outline fundamental concepts and areas that must be included or 
addressed in a comprehensive legal approach to cybersecurity and raise awareness about 
existing legal difficulties involving cybersecurity (Tikk 2011). Literature indicated that many 
international organisations have recommended different steps to develop legal framework. 
These steps are including development and adoption of relevant legislation supporting the 
strategy that would enhance cybersecurity. This requires substantive criminal law, procedural 
law, digital evidence, international cooperation and the responsibility of Internet service 
providers. The first the necessary substantive criminal-law provisions to criminalize acts such 
as computer fraud, illegal access, data interference, copyright violations and child 
pornography (ITU 2009; African-Union 2014).  
Substantive law outlines the rights and responsibilities of legal subjects, which include 
persons, organisations, and states. Sources of substantive law include statutes and ordinances 
enacted by city, state, and federal legislatures (statutory law), federal and state constitutions, 
and court decisions (UNODC 2019).  Legal framework is varying from state to state. 
According to UNODC (2019)each state has its own legal system, which affects the creation 
of substantive criminal law on cybercrime. These systems include Common law, Civil law, 
Customary law, Religious law and Legal pluralism 
Procedural law draws the processes and procedures to be followed to apply and to enable the 
enforcement of substantive law. A significant part of procedural law is criminal procedure, 
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which includes general rules and guidelines on the manner in which suspected, accused, and 
convicted persons are to be handled and processed by the criminal justice system and its 
agents (Boas et al. 2011; Capers 2018; UNODC 2019). 
Another crucial aspect of developing a national legal framework is developing criminal 
justice power includes Law enforcement and digital forensic power capacity building. These 
include assign a task owner and develop a cybercrime strategy, developing training modules, 
provide forensic tools, cooperation platform and regulations. Assigning a national-level 
cybercrime agency is a vital step in building cybercrime capacity within criminal justice 
system. Digital forensics competences should also be developed so that law enforcement 
agencies are able to process, interpret and analyse digital evidence once it has been recovered 
from a crime scene  (Bellasio et al. 2018). Furthermore, cybersecurity policies and techniques 
for vulnerability disclosure and national and international cooperation mechanisms are 
required. Vulnerability disclosure technique according to the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) is used to describe the overall activities associated with receiving 
vulnerability reports and providing remediation information. Additional activities such as 
investigating and prioritizing reports, developing, testing, and deploying remediation’s, and 
improving secure development are called “vulnerability handling” and are described in 
ISO/IEC 30111 (ISO/IEC29147 2018). 
Establishing cooperation platforms are also considered an important aspect to combat 
cybercrime. International cooperation has become increasingly necessary for governments, 
international organisations and private sector actors affected by this type of crime  (Boes and 
Leukfeldt 2017; Bellasio et al. 2018).  States  need  to  cooperate  since  cyber  criminals  are  
not  limited  by  national  boundaries,  and  digital  evidence  relating  to  a  single  crime  can  
be  dispersed  across  multiple  regions  (Cerezo et al. 2007).There are numerous international 
conventions on cybercrime. For instance, 2001, the Budapest Convention its main objective, 
set out in the preamble, is to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of 
society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering 
international co-operation (Weber 2003). In addition, The African Union (AU) has created 
Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection to address cybercrime issues. 
In addition to international cooperation among states and law enforcement agencies, 
partnership mechanisms among public and private sector actors are required. The public and 
private partnership has repeatedly been referred to as the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘hub’ of cyber-
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security strategy in different countries and international organisations such as the World 
Economic Forum, the United States and United Kingdom (Carr 2016). For instance, in the 
UK, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP) has been created to exchange 
cyber threat information in real time in a secure, confidential and dynamic environment (UK-
CERT 2015). The World Economic Forum has provided guidance on Public- Private 
Information Sharing against cybercrime. The guidance provided key considerations for types 
of information that should be shared between public and private sectors. These considerations 
include share all information not limited by legal constraints, information sharing should be a 
two-way street, no sharing personal information without checking applicable legal framework 
and better to share processed data than raw data. In addition, said guidance presents main 
considerations on how information should be shared such as, real-time and 24/7 sharing, 
secure channels, know you counterpart and share processed data (WEF 2017).  
Countries in a transitional phase venture into using cyberspace services without proper legal 
and regulations frameworks.  The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) from the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) indicates that most of these countries are lacking of legal 
and regulations to tackle cybercrime (ITU 2017a, 2018a). According to this report, the main 
challenge for national criminal legal systems in these countries is the delay between the 
recognition of potential cyber technology and necessary amendments to the national criminal 
law.   
2.8.2.7 Standards and Technologies  
Standards and technologies are important aspects that help countries to develop a secure 
cyber ecosystem. A large body of literature is frequently growing on the topics of technical 
information controls, Internet protocols, cryptographic standards, and cybersecurity 
compliance, auditing and certification processes. Standards help countries and organisation to 
establish common security requirements and the capabilities and skills needed for secure 
solutions (Scarfone et al. 2008). Scarfone et al. (2008), indicates that Standards may be 
compared with certain types of documents, usually called guidelines. Both standards and 
guidelines provide guidance to enhance cybersecurity, but guidelines usually lack the level of 
consensus and formality associated with standards.  
Cybersecurity standards improve security and contribute to risk management in several 
significant ways.  According to Bellasio et al. (2018), all governments and stakeholders have 
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a role to play in adopting voluntary and common ICT security, technology, cybersecurity, and 
risk-management standards and protocols, such as those published by ISO and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). This is because the scope of cybersecurity 
includes the protection of complex environments, resulting from the interaction of persons, 
software and services on the cyberspace by means of technology devices and networks 
connected to it (ENISA 2019). Adhere to standardisations in cybersecurity providing many 
benefits to countries and organisation. These benefits such as: interoperability, reusability, 
knowledge development and cybersecurity awareness, harmonisation of terminology, 
consistency between different manufacturers, vendors and users, repeatability, performance 
checking, security evaluation, supply chain integrity and security  .  
Identify baseline ICT security, cybersecurity and risk-management standards and promote 
their adoption across the public and private sectors is a crucial aspect in building state 
capacity. Security baselines are useful in improving cybersecurity because they can cover a 
range of risks that are applicable across a variety of environments (Craig 2018). According to 
Craig (2018), countries that are evolving security baselines can promote and foster such a 
holistic cybersecurity risk management approach by focusing on: utilizing an open, 
collaborative, and iterative development process; bridging risk management understanding 
both within and between organisations; advancing security through a risk-based and 
outcomes-focused approach; and leveraging existing best practices to the greatest extent 
practicable.  
In order to benefit from best practice and the economic advantages of global coordination 
standards and guidelines should be continually adopted (Bellasio et al. 2018). To build 
capacity in these areas, it is desirable to refer to the latest version of official vendor 
documentation and the state-of-the-art standards due to the rapid pace of technological 
development (Bellasio et al. 2018). States can adhere to a numerous of general resources for 
building capacity in ICT security standards, cryptographic controls, cybersecurity standards, 
risk-management standards and audited assessment. These include standards from 
International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC), International Telecommunication Union – Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector (ITU-T), Internet Engineering Task Force, Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the World Wide Web Consortium, and National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) (Bellasio et al. 2018). 
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Another vital aspect in building capacity in this dimension is resilience of national Internet 
services and national critical infrastructure, business continuity plan, technical security 
controls and enhances physical security of national critical infrastructure. In order to build a 
national resilience capacity plan, a number of policy areas needed to be addressed. These in 
particular: good practice guides should be implemented to strengthen the capacity, resilience 
and survivability of networks; and critical national infrastructure plans for the IT sector 
should be commissioned.  Physical security of national critical infrastructure encompasses all 
the physical parts of the infrastructure, such as cable links, radio equipment, power systems, 
connection points, satellite links and building (Bellasio et al. 2018). The threat of 
cyberterrorism including unauthorized access to a system, disruption or denial-of-service, 
unauthorized use of a system, or unauthorized changes to system hardware or software — can 
be as destructive as physical acts of terrorism. Quickly recovering from any type of business 
interruption is critical to a state’s to provide good services on cyber space. This can be 
achieved by building business continuity plan capacity (Cerullo and Cerullo 2004; Bellasio et 
al. 2018).   
Technical security controls implementations are a responsibility for all actors in the state 
includes private and public sectors. Several good practices and technical security controls can 
be implemented, including multi-factor authentication, digital certificates or public key 
infrastructure and application whitelisting (Scarfone et al. 2008; Bellasio et al. 2018; ENISA 
2019). 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
To summarise, this chapter discusses cybersecurity definition, its impact on states, the 
military concepts of the 5th Domain and the various policies, procedures and good practices 
from State Institutions, Standards Bodies and Corporations; each providing a different 
perspective to the domain. The Literature Review narrows down the topics of cyber threat 
landscape on national security such as, Cyber Crime, Cyber Attacks, Cyber Terrorism and 
Warfare. It highlighted that, Cybersecurity has become a central issue for many countries; 
and thus it is becoming extremely difficult to ignore the existence of cyber threats and risks to 
national security. These serious attacks highlight a significant need to protect critical national 
resources and have become a tier-1 focus of national concern. The literature shows that, 
countries in a transitional phase are more likely to face cybersecurity issues as dependency of 
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governments, private sectors and society on the ICT tools and cyberspace surge over the 
years. 
In addition, this Literature Review discusses the global and organisational cybersecurity 
frameworks. It has been identified that, the selected frameworks discuss global threats and 
cybersecurity measures on the global level, they have been mainly focussing on stable and 
mature nations and environments. Tagert (2010), pointed out that, these approaches to be 
insufficient for developing countries includes countries in a transitional phase due to the 
limited technical capacity, ICT maturity levels and socioeconomic conditions and lack of 
human capital. He found the problems required more multifaceted and tailored approaches 
aimed at improving the technical capability and policy implementation skills of both 
government and the private sector in the countries he studied. Yet, despite growing attention 
from state governments and international organizations, the defense against attacks on 
national critical systems has appeared to be generally fragmented and varying widely in 
effectiveness (Atoum et al., 2014).  
The chapter also reviewed and discussed the Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) 
definition, models and dimensions. The literature on CCB model has highlighted that, these 
models to date have not managed to cover CCB as a whole on a global scale or else they 
argue for CCB, but without indicating how to go about implementing it (Muller 2015). Some 
approaches set out a scope that is either too broad or too narrow, while others focus on 
different ways of highlighting the problems that come with increased access to cyberspace, 
but without indicating solutions (Muller 2015).  
In addition, the reviewed literature emphasised that both stable counties and countries in a 
transitional phase are facing cybersecurity challenges from managing cyber risks to building 
cybersecurity capacity. These challenges are likely to be acute in those countries in a 
transitional phase due to lack of security experts, lack cybersecurity leadership, financial 
resources, legal capacity to fight against cybercrimes and due to lack of investment in 
cybersecurity technologies and adhere to cybersecurity standards. 
Although extensive research has been carried out on CCB, to our knowledge no single study 
exists which focuses on countries in a transitional phase. In addition, there are no efforts so 
far in linking existing frameworks and initiatives with benchmarking models, and thus this 
effort from the CCMM is presented (Hameed et al. 2018). In addition, there are no studies 
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addressing the factors that influence the development of a National Cybersecurity Capacity 
Building Framework NCCBF in a chaos ecosystem. 
Thus, this thesis investigates the development of cybersecurity capacity building framework 
for countries in a transitional using Spring Land as case study. The framework relies on a 
variety of existing standards, guidelines, and practices to enable countries in a transitional 
phase to transform their current cybersecurity posture by applying activities that reflect 
desired outcomes. The following chapter presents the research methodology used to find 















3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction           
This chapter begins by presenting research paradigms germane to research methodologies, 
and describes the research design and the process that advances throughout the research. The 
methodology applied in this study was adopted from the research onion diagram developed 
by Saunders et al. (2009) to create a cohesive alignment between research objectives and the 
research methodology. Saunders research onion as shown in Figure (3.1) provides a number 
of key steps in the positioning of research methodology; the research philosophy, research 
approach, research strategy and design, and data collection techniques. Moreover, the use of 
the Saunders’ model allows for the discussion of primary and secondary data sources, data 
collection, and further analysis applied with use of certain techniques. 
 
 
Figure  3.1 The research onion (Saunders et al. 2009) 
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3.2 Research Philosophy         
The term “research philosophy” relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of 
that knowledge (Myers 1997b; Saunders et al. 2009, p.107). The adoptions of research 
philosophy hold the important hypothesis of how we see the world, and these hypotheses will 
subsequently support and underpin our research strategy and the methods we choose as part 
of that strategy (Saunders et al. 2009, p.108). Remenyi and Williams (1998) suggests that a 
number of major questions related to the research occur. However, the crucial one is ‘Why 
research?’ as researchers must understand the deeper purpose and necessities of their 
research. 
There are several approaches and ways in research philosophy which determine the way a 
researcher is building a relationship between the knowledge of the subject and process that 
develops the knowledge. As Burrell and Morgan (1979) claim, researchers make several 
assumptions that have an impact on the development of the knowledge. This section is going 
to examine and describe two common paradigms of social sciences appearing in the research 
onion in Figure 14; positivism and interpretivism. Ozanne and Hudson (1989), advocate that 
these two approaches are very different from one another as they are based on different goals 
and assumptions. Nonetheless, they both have proven to contribute to research and are 
therefore one of the most popular methods. 
Firstly, positivism approach will be explained and supported by particular literature showing 
examples and main points of this approach. According to Dudovskiy (2016), positivism 
adheres to the view that only “factual” knowledge gained through observation (the senses), 
including measurement, is trustworthy. This view is supported by Mack (2010) who 
demonstrates that, in the positivism paradigm all genuine knowledge is based on sense 
experience, and can be advanced only by means of observation and experiment. Furthermore, 
Clarke (2009) emphasises that positivism builds upon experience, observation and testing, 
which helps expands the knowledge.Aliyu et al. (2014) argue that, positivism can be 
considered as a research approach which is based the ontological principle and the fact that 
facts and reality are independent of the viewer and observer. Furthermore, Ozanne and 
Hudson (1989), state that positivists are convinced that ‘unchanging reality exists’ and can be 




In positivism studies, the role of the researcher is limited to data collection and results via 
recognised test regime; hence, research findings are usually quantifiable by observations. 
Olesen (1994), provides the list of methodologies that are used by positivist researchers: 
confirmatory analysis, nomothetic experiments, quantitative analysis, laboratory experiment 
and deduction. 
Interpretivism, on the other hand, integrates human interest into the research. The 
interpretivist paradigm considers the social reality as something that is subjectively 
constructed by people’s thoughts and actions (Denscombe 2014, p.19). Ozanne and Hudson 
(1989), suggest that from the interpretivists’ perspective, it is believed that each individual or 
group perceive reality differently and therefore many different realities exist. Interpretivists 
emphasise the importance of context and the determinant of events or behaviour. Therefore, 
realities always differ with respect to context and therefore the events have to be observed in 
its natural setting rather than being studied separately. This claim is supported by Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) who assert that reality should be perceived holistically. Additionally,Walsham 
(1995) believes that our knowledge of reality is created by ‘human actors’. Therefore, 
researcher may change the perceptions of the observed subjects and the perceptions of both 
parties might be eventually different. 
Each of these paradigms has its best means of obtaining the required information that forms 
the basis for the research design and data collection methods. The selection of appropriate 
paradigms is ‘a matter of horses for courses’ (Denscombe 2014, p.163). There are several 
considerations before choosing the appropriate paradigms. These include the suitability 
towards research strategy, the review of each paradigm towards the problem under 
investigation, and the potential opportunity of mixing two methods (Denscombe 2014, 
p.164). Wahyuni (2012) also points out the importance of choosing the right research 
approach and diagram in order to conduct the research with respect to the social phenomena 
and framing. Saunders et al. (2009), also add that research purpose is important to be 
established in order to develop an appropriate research design. These popular set of data 
collection methods associated with each research philosophy are demonstrated in Table (3.1). 
A positivist approach allows the researcher to adopt objective measurements; the surveys 
pursuing huge samples are usually the most proper methods of data collection (Denscombe 
2014). As Bryman (1984) exemplifies, the techniques associated with positivism are 
participant observation or social survey. While with interpretivist research, in-depth studies 
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of phenomena through interviewing small samples can be a useful approach (Denscombe 
2014).  
To sum the two paradigms, the interpretivist paradigm is associated with qualitative research, 
whereas the positivist paradigm is associated with quantitative research. As this research will 
question how protected data within countries in a transitional phase information infrastructure 
is under Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and the associated challenges of cybersecurity 
capacity.  An interpretivist approach is conducted in this research. The interpretivist approach 
will thus help the researcher towards understanding Spring Land Cybersecurity socio-
technical issues in-depth, rather than quantifying them. Furthermore, it offers the researcher 
an opportunity to observe peoples’ views and perceptions towards how research problems 
should be resolved or where challenges occur. 
Positivism Interpretivism 
• Highly structured 
• Large samples 
• Measurement 
• Quantitative but can use Qualitative 
• Small samples 
• In-depth investigations 
• Qualitative 
Table  3.1 Research philosophies and data collection methods (Dudovskiy 2016) 
3.3 Research Approach         
There are different research approaches that can be used to address a research study. As 
Saunder’s research onion shows, they can be divided into three approaches: induction, 
deduction and abduction approach (Saunders et al. 2009). The choice of research approach is 
linked to the research philosophy and in the following section provides examples on how 
particular approaches linked to individual research philosophies. However, the abductive 
approach is going to be omitted in the description as it of very little relevance to the present 
study and furthermore, there is very scare data on abductive approach, which according to 
Svennevig (2001) complements deductive and inductive approach. 
The inductive approach which focuses on observations, and theories are proposed towards the 
end of the research process as a result of observations(Andreewsky and Bourcier 2000). In 
this approach, researchers move from factual findings to theory (Danermark et al. 2001; 
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Kovács and Spens 2005). No theories or hypotheses would apply in inductive studies at the 
beginning of the research, and the researcher is free in terms of altering the direction of the 
study after the research process had commenced. Stentoft Arlbjørn and Halldorsson (2002), 
noted inductive research helps develop new theories and therefore contributes to the 
theoretical field of research. Research using an inductive approach is mainly concerned with 
the context in which such events were taking place (Ozanne and Hudson 1989). For instance, 
using a study with a small sample of subjects might be more appropriate than a large number 
as with the deductive approach (Saunders et al. 2009, p.126). 
Contrary to the inductive approach, deduction approach which according to Minnameier 
(2010) is associated with logical thinking and correct reasoning. Saunders et al. (2009, p.124) 
assert, deduction is used mainly in the positivism paradigm. Moreover, Andreewsky and 
Bourcier (2000) state that researchers using deductive approach follow the route from a 
general law to a specific case. According to Dudovskiy (2016), a deductive approach can be 
explained by the means of hypotheses, which can be derived from the propositions of the 
theory. In other words, a deductive approach is concerned with deducting conclusions from 
premises or propositions (Danermark et al. 2001). According to Stentoft Arlbjørn and 
Halldorsson (2002), deduction is one of the most prevailing approaches among researchers as 
it test already existing theories and does not establish or form any new sciences.  
The inductive approach is highly associated with qualitative research, whilst the deductive 
approach is more commonly linked with quantitative research (Gabriel 2013). In this 
research, the inductive approach has been chosen in order to develop a national framework 
with a focus on cybersecurity capacity building as a contemporary national security issue 
unstable environments and countries in a transitional phase. In addition, the initial motivation 
of this study is the shared interest between the author, decision makers, government officials, 
managers and general employees regarding security development in Spring Land. The aim is 
to devise a secure framework that can be generalised over the various organisations covering 
many of the Spring Land enterprise systems. This shifts the focus into the Spring Land 
homeland problem space, to be observed with the objective of conceptualising the various 
issues to be solved by developing the National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
(NCCBF). 
Table (3.2) shows the major differences between deductive and inductive approaches to 
research adopted from (Saunders et al. 2009). This results in the construction of a conceptual 
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model that can be generalised as a basis for formulation and consideration about requirements 
of NCCBF from different stakeholder perspectives. Therefore, the methodology of this 
research comes in accordance with the interpretivist approach. Furthermore, the complexity 
of the Cybersecurity problem is also of high attention and thus it requires a detailed view 
using various perspectives and understanding of different issues, such as social, technical, 
legal, etc. This makes an inductive approach more suitable than a deductive approach which 
depends on particular quantitative factors. 
Deduction Induction 
• Moving from theory to data 
• The need to explain causal 
relationships between variables 
• The collection of quantitative data 
• The application of controls to ensure 
validity of data 
• The operationalisation of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition 
• A highly structured approach 
• researcher independence of what is 
being researched 
• The necessity to select samples of 
• sufficient size in order to generalise 
conclusions 
• Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to events 
• A close understanding of the research 
context 
• The collection of qualitative data 
• A more flexible structure to permit 
changes of research emphasis as the 
research progresses 
• A realisation that the researcher is 
part of the research process 
• Less concern with the need to 
generalise 
Table  3.2 differences between deductive and inductive approaches (Saunders et al. 2009, 
p.126) 
3.4 Research Methodological Approaches 
Various methodological approaches are differentiated in order to address a research study and 
utilise the obtained data to maximum. This section focuses on the following methods: 
quantitative and qualitative, and a mix of the two, referred to as mixed method. According to 
Kothari (2004), quantitative research is based on the measurement of quantity or amount. It is 
applicable to phenomena that can be expressed in terms of quantity. Moreover, (Carey 1993) 
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implies that sample sizes used in quantitative research are considerably bigger to ensure that 
statistical approach can be used and more data is available. 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is concerned with qualitative phenomenon, i.e., 
phenomena relating to or involving quality or kind(Kumar et al. 2008). Myers (1997b) states 
that, qualitative research methods were developed in the social sciences to enable researchers 
to study social and cultural phenomena. Denzin and Lincoln (2000), assert that, qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Berger and Luckmann (1966) 
concluded that because there are many contexts and therefore many realities, consequently, 
there are many different points of views and truths based on how individual reality is 
constructed.  
In terms of comparing the alternative research methods, quantitative research sets out to 
measure variables and test hypotheses on the basis of numerical data that can be acquired and 
analysed (Creswell 2013). In contrast, qualitative research provides an opportunity to 
interpret text, such as the opinions of various stakeholders regarding possible security 
strategies (McCusker and Gunaydin 2015). For the purposes of the current study, a 
qualitative approach has been deemed most suitable because the stated aim is to examine the 
various cybersecurity issues facing Spring Land. By avoiding the use of statistical data, a 
qualitative approach arguably affords a more realistic interpretation of events in the world. A 
further advantage associated with qualitative methods is that they offer greater flexibility in 
terms of how the data are collected and analysed (Boodhoo and Purmessur 2009). Examples 
of qualitative research methods include interactive management and focus groups which can 
be used to garner opinions about a specific subject. For instance, these methods can be used 
to explore opinions about cybersecurity or gain insight from key personnel with specialist 
knowledge or who are able to offer an institutional perspective, thereby giving a better 
appreciation about a certain event, condition or experience at a personal level. In addition, 
qualitative research could entail analysis of text or other documents such as company reports 
or government papers to provide insight into private or distributed knowledge stored in 
various formats (Hammarberg et al. 2016). 
108 
 
3.5 Research Strategy and Design 
3.5.1 Research Strategy          
A strategy is a plan of act, considered to achieve a specific goal (Denscombe 2014, p.18). 
Denscombe pointed out that, researchers who implement the strategy are able to use the 
whole range of methods within the strategy to achieve the aim of the study. There are 
different kinds of research strategies, which is valuable for different kinds of research 
purpose. For instance, a survey research, case study, ethnography, action research, 
experimental research, and grounded theory (Denscombe 2014, p.21). Survey research aims 
to gather large amounts of data and therefore provides quantitate descriptions and detailed 
information about the study population (Glock and Bennett 1967). Pinsonneault and Kraemer 
(1993) emphasise that as opposed to standard survey, survey research is conducted to obtain 
advanced scientific knowledge. On the other hand, ethnography is a qualitative research 
strategy that has very specific features such as the thorough investigation of patterns of social 
interaction(Gumperz 1981), a holistic view and analysis of societies(Lutz 1981). Walker 
(1981) perceives ethnography as a story-telling and Yates (1987) points out that ethnography 
can give us the necessary context that may lead to changes in our ways of thinking and 
understanding of races and cultures. 
This research strategy is conducted for a long period of time and therefore can provide very 
consistent data (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983). With regards to action research, as noted 
by Avison et al. (1999), Baskerville and Wood-Harper (1996) is a strategy that combines both 
theory and practice. According to Greenwood and Levin (1998), action research is carried out 
by professional practitioners who seek to improve the situation or issues experienced by 
participants. MacColl et al. (2005), state that action research has two steps - collaborative 
analysis that is carried out by participants and collaborative change that takes place with 
respect to the formulated theory based on the collaborative analysis.  
Experimental research according to Druckman et al. (2006) allows for casual interference 
through the randomness of group control and observations. This type of research uses 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Another example of very rigorous qualitative research is 
grounded theory. Charmaz and Belgrave (2007) defines this research strategy as collected set 
of data and analytic procedures that have been gathered together in order to formulate a 
theory. This theory helps shape qualitative materials and creates patterns and relationships 
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that are generated through the data analysis. This claim is supported by Strauss (1987) who 
also created a set of written guidelines that should be followed when building a grounded 
theory. Strauss and Corbin (1998), also point out that a theory is generated based on the 
gathered and analysed data. 
Case study strategy is the most mutual qualitative method used in information systems. Case 
study strategy empowers an analyst to nearly look at the information inside a particular 
setting. Case study strategy is the most mutual qualitative method used in information 
systems according to Schell (1992) thanks to its flexibility regarding the design and therefore 
it allows for an investigation of the holistic characteristics of events. According to (Yin 
2004), the case study research is not limited to a signal source of data, and good case studies 
benefit from having various data sources. Benbasat et al. (1987) describe three major reasons 
to use case study in information research: 
• Researchers can collect data and find evidence from the context then create theories 
in practice. 
• The case study method allows researchers to answer 'how' and 'why' questions. 
• The case study method is an appropriate method to conduct research in an area in 
which few previous studies have been conducted. Case studies use multiple methods 
to gather data and information from one or more person or organisation enclosed in 
the scope of a problem. 
A case study strategy was chosen to apply in this study in order to investigate and explore the 
factors that may affect the cybersecurity capacity in Spring Land, and how NCCBF will 
improve the situation. Furthermore, this gives the researcher an opportunity to gather 
people’s views, attitudes and experiences in relation to Spring Land cybersecurity capacity 
issues, which allows new issues to arise. 
3.5.2 Research Design          
Research design is the overall plan for collecting data and the methods. As De Vaus (2001) 
explains that research design is critical for researchers to create a plan before they start a data 
collection and that obtained data will provide us with a clear and straightforward answer and 
explanation of the proposed research question or hypotheses. Therefore, research design will 
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be used to collect and analyse data to help answer the research question. As this research 
aims to develop a secure framework with a focus on cybersecurity, the design science (DSR) 
methodology in information systems research is used. The fundamental principle of DSR is 
that knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its solution are acquired in the 
building and application of an artefact (Hevner et al. 2004).  
Figure (3.1) illustrates the interaction and cycle in DSR framework. This framework has been 
adjusted to the scope of the research topic. According to the environment defines the problem 
space; its people, organisation and technology. Participants involved in this research include 
Information Security experts and other strategy related employees of targeted stakeholders 
within a cybersecurity domain. The framework takes strategic views in mind across the 
organisation, structure, process and culture. In addition, all technical factors are taken in 
account during the development of the framework.  
 
Figure  3.2 Design Science Research Cycles (Hevner et al. 2004) 
The major principle of DSR is that knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its 
solution are acquired in the building and application of an artefact (Hevner et al. 2004). The 
DSR is the research method used for design and evaluation of artefacts for information 
models (abstractions, architects, frameworks, conceptual systems intended to solve an 
identified fuzzy organisational problem (Farrell and Hooker 2013)  
Many researchers have utilised DSR method to develop and evaluate cybersecurity 
frameworks, cybersecurity strategies (Dennis et al. 2014; Muegge and Craigen 2015), 
protecting critical infrastructure and cyber defence approach (Peursum 2015; Smith 2019). 
111 
 
The DSR research process carried out in this study included five research activities as defined 
by the DSR framework of Johannesson and Perjons (2014). This process involves of 
activities such as problem identification and motivation, objectives for a solution, design and 
development, evaluation, and communication and Knowledgeable by these activities. This 
framework is represented using the OODA as a modelling baseline and guided by IDEF0 
method where channels conveying data or objects are related to each activity, and represent 
different types of knowledge depending on the direction of the arrows. In Figure (3.3), 
Johannesson and Perjons (2014) define the channels as follows: 
• Input describes what knowledge or object is the input to an activity (arrows from 
left); 
• Output defines what knowledge or object is the output from an activity (arrows to 
right); 
• Controls refer to what knowledge is used to manage an activity, including research 
strategies, research methods, and creative methods (arrows from above); 
• Resources outline what knowledge is used as the basis of an activity, i.e. the 
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These activities and their application are presented below:  
3.5.2.1 Problem Identification and Motivation 
The first step in DSR is to identify the initial problem and motivation of why the artefacts, in 
this study the national cybersecurity capacity building framework for countries in transitional 
phase, need to be developed and evaluated. Hence, no scholarly research has currently been 
done on countries in a transitional phase posture to implementing appropriate cybersecurity 
capacity building framework. In addition, there are no studies addressing the factors that 
influence the development of a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
(NCCBF) in a chaos ecosystem. According to Hevner et al. (2004), convenient design 
research is based on the novelty, generality, and significance of the designed artefact. 
Furthermore, artefact may empower the solution of an unsettled problem by either extending 
the knowledge base or applying existing knowledge in new innovative ways.  
3.5.2.2 Define Objectives for a Solution 
The second activity in the design science process is to define the objectives for a solution. 
The development of NCCBF through the reliance of multiple established sources, by using 
literature, conducting focus group interviews, Interactive Management (IM) and studying 
existing cybersecurity frameworks. In this study, utilises the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity 
Model (CCMM) for Nations, originally proposed by the Cybersecurity Capacity Centre at the 
University of Oxford, as a baseline. The ultimate aim of the section is to provide benchmark 
for measuring and planning cybersecurity for countries in transitional phase. A focus group 
study was performed using this model with the members of the Spring Land National 
Cybersecurity Authority (NCSA). NCSA leads the Cybersecurity program in Spring Land in 
terms of technical, operational and strategical level. In addition, an Interactive Management 
technique was used. A one-day Workshop hosted by NCSA was conducted for a total of 26 
participants from different stakeholders. The set of problem statements and objectives derived 
from the IM approach has been employed to support the management of a national 




3.5.2.3 Design and Develop the Artefact 
The third steps in DSR method is design and develop the artefact which address the identified 
problem and define objectives for a solution. In this study, the OODA was used as a 
modelling baseline, selected for its simplicity and adaptability. To develop a framework that 
enhances the national cybersecurity capacity, OODA steps were used to construct and 
guiding the requirements of IDEF0. These steps were instantiated with the CCMM and 
finding from the conducted empirical studies and literature. 
3.5.2.4 Demonstrate and Evaluate the Artefact 
The fourth and fifth design science steps are to demonstrate and evaluate how well the 
artefact solves the real-world problem taking in account the previously identified objectives. 
The focus group was conducted with group of experts from different countries. The 
participants were selected due to their contributions in their decision-making roles, and 
included government officials, managers, and general employees participating in security 
development areas. These areas such as Defence, e-services, Private Sector, Banking and 
Finance, Regulations of ICT sectors, National cybersecurity agencies and authorities , 
Technical Advisor and capacity Buildings , High Education, IT security division , planning 
and projects Unit, Integrated Digital applications and ICT sectors.  
3.5.2.5 Communication of the Artefact 
The last step in DSR n design science is the communications of the artefact. Communications 
include the significant of the problem space, the usefulness, and  novelty of the artefact, the 
objectivity of its design, and the effectiveness of researchers and public (Hevner et al. 2004; 
Petter et al. 2010). The vital point of communicating this research was to contribute to the 
cybersecurity body of knowledge. The results of Chapter 4 has been published in 2019 as part 
of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 930) (Ben 
Naseir et al. 2019). Two scientific papers also have cited these results. In addition, the 
development of a proposed NCCBF framework has been published in 22nd International 
Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (ICEIS 2020) (Ben Naseir  et al. 2020). The 
researcher will continue to seek opportunities to publish the work at academic conferences 
and journals.  
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3.5.3 Data Collection Techniques  
This section looks at data collection tools and analysis. The data sources in the qualitative 
approach include participant observation (e.g. fieldworks), literature review , interviews, 
focus group discussion, questionnaires, documents and texts, and the researcher’s 
impressions and reactions (Myers 1997b). Literature review is the analysis and summary of 
documents that gives an overview of a particular topic without data collection (Seuring and 
Müller 2008). Furthermore, based on a literature review researchers can develop a theory.  
In this study, interviews and focus groups with domain experts will be the main method of 
collecting a data set for this study. The research will involve decision makers, government 
officials, managers and general employees regarding security development in Spring Land. 
According to Kvale (1994), interviews have gained their popularity over the years and 
become the most frequently used data collection techniques with respect to qualitative 
research. Interviews can be divided into several types, such structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews. Campion et al. (1994) highlight the fact that structured interview 
questions has an impact on the validity and utility of the study as the questions affect the 
sections of participants. DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree (2006) mentions that, structured 
interviews commonly produce quantitative data due to its high validity and reliability. On the 
other hand, semi-structured and unstructured interviews are the most commonly used 
interviewing plan for qualitative research because of their flexibility in garnering detailed 
information (DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree 2006). Wong (2008), describes this technique as a 
research methodology that uses a small group of participants who analyse through discussion 
a particular topic. That was data is generated for the research purposes. Wong also points out 
that the main feature of this method is the interaction between the moderator and the group 
members. Kitzinger (1995a) supports the previous definition of this method and adds that 
focus groups belong to qualitative research and the interaction between the moderator and the 
group member encourages discussing among all the participants of this research method. The 
group discussion also helps generate and clarify ideas that would not be accessible during 
one-to-one interviews. 
In addition, methodologies from the Socio-Technical-Systems (STS) disciplines will be used. 
According to Baxter and Sommerville (2011), an STS approach towards design considers 
human, social and structural factors, as well as technical factors in the design of 
organisational systems. This is supported by Appelbaum (1997) and Trist (1981) by claiming 
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that STS design functions on the presumption that an organisation is a combination of social 
and technical parts open to its environments. Moreover, Appelbaum (1997) emphasises that 
this design is different from the traditional methods that combines physical products and 
social/psychological outcomes. This model leads to a better understanding of the problem 
situation and helps capture the stakeholders’ needs and requirements. Manz and Stewart 
(1997) emphasise that, STS recognises the significance of social forces and technical 
components, which according to Trist (1981) leads to improved group work, which is 
supported by Lawler (1986) who claim that thanks to STS, companies adopted self-managing 
work teams and collaborative relationships are encouraged. 
An as example of such cooperation and interaction is Interactive Management (IM) which 
provides contextualisation of the problem space that comprise an intricate connection 
between people, machines and the natural parts of the work system in the current era 
(Christakis 1985). 
3.5.3.1 Interactive Management (IM) 
The IM technique is one of the STS approaches used within this research. The IM is based on 
the recognition that when dealing with complex situations, there is a need for a group of 
people, knowledgeable of the situation, to tackle together the main aspects of issue, to 
develop a deep understanding of the situation under analysis, and to detail the basis for 
effective action (Warfield and Cárdenas 2002). It was Warfield and Christakis who 
developed the concept of IM in 1980 (Banathy 1996) and the concept creates a situation 
when all the participants comes a mutual agreement, not a consensus that is held by the 
majority. The same authors pointed out that, IM offers the framework for a real and deep 
understanding of the circumstances that is under consideration. The people involved in an IM 
activity are exposed to a real sharing of ideas and information, and thus are passively learning 
about the problem at hand. The main benefits of this method are; the efficient use of 
participant’s time; provision for iteration and documentation; and effective communication 
between participation  (Dogan 2013). IM has a three phases as described below: 
The Planning phase: at this phase the situation is defined and the scope of the issue becomes 
clear. This is completed with the scope and context statement writing, proof of actor identity, 
and State of Definition Assessment. In addition, at this stage participants will find out who is 
involved and what is required to gather a comprehensive view of the problem. Once the state 
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of definition has been finished, the type of questions that need to be answered during the next 
phase (The Workshop phase) will be revealed, which might considerably yield in respect of 
an efficient solution (Warfield et al. 2002) 
The Workshop phase: the Workshop Phase involves bringing jointly a group of participants 
who understand the issue or situation (Warfield et al. 2002). According to Ward et al. (2017), 
the IM workshop will be made of three procedures: Idea Writing, Nominal Group Technique, 
and Interpretive Structural Modelling. In idea writing, a trigger question is offered to 
participants to noiselessly write down ideas about. The written ideas are then swapped over 
with others where additional ideas are added. Everything is then collated and divided into 
categories, then presented to the group. Following is the Nominal Group Technique, where 
participants generate further ideas after a more holistic view of the problem is gained from 
idea writing. This also allows for clarification and editing of problem statements. Participants 
then rank each idea based on importance. The final part of the workshop is to transform idea 
statements into objectives and then build an Interpretive Structural Model (ISM) to identify 
relationships amongst various items surrounding the problem. In this study, a one-day 
Workshop hosted by NCSA was conducted for a total of 26 participants from different 
stakeholders. NCSA had issued an invitation letter to all stakeholders to help the researcher in 
contextualising the problem space that is centred on the current Spring Land National 
security state. The following group of stakeholders were involved in the workshop: 
1. Telecommunication and Internet service providers. 
2. Intelligence agency. 
3. Ministry of defence. 
4. Digital crime unit in Ministry of defence. 
5. Private companies. 
6. National ID project and Spring Land Passport, Immigration and Foreigners Affairs 
Authority. 
7. Oil and energy sector. 
8. Finical sector. 
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9. Training and Education department of Spring Land Army. 
10. Spring Land Army Signal corps. 
11. National Cybersecurity Authority (NCSA). 
12. Spring Land E-government. 
The Follow-up Phase: in this phase, the outcome and objectives derived from the previous 
phase is set into action, starting the implementation plan of the solution. In this research 
study, IM method was utilised in Chapter 4. The IM was conducted to contextualise the 
challenges of CCB in Spring Land.  
3.5.3.2 Focus Groups      
Focus group discussions aim to explore a range of ideas and feelings that individuals have 
about certain issues, as well as illuminating the differences in perspective between groups of 
individuals (Tong et al. 2007). When using a focus group technique, the data are collected 
through precise group collaboration on a chosen topic (Doody et al. 2013). Gill et al. (2008) 
declares that, the interaction is the key of a successful focus group. Using the focus group 
method as a qualitative approach, enables participants to elaborate and engage in 
conversation with one another (Hu et al. 2014). The important consideration in this technique 
is the group size. Stewart et al. (1990) recommend that the ideal size for a focus group is six 
to eight, but it can work effectively with as limited as three, and as more as fourteen 
participants. 
In this study, the focus group method was utilised in Chapters 5 and Chapter 7. The focus 
group conducted in Chapter 5 was to assess the Spring Land cybersecurity capacity maturity 
levels by utilising the CCMM model. Five experts from NCSA were interviewed in sessions 
hosted in Spring Land capital city. The chosen experts then reflected on their role in NCSA 
and the limitations of the study. This sample was selected based on a purposive sample 
technique. The purposive sample technique relies upon the judgment of the researcher when 
it comes to choosing the case that is to be investigated (Tongco 2007; Marshall et al. 2013). 
What is more, Cronin (2014) and Onwuegbuzie and Byers (2014) described that despite the 
fact a minimum of four to 15 participants is anticipated, the primary focus is on gathering 
thick, rich data and not on the number of participants. As the CCMM model was used to 
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assess the Spring Land Cybersecurity capacity, participants of the focus group discussion 
were those working in NCSA with a role of managing cybersecurity program in Spring Land. 
In Chapter 7, the focus group has been conducted to evaluate the proposed framework 
(NCCBF). The framework has been evaluated by 13 experts in the field the cybersecurity 
from different countries including experts from countries that in transitional phase, during a 
workshop session by using the focus group technique. 
Table (3.3) below, provides a snapshot towards the type of data collection technique adopted 
for each objective in this study. The final evaluation of the approach will be done through 
more than one case study in real-world settings, incorporating expertise-based feedback. 
Research Objectives Purpose Data Collection Technique and methods 
1- To investigate a state 




State of Art will reinforce 
the suspension that the 
Spring Land National 
security is wholly 
inadequate to resist APTs. 
This objective will be attained 
by a comprehensive literature 
review. 
2- To contextualise the 
problem space that is 




This will feed into 
requirement analysis for 
NCCBF and the possibility 
to organise and test the 
Spring Land Cyber 
Defence. 
The contextualisation will 
analyse the security operations 
of the state by the use IM  and 
focus group interview 
3- To assess the current 
maturity levels of 
cybersecurity capacity in 
Spring Land. 
Determining areas of 
capability that are required 
by the Spring Land 
Government in order to 
improve cybersecurity 
capacity of the state 
The assessment will analyse 
the maturity levels of the 
Spring Land cybersecurity 
capacity of the state by the use 
of focus group discussion. 
4- To develop the 
NCCBF for countries in 
transitional stage 
The NCCBF will supports 
the National security for 
countries transitional stage 
The NCCBF will be managed 
and guided using modelling 
functions techniques. 
5- To evaluate the 
proposed  framework 
(NCCBF)  
Enhancing the NCCBF for 
countries in a transitional 
phase. 
The NCCBF will be evaluated 
by using focus group and 
experts’ feedback. 
Table  3.3 a snapshot towards the type of data collection technique adopted for each objective 
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3.5.3.3 Data Analysis  
This section presents the data analysis method that used to analyse and evaluate the collected 
data. As the data collected in this research using qualitative approaches, the content analysis 
technique was used to analyse the data generated by IM and focus group. Qualitative data 
analysis in general consists of three stages (Strauss and Corbin 1997). These stages are 
includes the information about a topic such as a specific context, components and their 
prosperities and dimensions and knowledge is gained by studying these components. 
Qualitative data analysis is, in summary, “the process of making sense out of the data" 
(Ruona 2005, p.236).  The common approaches used in qualitative data analysis are thematic 
analysis and content analysis. Their main characteristic is the systematic process of coding, 
examining of meaning and provision of a description of the social reality through the 
construction of theme (Vaismoradi et al. 2016).  
Thematic analysis according to Braun and Clarke (2006) is “a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data”. Content analysis according to 
Vaismoradi et al. (2013)  is “a systematic coding and categorising approach used for 
exploring large amounts of textual information unobtrusively to determine trends and patterns 
of words used their frequency, their relationships, and the structures and discourses of 
communication”. The main difference between them lies in the possibility of quantification 
of data in content analysis, conversely, thematic analysis provides a purely qualitative, 
detailed, and nuanced account of data (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). For this reason, content 
analysis is employed in this study. Since the data were captured the themes are identified 
based on the indicators of the CCMM. The input template analysis that constructed in next 
section is used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to analyse the data. 
3.6 Modelling Function IDEF0  
There are many techniques and methods available, such as UML (Eracar and Kokar 2014), 
BPMN (Gerber et al. 2014), Colour Petri Net, BPEL (Herrera et al. 2012), Integration 
Definition for Function Modelling (IDEF0) (IDEF0 1993), modelling language, etc. 
The IDEF and Unified Modelling Language (UML) modelling methodologies have become 
widely used in industrial and academic circles. IDEF comprises a suite of graphical 
modelling techniques aimed to formally specify and communicate important aspects of 
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enterprise engineering projects, whereas UML is a modelling language that can be used to 
generate computer executable models that encode key aspects of software engineering 
projects (Kim, Weston et al. 2003). 
The IDEF (originally an acronym for ICAM DEFinition) family of languages has its origins 
in the 1970's US Air Force Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) program, 
which designed to create computer-implementable modelling methods for analysis and design 
(Noran 2003). The IDEF suite of enterprise modelling approaches, which comprises IDEF0, 
IDEF1, IDEF1x, IDEF3 and other graphically based modelling notations have been applied 
extensively in support of large industrial engineering projects. 
The Unified Modelling Language (UML) has fast become a de facto software engineering 
standard. It provides a set of modelling notations designed to support various domain 
specialisms and life phases involved in the engineering of object-oriented software systems. 
It follows that UML provides suitable and widely-used modelling constructs for developing 
structured, configurable, reusable and readily-distributed multi-perspective models of IT 
systems  (IDEF0 1993). 
The IDEF0 modelling method has proven effective in detailing the system activities for 
function modelling, which was the original structured analysis communication goal for 
IDEF0 (Fortier and Dokas 2008). 
Currently, the IDEF0 technique is widely used in the government, industrial and commercial 
sectors, supporting modelling efforts for a wide range of enterprises and application domains 
(Commerce. 1993). As a function modelling language, IDEF0 has the following 
characteristics: 
1. It is comprehensive and expressive, capable of graphically representing a wide 
variety of business, manufacturing and other types of enterprise operations to any 
level of detail. 
2. It is a coherent and simple language, providing for rigorous and precise expression, 
and promoting consistency of usage and interpretation. 
3. It enhances communication between systems analysts, developers and users through 
ease of learning and its emphasis on hierarchical exposition of detail. 
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4. It can be generated by a variety of computer graphics tools; numerous commercial 
Product products specifically support development and analysis of IDEF0 diagrams 
and models. 
5. It is well tested and proven, through many years of use in Air Force and other 
government development projects, and by private industry. 
IDEF0 is an engineering technique for performing and managing needs analysis, benefits 
analysis, requirements definition, functional analysis, systems design, maintenance, and 
baselines for continuous improvement. 
IDEF0 models provide a "blueprint" of functions and their interfaces that must be captured 
and understood in order to make systems engineering decisions that are logical, affordable, 
integratable and achievable. 
The IDEF0 method is used to specify function models ('what to do'). It is loosely based upon 
the Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) method developed by Douglas Ross 
from SofTech in the 1970s (IDEF0 1993). Figure (3.4), shows a generic view of IDEF0 
model. IDEF0 allows the user to illustrate a view of the process including the inputs, outputs, 
controls and mechanisms (which are referred to generally as ICOMs): 
• Function is a transformation of inputs to outputs, by means of some mechanisms, 
and subject to certain controls, that is identified by a verb or verb phrase that 
describes what must be accomplished and modeled by a box.  
• Inputs are resources transformed (refined) by the process.  
• Outputs are the things created through the transformation of the inputs by the 
process to achieve desired outcomes.  
• Controls are the things guiding the process: policies, guidelines, laws, standards, and 
best practice.  





Figure  3.4 A generic IDEF0 diagram (IDEF0 1993)  
3.6.1 IDEF0 Diagrams  
The IDEF0 models consist of three types of information: graphic diagrams, text and glossary. 
These diagram forms are cross-referenced. The graphic diagram is the main component of the 
IDEF0 model, containing boxes, arrows, box / arrow links and associated links. Boxes are 
each primary feature of the subject. These tasks are broken down or broken down into more 
detailed diagrams before the subject is represented to the level required to meet the goals of a 
specific project. The top-level diagram in the model gives the most general or abstract 
description of the subject represented by the model (IDEF0 1993). These diagrams are 
discussed below. 
1. Top-Level Context Diagram 
The top-level diagram in the model provides the most common or abstract description of the 
subject represented by the model. This diagram is followed by a chain of child diagrams 
providing more detail about the subject. Each model shall have a top-level context diagram, 
on which the subject of the model is represented by a single box with its bounding arrows. 
This is called the A-0 diagram (pronounced A minus zero) (IDEF0 1993) . 
2. Child Diagram 
The single function represented on the top-level context diagram may be decomposed into its 
major sub-functions by creating its child diagram. In turn, each of these sub-functions may be 
decomposed, each creating another, lower-level child diagram. On a given diagram, some of 
the functions, none of the functions or all of the functions may be decomposed. Each child 
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diagram contains the child boxes and arrows that provide additional detail about the parent 
box (IDEF0 1993). 
3. Parent Diagram 
A parent diagram is one that contains one or more parent boxes. Every ordinary (non-context) 
diagram is also a child diagram, since by definition it details a parent box. Thus, a diagram 
may be both a parent diagram (containing parent boxes) and a child diagram (detailing its 
own parent box). Likewise, a box may be both a parent box (detailed by a child diagram) and 
a child box (appearing on a child diagram). The primary hierarchical relationship is between 
a parent box and the child diagram that details it. The decomposition structure of IDEF0 is 
illustrated in Figure (3.5). 
 
Figure  3.5 Decomposition Structure of IDEF0 
3.7 Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Model 
The OODA Loop is a model for conceptualising how individuals and organisations make 
decisions (Gray et al. 2015). The OODA loop has been developed by Colonel John Boyd in 
1986, as outcomes of his years of research and analysis in his effort to describe the nature of 
adversarial engagements (Boyd 1996; Zager 2017). Boyd's concept created the ability to 
formulate and implement strategies in constantly changing environments.  The OODA loop is 
a subject of significant discussion in the cybersecurity community (Gray et al. 2015; Zager 
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2017) . For instance, Cisco summarises the significance of the OODA loop to cybersecurity 
“The OODA Loop assumes that continuous improvement is an integrated part of the process, 
allowing you to learn from your previous experiences, feeding lessons learned into the loop 
activities to achieve better performance every time you complete the four steps” (Muniz et al. 
2015). An OODA loop consists of following steps as shown in Figure (3.6).  
 
 
Figure  3.6 The OODA loop (Gray et al. 2015) 
These steps are observe, orient, decide and act. In context of cybersecurity capacity, the four 
steps as follows: 
• Observation phase:  this phase is the earliest stage of OODA loop process. The 
observation phase continuously analyse the social, internal, and external challenges.  
•  Orientation phase: this phase is the most critical part of the OODA loop. The raw of 
information obtained from the observation phase is analysed and synthesised into 
usable information that can be used to support decision phase. According to Coram 
(2002) the orientation phase is a "nonlinear feedback system" that spontaneously 







• Decision phase: the information gained from the observation and orientation phases 
including, social internal and external challenges, implicit and explicit guidance 
within the state, and the context of the circumstances under consideration, leads to 
the point at which a decision is made.   
• Action phase: As outlined in Boyd’s diagram, one can consider this process of acting 
upon opportunities discovered in the decision phase. Once the action is executed, the 
OODA loop closes (Coram 2002).  
The OODA Loop provides an abstract yet easily understood framework that can be applied to 
national cybersecurity and integrated into a broader capacity building process within a 
country. Its ability to adapt to a continuously changing environment allows the OODA Loop 
to formulate strategies and building cybersecurity capacity germane to the problems in the 
Digital Age (Sims 2011). 
3.8 Constructing (Authoring) an IDEF0 template analysis 
This section describes the statement templates that used to construct fundamentals of IDEF0 
requirements to develop the proposed framework. These templates are, Input statement 
template, Dimensions and Functions statement template, Mechanisms and Controls Template 
analysis and Output statement template. 
3.8.1 Input statement template 
This template has been built based on CCMM to model to review the key issues and assess 
the maturity levels of the Spring Land cybersecurity capacity. Moreover, it describes the 
state’s cybersecurity ecosystem; legal and regulation aspects, cultural and social aspects, 
educational aspects and mitigating risks over standards, organisations and technologies 
resilience. In addition, this template is used for analyse the data captured in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5. These findings provide the basis for the requirements of the NCCBF for countries 
in a transitional stage. 
Each dimension includes multiple factors and attributes (GCSCC, 2017), each making a 
significant contribution to capacity building. Each factor, involves five stages of maturity 
(Start-Up (S-UP), Formative (F), Established (E), Strategic (S) and Dynamic (D). The lowest 
indicator implies a non-existent, or inadequate, level of capacity, and the highest indicates 
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both a strategic approach, and ability to dynamically enhance environmental considerations, 
including operational, socio-technical, and political threats. Table (3.4) presents the template 





Indicators Challenges and issues 
S-UP F E S D  
        
        
Table  3.4 Input template statement 
3.8.2 Dimensions and Functions statement template 
Function is a transformation activity or process required for transform inputs to outputs, by 
means of some mechanisms, and subject to certain controls, that is identified by a function 
name and modelled by a box. As described in Section 3.6.1, in IDEF0 models the whole top-
level function is segmented into sub-function parts. In this study, the Dimension ID is used to 
describe the top level activity name for each dimension of the NCCBF based on the five 
dimensions of the CCMM. Table (3.5), presents the template statement that was used to 
create the functions for each dimension and the interaction of each activity with other 
activities in the same dimension of other dimensions. Function ID is used to describe the 
activities or the processes required for NCCB in each dimension. The function statements 
were created based on the stakeholders’ view from within the case study country and the 
existing national cybersecurity frameworks (Ben Naseir et al. 2019). More details on how to 







Function ID and description 
(Activities) 
Interactions 
Used to identify the 
name of the 
dimension. 
 Used to identify the name of 
the function and describe its 
purpose. 
Used to indicate the interactions 
of a given activity with other 
activities. 
Table  3.5 Functions statement template 
3.8.3 Mechanisms and Controls Template analysis 
This template is used to capture related mechanisms and controls for each dimension. The 
mechanisms are the different types of resources such as the cross-functional teams, systems 
and technology that are used to support functions (activities) to achieve change.  
Mechanism ID and 
description 
Rational of the 
mechanism 










motivation to use the 
mechanism 
Identifies the 
mechanism that the 
selected control is 
related to. 
Identifies the milieu 
of the selected 
supporting material 
and whether it is 
considered to be 
open source or 
proprietary. 
Table  3.6 Mechanisms and Controls Template analysis 
The controls are tools or checklists that ensure adherence to best practices such as the budget, 
knowledge and regulations. Table (3.6), above presents the template statement that was used 
to create the mechanisms and controls for each dimension. More details on how to use this 
template will be described in Chapter 6. 
3.8.4 Output template statements 
The output template statements perform two major activities: 1) Find the gaps in the 
implementation process in each dimension, and 2) Measuring maturity levels improvement in 
each dimension. Countries or organisations may have the capacity to change, but lack certain 
key capabilities. States  need  to  mature  cybersecurity  capacity and capabilities  at  national 
level  in  order  to  facilitate  the requirements expressed through national authoritative or 
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stakeholders. These national cybersecurity capabilities typically consist of people, processes 
and technology (Jacobs et al. 2017). However, a  comprehensive  way  to define  work  
deliverables  and  work  standards, and  provides  a  way to measure  the work deliverables is 
needed. One of the weaknesses that burdens IDEF0, is the dearth of modelling notations in 
any form of mistakes. This happens because the existence of IDEF0 based totally to the 
outline of the manner path and not to the identification or prediction of errors. Moreover, is 
not apparent to any form of quit user the effects that an blunders may have (Tsironis et al. 
2008).  
In this study OODA model is used to observe and react to the changing environment more 
quickly through the decision cycle. Based on the Mechanisms and Controls template analysis, 
the mechanisms are the different types of resources such as the cross-functional teams, 
systems and technology that are used to support functions (activities) to achieve change. The 
controls are tools or checklists that ensure adherence to best practices such as the budget, 
knowledge and regulations. These mechanisms and controls must be cross-examined to the 
fullest for a cost-effective and find the gaps in the implementation process in each dimension. 
The gap report suggests corrective actions to observation, orientation and decision phases by 
adding/updating functions, mechanisms and controls. After finds and measure capacity 
building gaps and react to it in each dimension, the maturity levels are measured to check the 
targeted maturity levels are achieved. In this study, the output template has been created 
based on the CCMM, existing maturity models and cybersecurity indexes that discussed in 
Chapter 2. Table (3.7) shows the template that used for measuring maturity levels 












aware of the 
mechanism 
principles, but have 




mechanism, but are 
yet to approved and 
reviewed 
Government has 






renewal process are 
confirmed 
Government has  
created and approved 
the mechanism 
and is constantly 
involved in a review 
process to keep the 




aware of the control 
principles, but have 
not yet created. 
Government has 
created the control, 












created and approved 
the control  
and is constantly 
involved in a review 
process to keep the 
mechanism in line with 
country needs 
Table  3.7 Output template statements
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3.9 Research ethics 
Research ethics are the moral principles that govern how researchers should carry out their 
work. According to Bhattacherjee (2012, p.137), research ethics is significant because, 
science has often been manipulated in unethical ways by people and organisations to 
advance their private agenda and engaging in activities that are contrary to the norms of 
scientific conduct. In social science there are ethical principles as indicated by 
(Bhattacherjee 2012; Bryman 2016): the first principle is ‘Voluntary participation and 
harmlessness’, the researcher must be aware not only physical harm but also psychological 
harm should be avoided to the participants. In addition, participation in the study is 
voluntary, that participants have the freedom to withdraw from the study at any time without 
any unfavourable consequences.  
In this research, no vulnerable groups such as children or people with disabilities. In order to 
avoid any harm, numerous measures were taken such as; 
• All participants were voluntary. 
• Considering the organisations that participants were employed, consent for their 
participation was gained from the host organisation. 
• All participants were clearly informed that they could withdraw at any time. 
The second principle was ‘informed consent’. All the participants were informed on the 
goal, purposes, and the nature of the study. According to Bhattacherjee (2012, p.138), 
researchers must retain these informed consent forms for a period of time (often three years) 
after the completion of the data collection process in order comply with the norms of 
scientific conduct in their discipline or workplace. In this study, comprehensive information 
was offered to the participants so that they could make an informed decision on the 
participation of the research. These included the following :  
• All participants were notified to potential risks in invitation information. 
• All participants were reminded of the risks before the start of survey and interview. 
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• All participants were informed that data would be published but would be 
untraceable and anonymous. 
• Signed consent was acquired. 
• All participants were provided with the University supervisory details for making a 
complaint. 
The third was ‘Anonymity and Confidentiality’. Anonymity indicates that the researcher or 
readers of the final research report or paper cannot identify a given response with a specific 
respondent. Bhattacherjee (2012, p.138), mention that in some research designs such as 
face-to-face interviews, anonymity is not possible. In other designs, such as a longitudinal 
field survey, anonymity is not desirable because it prevents the researcher from matching 
responses from the same subject at different points in time for longitudinal analysis. Under 
such circumstances, subjects should be guaranteed confidentiality, in which the researcher 
can identify a person’s responses, but promises not to disclose that person’s identify in any 
report, paper, or public forum. 
This research did not use any covert methods and no particular privacy issues were 
expected. It has been guaranteed that both interviewees were protected under anonymity and 
confidentiality by applying following steps:  
• Participants were coded anonymously 
• All data not in the public domain was anonymous 
• Data in the public domain, traceable to an anonymous participant, was anonymised 
or discarded 
• Raw data was not shared with anyone else including colleagues in the University 
The fourth and last principle was ‘no deception’. Experimental or empirical research often 
uses deception to inspire natural responses of participants (Bryman, 2016). This research did 
not involve any experimental settings but sought verbal and written answers based on their 
pre-existing perceptions and knowledge of their organisations.  
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3.10 Chapter summary: 
This chapter outlined the methodology adopted for this study, which were chosen in order to 
achieve the research objectives. The methodology applied in this study was adopted from 
the research onion diagram developed by Saunders et al. (2009) to create a cohesive 
alignment between research objectives and the research methodology. Saunders research 
onion provides a number of key steps in the positioning of research methodology; the 
research philosophy, research approach, research strategy and design, and data collection 
techniques. 
The overarching research approach used in this research is Design Science Research 
methodology (DSR). The major principle of the DSR is that knowledge and understanding 
of a design problem and its solution are acquired in the building and application of an 
artefact (Hevner et al. 2004). The DSR research process carried out in this study included 
five research activities as defined by the design science method framework of (Johannesson 
and Perjons 2014). In this study, data has been collected through Interactive Management 
(IM) and Focus Group discussion approaches, by utilising the CCMM for Nations as a 
baseline. Data collection techniques are used for in qualitative researches, they encourage 
interaction between all the participants, and therefore data that are more complex are 
obtained. The findings of collected data was analysed using a content analysis technique. 
This chapter also describes the statement templates that used to construct fundamentals of 
IDEF0 requirements to develop the proposed framework. In addition, research ethics have 
been discussed in this chapter. The following two chapters present the findings and analyses 







4. CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALISING THE 
PROBLEM SPACE IN SPRING LAND 
4.1 Introduction           
This chapter discusses the results of the Interactive Management (IM) through using the 
Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (CCMM) for Nation. As explained in Chapter 3, 
two qualitative approaches Interactive Management (IM) and Focus Group discussion have 
been conducted to analyse and review of the current state of Spring Land’s cybersecurity 
capacity. The participants in this stage are from different government agencies and national 
experts (lead practitioners) from the Spring Land National Cybersecurity Authority 
(NCSA). The participants were chosen for the purposes of this study where they reflected 
upon their roles within (NCSA), the responsibilities for Cybersecurity and the boundaries of 
the study. The results have provided a good opportunity to highlight the fact that countries 
in transitional stage are not operating in isolation and their failure in certain critical areas 
such as cyberspace are likely to have a ripple effect in destabilising stable states.  
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: in Section 4.2 the research goal is presented. In 
Section 4.3, the research method and process are discussed. The Process and Participants in 
this stage are provided in Section 4.3.1 and the Idea Writing (IW) are deliberated in Section 
4.3.2. The Nominal Group Techniques (NGT) and Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) 
outcomes are delivered in Section 4.3.4. Section 4.5 provides a summary of this chapter.  
4.2 Research Goal  
The primary purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the challenges that Spring Land face 
in relation to cybersecurity capacity. As explained in Chapter 1, the questions of this thesis 
served as reference points to guide the contextualisation questions. The questions in this 
stage were built based on the CCMM dimensions. Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre in 
University of Oxford has developed the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations 
(CCMM) through collaboration with international stakeholders. These include the 
Organization of American States (OAS), World Bank, Commonwealth Telecommunications 
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Organisation (CTO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (GCSCC 2017). 
According to GCSCC (2017), “The CCMM allows the review of current national 
cybersecurity capacity maturity. In each case, understanding the requirements to achieve 
higher levels of capacity should directly indicate areas requiring further investment, and the 
data required to evidence such capacity levels.” 
 
Figure  4.1: Illustration Dimension Framework (GCSCC 2017) 
Figure (4.1) illustrate the main five dimensions that considered for enhancing cybersecurity 
capacity on national or organisational level. These dimensions are helps Nation states to 
develop the Common Operational Picture (COP) of the State-of-Art of the Cyber defence 
and its threat landscape (GCSCC 2017). 
4.3 Research Method  
This chapter adopted an Interactive Management (IM) as research method and data 
collection. IM is a technique aimed to manage the complex conditions through structured 
group discussions between groups of participants familiar to the particular issue. 
Concentrating on the problem in detail and building a deeper understanding of it prevents 
premature solutions not fit for purpose (Warfield and Cárdenas 2002). According to Ward et 
al. (2017), IM supports a consensus of decision-making where group members reach an 
136 
 
agreement on a solution together, rather than voting and leaving some members unhappy 
with the outcome. It promotes effective communication, participation, and is an efficient use 
of participants’ time. 
4.3.1 Process and Participants 
In this study, a one-day Workshop hosted by NCSA was conducted for a total of 26 
participants from different stakeholders. NCSA had issued an invitation letter to all 
stakeholders to help the researcher in contextualising the problem space that is centred on 
the current Spring Land National security state. The information details of participants 
involved in the workshop are listed below in Table (4.1). 
Code The Organisation Job Role 
Years of 
Experience 
P1 National ID project 




Aman Private IT 
Security company 
Representor of the company and 
Sales Manger 
2 
P3 Spring Land Army IT Engineer in Army Signal Corps Since 2009 
P4 
Private IT Security 
company 
Private IT Security company +5 
P5 




IT Engineer in Spring Land Passport 




Central Bank of Spring 
Land 
Head of Information Security 
department 
10 
P7 Ministry of Interior Digital Crime unit 12 
P8 Ministry of Interior Digital Crime unit 10 
P9 Ministry of Defence 
MOD – General Manager of Human 








Head of Information Security 






Deputy Director of Safety and 









Deputy Head of Information Security 
department - Spring Land Telecom 
and Technology (LTT) (Main ISP in 
Spring Land) 
+8 

























IT Security Engineer - IT 
Department 
+2 
P19 Spring Land Army 
Training department – Spring Land 
Army 
- 
P20 Spring Land Army 







Head of Information Security 
department –mobile phone and 
internet services company 
Not specify 








Deputy Director of National 




P25 Spring Land Army 







Director of National Information 
Security and Safety Authority 
(NCSA) 
+4 
P27 Ministry of Defence 
Head of Human Resources 
Development Department 
Since 2015 
Table  4.1 IM Participants Details 
In this workshop, the researcher presented a brief explanation about the aim of this study, 
and how it will contribute to secure Spring Land cyber space. The participants were asked to 
read and complete a Participant Agreement Form before starting the session. Moreover, the 
researcher prepared a form used to gather information about the characteristics of 
participants, such as their roles in the organisation and years of experience. Related 
information is demonstrated in Appendix (1). The researcher then introduced IM techniques. 
This included Idea Writing (IW), Nominal Group Techniques (NGT) and Interpretive 
Structural Modelling (ISM). The (IW) technique has been used in order to gain participant’s 
ideas about Spring Land Cybersecurity issues and how we can tackle them. 
4.3.2 Idea Writing technique  
As explained in the section 3.4.3.1 of the research methodology chapter, IW needs a trigger 
question so participants can brainstorm ideas and exchange ideas. Participants were divided 
to three groups where ideas were collected. After a short break, results of the data were 
presented to them using a projector. The trigger question was: 
“What are the current issues of Cybersecurity in Spring Land?” 
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In addition, the researcher has created a table with a set of interactive questions based on the 
CCMM model represented in the Table (4.2). These questions are designed to help 
participants understand the content of the CCMM model in order to identify the problems 
and weaknesses of state institutions, and how to solve them. 
Dimensions Interactive questions Key Question 
D1- Cybersecurity 
policy and strategy 
1. What are the key objectives of 
the Cybersecurity policy and 
strategy? 
2. What is their comprehension of 
the strategic goals? 
3. What are current issues driving 
cybersecurity in the Spring Land 
context? 
When will the state be 
in a position to publish 
its national 
Cybersecurity strategy? 
D2- Cyber culture 
and society 
1. What would be the top priority 
to address cybersecurity across 
Spring Land? 
2. What is the cultural attitude of 
various agencies and co-operation 
to Cybersecurity defence? 
3. What are society challenges to 
imbedded Cybersecurity in the 
home/mobile? 
How do we address our 
societal challenges in 




1. What are the key objectives of 
the Cybersecurity education 
strategy? 
2. When will the Spring Land 
Government introduce 
Cybersecurity education in the 
schools? 
3. How will the Government tackle 
the skills gap in Cybersecurity 
training? 




education and address 
the growing skills gap? 
D4- Legal and 
regulatory 
frameworks 
1. How do we manage and regulate 
data protection loss (DPL)? 
2. Is our intellectual property rights 
(IP) fit for purpose? 
3. How will we align to the EU 
General Data Protection regulation 
(GDPR)? 
When do we start 







1. What do we need to facilitate a 
risk management culture? 
2. How can we engage Small 
Medium Enterprise (SME) and 
individuals to design and create 
next –generation security products? 
How do we intensify 
individuals or 
organisations to 
improve our national 
security posture? 
Table  4.2 Interactive Management Question Set 
During the session, participants were divided randomly into three groups to discuss the 
trigger question and provide their views about the issues related to the Cybersecurity in 
Spring Land. After IW, the information was numbered and organised, then placed into 
categories in which each ideas related to each of the CCMM dimensions. The lists of ideas 
generated from the groups question are represented using the input template analysis that 
created in Section 3.5.1 as shown in Table (4.3) below. 







D1-1. Lack of national Cybersecurity strategy. 
D1-2. Lack of national risk management plan and threat of cyber 
space has not identified on the national or sectors level. 
D1-3. There is no national roadmap for Cyber Defence strategy. 
D1-4. Difficulties in implementing the Cybersecurity strategy due to 
political issues and scarcity of resources for preparation of national 
Cybersecurity blueprint (government funding and human 
resources). 
D1-5. Lack of public and private partnership. In addition, there are 
no government forums to share information. 
D1-6. There is no national crisis management protocol and Incident 
response plan for national critical infrastructure assets have not been 
prioritised. 
D1-7. There is no national Cybersecurity framework to monitor the 




D2 - Cyber 
Culture and 
Society 
D2-1. Lack of Cybersecurity culture and absence of understanding 
of cyber-risk and consequences by citizens, employee of public and 
private sectors and decision makers. 
D2-2. Lack of awareness programs on the governmental level 
except some initiative from NCSA. 
D2-3. Citizens' confidence in the use of e-government services is 
weak due to the lack of interest of some sectors in providing 






D3-1. Dearth of experienced people for train and teach 
Cybersecurity programs and migration of experiences due to the 
security situation in the country. 
D3-2. There is no national plan or curriculums in educational 
system that meets the needs of Cybersecurity environment. 
D3-3. Education outputs in cybersecurity domain are weak and 
focused only on technical issues. 
D3-4. Lack of training collaboration between public and private 
sector. 
D3-5. There is no strategic view for Cybersecurity capacity 
building. 
D4 - Legal and 
Regulatory 
Frameworks 
D4-1. There is no cybersecurity legislation or regulations to protect 
personal, commercial and governmental data from unauthorized 
access, modification, destruction or misuse. In addition, the 
initiatives to issue laws related to cybersecurity and e-transactions 
issues are facing difficulties as a result of the political situation. 
D4-2. There is no legislation or regulations to report breaches and 
abuses on cyber space. 
D4.3. Absence of legislative system due to unrest political situation. 
D4-4. Poor cooperation between the authorities in the Ministries of 
Justice and Interior, especially in the field of digital criminal 
investigation 
D4-5. Absence of human rights law on cyber space. 
D4-6. There is no official national policy or framework for 
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reporting of or sharing technical vulnerabilities. 
D4-7. There is no specific legislation concerning to cybercrime, and 
there are no courts to handle cybercrime cases. 
D4-8. Lack of resources, expertise and laboratories for digital 
criminal investigation. 
D5 - Standards, 
Organisations, and 
Technologies 
D5-1. Lack of use of information security management system 
(ISMS) is a set of policies and procedures in all governmental 
sectors except some telecommunications provider (Almadar Mobile 
Operator). 
D5-2. Most government sectors use technologies and applications 
from third parties and international companies without paying 
attention to reviewing the security vulnerability in the systems. 
D5-3. There is no national agency for digital certification and there 
is no national Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
D5-4. There is no national benchmarking, auditing and risk 
assessment policy.D5-5. There is no national infrastructure 
resilience plan due to lack of coordination between the 
governmental agencies with respect to governing resilience efforts. 
In addition, military and political conflicts have extremely affected 
the resilience of infrastructure and exposed the sectors of 
telecommunications, electricity and water to destroy or stolen. 
D5-6. Most government sectors use technologies and applications 
from third parties and international companies without paying 
attention to reviewing the security vulnerability in the systems. 
Table  4.3 List of CCB Challenges in Spring Land 
After IW was categorised participants were asked to rank them between one and five, based 
on the importance of each category as represented in Table (4.4) were one is the most 





Category Ideas Rank 
Policy and strategy D1.1,D1.2,D1.3,D1.4,D1.5,D1.6,D1.7 1 
Culture and Society D2.1,D2.2,D2.3 2 
Education, training and skills D3.1,D3.2,D3.3,D3.4,D3.5 3 
Legal and regulatory frameworks D4.1,D4.2,D4.3,D4.4,D4.5,D4.6,D4.7,D4.8 2 
Standards, organisations, and 
technologies D5.1,D5.2,D5.3,D5.4,D5.5,D5.6 4 
Table  4.4 Categorisation of Idea 
In view of the aforementioned issues in Spring Land, these are revealing participants 
concerns. The lack of National Cybersecurity policy and strategy, legal framework, and 
cyber culture and awareness were ranked the most important issues. These issues need 
greater attention from the government because they are impacting the Spring Land 
Cybersecurity ecosystem. These issues were raised due to political issues and scarcity of 
resources for preparation of national Cybersecurity blueprint (government funding and 
human resources). Furthermore, participants also perceived that the absence of these 
frameworks creates more potential issues. For instance, there is lack of national risk 
management plan, and the threat of cyber space on national security has not identified. 
Likewise, there is no government forum to share information or report incidents, even 
between the government organisations or between public and private sectors. Moreover, 
there is no national roadmap for a Cyber Defence strategy. 
Participants also noted that there is a lack of Cybersecurity culture, and absence of 
understanding of cyber-risk and consequences by citizens, employees and decision makers. 
However, this issue identified that inside attacks provide the most challenges for 
governmental agencies. Furthermore, participants also observed that, there is no national 
plan or curriculums in educational system that meets the needs of Cybersecurity 
environment; this contributed to the shortages of skilled people. In addition, a lack control 
over mixed technologies and lack of Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plan in all 
governmental sectors were identified by the participant group. 
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4.3.3 Nominal Group Techniques (NGT)  
After the ideas writing was organised and numbered, the participants were asked to 
transformer these ideas into a set of objectives. These objectives were used to create an 
interpretive structural model and summarise the interactions between them. Table (4.5) 













D1.1- Adopt a national Cybersecurity framework and create collaborative model for include all stakeholders to write the 
national Cybersecurity strategy. 
D1.2- Develop information sharing mechanism between the public and the private sectors. 
D1.3- Establishment of a central committee for cybersecurity. 
D1.4-Increase the development of the Spring Land CERT and provide clear processes that define roles and responsibilities 
D1.5-Specify a national level for reporting of incidents and boost reporting. 
D1.6-Create a national list of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) assets and identify the risk priorities 
D1.7-Allocate funding for implement Cybersecurity framework 
D1.8-Start the development of a national cyber defense strategy and identify the threats to national security on cyber space. 
D2 - Cyber 
Culture and 
Society 
D2.1-Foster the efforts of the awareness at all decision makers level of government to raise understanding of risks and threats 
D2.2-Develop national awareness program compatible with the current situation targeting all society 
D2.3- Encourage all stakeholders to run regular awareness campaigns and provide training needs. 






D3.1-Develop national Cybersecurity education Cybersecurity modules. 
D3.2-Provide a sufficient budget for capacity building in understanding Cybersecurity issues, cryptographic techniques. 
D3.3-Combine the education with practical training. 
D3.4-Classify the training needs and develop cyber exercises and drills 




D3.6- Establish national Cybersecurity researches centre and develop collaborative training platforms between public and 
private sector. 
D4 - Legal and 
Regulatory 
Frameworks 
D4.1-Draft a national laws and regulations related to digital crime 
D4.2-Create a strong national legal framework for sharing of information incidents, vulnerability disclosure and report. 
D4.3- Build and strengthen national capacities in law enforcement , cyber related crimes investigation and prosecutors and 
judges 
D4.4-Establishing a specialised centre for digital forensic studies 
D4.5-Enhance national and international cooperation and mutual legal assistance in combating digital crime. 






D5.1-Adapt and adopt of international standards such as ISO27000 in all stakeholders. 
D5.2-Create a national risk assessment, crisis management and auditing framework. 
D5.3-Establish a national agency to issue digital signature certificate and create public key infrastructure. 
D5.4-Increase reliability of e-government and develop national resilience plan. 
D5.5-Enhance physical security. 
D5.6- Embed security-by-design, in buying technology or install software from overseas. 
Table  4.5 List of Objectives 
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In the last part of the workshop, we used NGT where participants were asked to choose their 
top three objectives from the list of each dimension. Each objective was rated between the 
numbers one and three, with one being the less important and three the most important. 
Table (4.6) shows the results of rating the objectives.  
During this stage a total of 19 participants voted on the objectives, and 7 participants failed 
to vote have because they were committed to other scheduled meetings, as department 




Table  4.6 Participant’s ranking of objectives
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P7 P8 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P21 P22 P23 Total 
D1-O1 2 2 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 41
D1-O2 1 1
D1-O3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 3 1 37
D1-O4 3 3
D1-O5 1 1 3 1 1 1 8
D1-O6 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 17
D1-O7 1 2 1 1 5
D1-O8 1 1 2
D2-O1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 16
D2-O2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 40
D2-O3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 39
D2-O4 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 20
D3-O1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 1 3 3 40
D3-O2 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 3 39
D3-O3 2 2 1 2 2 9
D3-O4 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 12
D3-O5 1 1 1 3 1 1 8
D3-O6 1 1 2 1 1 6
D4-O1 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 40
D4-O2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 1 31
D4-O3 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 27
D4-O4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
D4-O5 1 2 3
D4-O6 1 2 1 1 1 6
D5-O1 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 39
D5-O2 3 3 2 2 3 2 1 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 31
D5-O3 2 2 2 2 8
D5-O4 1 1 2 4
D5-O5 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 26









4.3.4 Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) 
The ISM technique helped the participants to examine the inter-relationships between the 
elements gained through the NGT process, and provided a structure for tackling its 
complexity (Dogan et al. 2011). The ISM is an acknowledged methodology for classifying 
relationships among a set of interconnected criteria, which define a problem or an issue 
(Shahabadkar 2012). The ISM was first proposed by Warfield in 1973, to analyse complex 
systems issues (Warfield 1974). In order to create a clear ISM, firstly the objectives generated 
in Section 4.3.3 were grouped by similarity, to facilitate the identification of the three most 
important objectives from each dimension, which are presented in Table (4.7). 
 
Table  4.7 Results of the important Objectives  
The interpretive structural model (ISM) derived from Table 19 and their interaction based on 
the dimensions of the CCMM is represented in Figure (4.2). The participants stressed that the 
national strategy is most important objective for enhancing Spring Land Cybersecurity 
Capacity. Although the priorities of the current government are, counterterrorism, political 
stability and solidity of the security, these efforts are all facilitated by security of Spring Land 
cyber space. The national blueprint is also important because of state interactions in 
cyberspace are characterised by uncertainty, rather than predictability of this era. This is 
manifested by the lack of national cyber frameworks, as well as the continued development of 
terrorist groups’ cyber capabilities in the region. Given this dilemma, an official cyber 
strategy is vital in both national and international contexts. 
The group of participants were concerned with how to balance the need to implement a 
national framework and the availability of government funding and human resources within a 
political situation of unrest. Moreover, the participant group believed that, creation of national 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P7 P8 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P21 P22 P23 Total 
D1-O1 2 2 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 41
D1-O3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 3 1 37
D1-O6 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 17
D2-O2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 40
D2-O3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 39
D2-O4 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 20
D3-O1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 1 3 3 40
D3-O2 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 3 39
D3-O4 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 12
D4-O1 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 40
D4-O2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 1 31
D4-O3 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 27
D5-O1 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 39
D5-O2 3 3 2 2 3 2 1 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 31









a strategy drives to create an effective national legal framework. The legal framework would 
assist to improve the sharing of information, incidents vulnerability disclosure and report 
between governmental sectors.  
D1.3Establishment of a central 
committee for cybersecurity 
(37)
D1.1 Adopt a national cyber 
security framework (41) D1.6 Create a national list of Critical 
National Infrastructure (CNI) assets 
(16)




D2.4 Improve e-services (20)
D3.1Develop a national cyber 
security education (40)
D3.4 Classify the training needs 
(12)
D 3 . 3 Provide a sufficient Budget 
capacity building  (39) 
D4.1 Draft national laws and 
regulations relating to digital crime 
(40)
D4.2 Create a strong national 
legal framework (31) D4.3 Build national capacity in law 
enforcement of cyber-related crime 
(27)
D5.1  Adapt and adopt international 
standards (39)D5.5 Enhance physical security 
(26)
D5.2 . Create a national risk 
management framework (31)
 
Figure  4.2 Interpretive Structural Model 
In addition, providing a robust national awareness program on consequences of cyber threats 
program compatible with the current situation, and targeting all society, is considered as a 
significant factor to improve the national Cybersecurity. This program would reinforce 
training needs on Cybersecurity issues to change the Cybersecurity culture. Furthermore, 
from the diminished shortages of skilled people, a sufficient budget is required to establish a 
national Cybersecurity research centre, and to develop collaborative training platforms 
between public and private sectors. The group advocated the adaptation of international 
standards such as ISO27000 in all governmental agencies helps in strengthening of the 
technical controls process. Nevertheless, development of the national resilience plan whilst 
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enhancing the physical security would help to increase national and organisational 
capabilities to resist and react to internal and external threats.  
The relationships among objectives were obtained from the judgment of the researcher and 
based on existing literature review. These relationships are then analysing using the adjacency 
matrix. The adjacency matrix is a binary matrix describing the graph with vertices and their 
order with respect to whether they are adjacent or not (Broome and Keever 1986). This 
matrix demonstrates the dependencies among objectives and it is constructed by setting (1) 
whenever there is a relationship in ISM graph between objectives and setting (0) when there 
is no relationship as shown in Table (4.8). The term Function (F) is used instead of objectives 
in this Table (20) based on the IDEF0 requirements.  As described in Section 2.9, the 
function is a transformation activity that describes what must be accomplished, which herein 
are the objectives. For instance, F1.1 means objective D1.1, F1.2 means objective D1.1 and it 
is same for other objectives. In addition, the top three objectives in each dimension are 
represented sequentially. For example, F1.3 is used in dimension one equivalent to objective 






D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
F1.1 F1.2 F1.3 F2.1 F2.2 F2.3 F3.1 F3.2 F3.3 F4.1 F4.2 F4.3 F5.1 F5.2 F5.3 
 
D1 
F1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F1.2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F1.3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D2 
F2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F2.2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D3 
F3.1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F3.3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D4 
F4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
F4.2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
D5 
F5.1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
F5.2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F5.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Dependencies 5 0 1 5 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 1 
Table  4.8 Adjacent Matrix
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Based on the results from Table (4.8), the function template analysis created in Section 3.5.2 
has been used to capture all required functions for each dimension and the interaction of each 
activity with other activities in the same dimension of other dimensions as shown in Table 






Functions ID and description (Activities ) Interaction 
D1 
F1.1.Adopt a national Cybersecurity framework and create 
collaborative model for include all stakeholders to write the national 
Cybersecurity strategy. 
• Depends on F1.2,F1.3,F2.2,F3.1, and F4.2   
• Supports F3.2 
F1.2. Establishment of a central committee for cybersecurity. • Supports F1.1 
F1.3.Create a national list of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) 
assets and identify the risk priorities 
• Depends on F5.2 
• Supports F1.1 and F2.2 
D2 
F2.1. Develop national awareness program compatible with the current 
situation targeting all society 
• Depends on F1.3,F2.2,F3.1,F3.3, and F5.1 
• Supports F1.1 and F2.2 
F2.2. Encourage all stakeholders to run regular awareness campaigns 
and provide training needs. 
• Depends on F2.3 
• Supports F2.1 
F2.3. Improve e-services to promote required trust and improve the 
application of security measures. 




F3.1. Develop national Cybersecurity education Cybersecurity modules. • Depends on F3.2, and F3.3 
• Supports F2.1 
F3.2.Provide a sufficient budget for capacity building in understanding 
Cybersecurity issues, cryptographic techniques. 
• Depends on F1.1 
• Supports F3.1and F4.3 
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D3.4. Classify the training needs and develop cyber exercises and drills • Supports F2.1and F3.1 
D4 
F4.1. Draft a national laws and regulations related to digital crime • Depends on F4.2,F5.1 and F4.3 
• Supports F1.1,F5.3 
F4.2. Create a strong national legal framework  • Supports F1.1 and F4.1 
F4.3. Build and strengthen national capacities in law enforcement • Depends on F3.2, and F3.3 
• Supports F2.1 
D5 
F5.1.Adapt and adopt of international standards such as ISO27000 in all 
stakeholders. 
• Supports F2.2,F4.1 and F5.2 
F5.2.Create a national risk assessment, crisis management and auditing 
framework 
• Depends on F5.1, and F5.2 
• Supports F1.3 
F5.3.Enhance physical security. 
 
• Depends on F4.1 
• Supports F5.2 




4.5 Chapter Summary 
In conclusion, the IM workshop provided a rational grounding on what the current 
Cybersecurity challenges in Spring Land, and how we can address them. All participants 
agreed that the current challenges should be tackled urgently, with a need towards developing 
a national cybersecurity framework. These challenges are summarised below: 
1. There are no Spring Land official documents describing the cyber threats to Spring 
Land, which means no national strategy related to the Cybersecurity field is exist. 
This lack is due to political instability and scarcity of resources for preparing the 
national Cybersecurity blueprint (government funding and human resources). 
2. There are a Lack of Cybersecurity culture and absence of understanding 
consequences of cyber-risk by citizens, employee of public and private sectors and 
decision makers. The reasons for this are no large-scale of training and an awareness 
campaign on Cybersecurity with all governmental sectors is provided. Thus, 
Citizens' confidence in the use of e-government services is weak 
3. Dearth of experienced people for train and teach Cybersecurity programs and 
migration of experiences due to an unstable situation in the state. This is as a result 
of lack of strategic view for Cybersecurity Capacity building that meets the needs of 
Cybersecurity environment in the Spring Land. Furthermore, there is no sufficient 
budget for training needs such as cyber exercises and drills.  As well as, there is no 
interdisciplinary research centres that are developed collaborative training platforms 
between public and private sector and involved in a wide-ranging study related to the 
Cybersecurity issues. 
4. There is no cybersecurity legislation or regulations to protect personal, commercial 
and governmental data from unauthorized access, modification, destruction or 
misuse. In addition, there is no national mechanism to report breaches and 
vulnerabilities on cyber space. This is due to absence of legislative system due to 
unrest political situation. 
5. There is no national infrastructure resilience plan due to lack of coordination 
between the governmental agencies with respect to governing resilience efforts. In 
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addition, military and political conflicts have extremely affected the resilience of 
infrastructure and exposed the sectors of telecommunications, electricity and water 
to destroy or stolen. In addition, most government sectors in Spring Land are 
vulnerable as it immensely relies on overseas software and technology products, 
















5. CHAPTER 5: ASSESSMENT OF 
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CAPACITY 
MATURITY LEVELS IN SPRING LAND 
5.1Introduction   
This chapter discusses the results of applying the CCMM model to review the key issues 
related to the Libyan cyber security policy and strategy. Moreover, it describes the state’s 
cybersecurity ecosystem; legal and regulation aspects, cultural and social aspects, educational 
aspects and mitigating risks over standards, organisations and technologies resilience. The 
results show that Spring Land has many issues such as lack of cybersecurity culture and 
collaborative road-map across government sectors which results in instability within the 
country. The assessments feed into the requirement analysis of the National Cybersecurity 
Capacity Building Framework that can be utilised to organise and test the cybersecurity for 
nations. The assessment results of the CCMM have been verified and validated by mapping 
them with ITU GCI Pillars reports 2017 and 2018. More information is available in Section 5.4.  
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 provides the research goal. The 
research method, data collection technique, and profiles of participants are discussed in 
Section 5.3. Section 5.4 discusses the levels of Spring Land cybersecurity capacity maturity 
for each dimension in the CCMM. Critical Reflection of Nation State Posture is delivered in 
Section 5.5. The summary of this chapter is discussed in Section 5.6.  
5.2 Research Goal  
The main goal of this Chapter is to assess the current maturity levels of  Cybersecurity 
capacity in Spring Land by using the CCMM, and to determine areas of capability that are 
required by the Spring Land Government in order to improve Cybersecurity Capacity of the 
state. In order to gather the data, the Focus Group Discussion method has been chosen and 




5.3 Research Method 
5.3.1 Focus group 
Focus group discussions aim to explore a range of ideas and feelings that individuals have 
about certain issues, as well as illuminating differences in the perspectives of groups of 
individuals (Tong et al. 2007). When using a focus group technique, the data are collected by 
means of precise group collaboration on a chosen topic (Doody et al. 2013). Similar to the 
interview technique, focus groups are an interactive approach with the benefit that during the 
process of collecting data and information, diverse perspectives and conceptions can emerge. 
The authors had selected focus group method since it offers a richer set of data compared to 
other qualitative approaches (Kitzinger 1995b)  
5.3.2 Participants’ profile  
Five national experts (lead practitioners) from (NCSA) participated in sessions hosted in 
Tripoli where they reflected upon their roles within NCSA, the responsibilities for National 
security and the boundaries of the study. National Cybersecurity Authority (NCSA) was 
established by a decree No # (28) on January 22, 2013 by the Ministerial Council of the State 
of Spring Land (NISSA 2013). NCSA leads the national Cybersecurity program in Spring 
Land in terms of technical, operational and strategic levels for the State to achieve resilience. 
Table (5.1) represents participant details, their roles in NCSA, and work experience in the 
field of Information Security. For confidentiality purposes, the names of participants were not 
disclosed. The researcher set-up a table and a set of questions based on CCMM, then 
distributed them to the participants in the discussion. Table (5.2) represents the example of 
these dimensions and the questions. Additional information can be found in Appendix (3).  
The discussion was recorded using a smartphone application, then later transcribed into a 
word document in Arabic language, which the researcher then translated into the English 




Code  Job Description Role in NCSA Years of Experience 
N1 
Deputy Director of 
National Cybersecurity 
Authority (NCSA). 
Assisting the general director 
of NCSA and Chairman of 
the committee of preparing 
the Cybersecurity Strategy in 
Spring Land. 
Almost 15 years 
N2 Head of Spring Land-CERT 
Managing and monitoring the 
Cybersecurity incidents 
response team and 
Communicate with 
international and local 
organisations. 
8 years 
N3 Head of Awareness and General Relations 
Develop Cybersecurity 
awareness and training 
programs. Communicate with 
public and private sectors 
regarding the preparation of 
awareness programs. 
2 years 
N4 Head of Internal Auditor office 
Review the NCSA business 
process. 2 years 
N5 
Director of National 
Cybersecurity 
Authority (NCSA). 
Chairman of the committee of 
preparing the Cybersecurity 
Strategy in Spring Land 
2 years 
Table  5.1 Focus group participants’details 
In all focus group meetings, the researcher served as the facilitator and moderator. The role of 
the facilitator (Patton 1990) was to encourage participants to take an active part in high-
quality discussions centred on the topic of State Resilience. Moreover, the researcher 
provided a brief explanation of the idea of the project, domains of CCMM model, and the 
interview questions. NCSA participants were asked to complete a Participant Agreement 
Form before commencement of these discussions, more information can be found in 
Appendix (1). Furthermore, the researcher also prepared a form to profile the characteristics 
of each participant, such as their roles in NCSA and their years of experience. Further 










Challenges and issues 










     Are we conducting Cybersecurity awareness activities for 
the critical services? How? 
What are the cybersecurity issues currently been addressed 
and what is the degree of importance of each issue? 
Are there any standard, policies and security measures to 
promote trust in e-services 
Is there legislation or regulations detailing privacy? 
D2-2 
     
D2-3 
     
D2-4 
     
Table  5.2 Example of Multi-Dimensional National Cybersecurity Question Set for the 
Review of the Spring Land Security Posture 
5.4 Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity levels of Spring Land  
The outcomes of the Spring Land Cybersecurity capacity discussion using CCMM are 
summarised as follows: 
5.4.1 Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy Indicators 
This dimension according to the GCSCC (2017), explores the capacity of the government to 
design, create, organise and implement the cybersecurity strategy. Through the discussion, 
this dimension was classified from start-up to strategic stages. In Spring Land, no national 
Cybersecurity strategy exists; however, NCSA has been assigned to be in charge of the 
Cybersecurity program.  
“NCSA leads the security of information and cybersecurity in Spring Land and there is no 
body or group related to cybersecurity in Spring Land. In general, we can say that we are in 
a strategic level with lack of financial support because of the political situation’’- N1 
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NCSA has a plan to provide a national Cybersecurity strategy and framework by 2019. The 
plan will aim to engage multiple stakeholders’ directly and indirectly, and target all public 
and private sectors. In addition, NCSA had created a national Computer Emergency Response 
Team (SPRING LAND-CERT), which is working at the level of NCSA departments only. 
This is due to lack of co-operation on the state level for many reasons such as ; lack of a 
national strategy, administrative complications, and furthermore there is no trust between all 
sectors, political orientations and poor awareness. 
‘‘In general, we have national accreditation to represent Spring Land in the world, 
but there is no national plan, and also, the communication channels between the 
sectors is very weak due to the fear of dealing with each other for several reasons; 
including obstruction of administrative procedures suffering from a lack of 
information sharing between all sectors, political orientations and poor 
awareness’’ - Director of Spring Land-CERT. 
According to the Director of Spring Land-CERT, 
‘‘there is a good cooperation on the international level as Spring Land is a member in 
different international organisations such as; the Organisation of The Islamic Cooperation – 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (OIC-CERT); AfricaCERT; and for the future has a 
plan to get a membership in the global Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
(FIRST) by 2019’’. 
Furthermore, NCSA has a good co-operation with Oman-CERT and Tunisia-CERT. The 
participants agreed that Spring Land is in a strategic level due to national and international 
recognition as an organisation, but there are no a co-ordination mechanisms for incident 
response at the national level. 
‘‘generally we can say that the international cooperation is high, due to the existence of 
international concerns of cyber risks, but at the national level, it is weak and the cooperation 
is based on the personal relations between the authority and some other government 
sectors’’ - Director of Spring Land-CERT 
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The NCSA team had mentioned that they were thinking about the creation of a National 
Security Operation Centre, containing Spring Land-CERT and cyber threat intelligence 
within one centre. 
On the subject of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Protection, the Spring Land 
government has not issued a list of (CNI). Yet, the physical security is very impressive and 
most of the Spring Land critical systems have been destroyed. For instance, the SCADA 
system in the Man-Made River that provides water to all cities in Spring Land was destroyed 
as result of fighting between Militias. 
‘‘In the aspect of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Protection, Spring Land is at an 
extremely low-scale and the government has not issued a list of (CNI). In general, the 
physical security has a negative impact on CNI and there are no clear processes to reveal 
who is in charge of protecting all sectors, except the telecommunication sector’’ - Director of 
Internal Auditor Department. 
Moreover, the Deputy Director of NCSA declared that the NCSA awareness team have 
planned to conduct a workshop about SCADA security to the Man-Made River authority, but 
their response was: 
“The SCADA system is out of service for a year or more, because all links and cables 
were stolen, because militias were thinking that the cables were made from a copper 
wire to sell them’’. 
Additionally, there is no national response plan to handle Cybersecurity incidents, and there is 
no co-ordination mechanism established. According to the Director of Spring Land-CERT, 
‘‘National strategy for risk assessment is currently unavailable and is not specified or rated, 
but there is a considerable interest within the telecommunications sector in the field of 
physical security to protect Spring Land's telecommunications infrastructure. Nevertheless, at 
the level of the state, we are in a start-up level’’. 
In relation to crisis management, there are no government strategies or protocols dealing with 
cyber or physical crisis. 
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‘‘There is no national framework for analysing and identifying risks and threats. There are 
currently efforts to establish a centre, and we are working on it. The proposal is submitted to 
the Prime Minister’s Council to build a homeland crisis centre (National Crisis Management 
Centre). We could say that we are still in the start-up-level’’ - Deputy Director of NCSA. 
Additionally, all participants have mentioned that Spring Land does not have a cyber defence 
policy as a result of political instability. 
In relation to Digital Redundancy, there is no official business continuity plan or recovery on 
the national level, and there is a lack of co-ordination between public and private sectors. In 
addition, most of the organisation does not have a disaster recovery plan or log and event 
management. 
‘‘For example, there is a Spring Land institution that I cannot mention its name due to the 
confidentiality that has lost millions of Dinars, and when we investigated that, we found that 
there is no log management or disaster recovery plans in this organisation’’ - Director of 
Spring Land-CERT. 
On the other hand, the NCSA team has mentioned that some sectors in Spring Land, like the 
Spring Land central Bank and Telecommunications sector have a business continuity 
recovery plan, but at the state level, there is not. These sectors are acting freely with NCSA, 
and NCSA as an authority is considered as an umbrella for applying future plans to co-
ordination on local level. 
‘‘NCSA is acting freely in the telecommunications sector, acting in a way of simple freedom 
in the banking sector, and acting more freely in the oil and gas sector. Thus, in every sector, 
we gain trust for a while, but the authority is considered as an umbrella for applying future 
plans, and we can say that we are in Formative level’’ -Head of Awareness & General 
Relations Division. 
5.4.2 Cyber Culture and Society Indicators 
According to the GCSCC (2017) model, this dimension looks at reviewing vital elements of a 
responsible cyber-culture and society at the individual and governmental level, as observed 
by a variety of stakeholders. During the discussion, we came to understand that the Spring 
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Land capacity of this dimension is considered as a Start-up level. The Head of Awareness & 
General Relations Division in NCSA pointed-out that “NCSA has conducted awareness 
activities for the governmental sectors. As a result of these activities, NCSA reported a lack of 
awareness program in all governmental sectors and society’’. It was also mentioned that 
NCSA had run a volunteer campaign (Karin) that targeted some universities in Tripoli. This 
campaign addressed different Cybersecurity issues to raise Cybersecurity culture between 
students. 
‘‘One of the things that we have been focused on is the increase in the use of internet by 
citizens of all age groups, for example, social networking sites in Spring Land specifically. 
We have prepared a range of lectures to raise awareness from 8 to 10 different topics, such as 
social networking, cloud computing, information security, Internet stuff, personal computer 
security, spam, ransom viruses, how the terrorists hide their online activities, and privacy 
protection in the digital community’’ - Head of Awareness & General Relations Division. 
Another part of national awareness activity from NCSA is the Child Online Protection 
program. This program is targeting children and their families within a timeframe from 5 to 
10 years. Additionally, NCSA has a plan to adopt and apply international standards from ITU 
about cyber awareness programs. 
‘‘The authority is trying to apply international standards from ITU, and we have a written 
implementation plan to launch the program. We can say that we are in the start-up level with 
lack of government support’’ - Head of Awareness & General Relations Division. 
Furthermore, NCSA had prepared a leaflet written in Arabic language and sent it to all public 
sectors in Spring Land to improve and change the Cybersecurity mind-set. This leaflet has 
covered different topics such as: Spam, Scam, Phishing, Information Security, Wireless 
Network security and Cloud Computing Security. Likewise, NCSA has prepared a national 
awareness program on cybersecurity in general. This program focused heavily on spamming, 
phishing, and dangers of smart phone mobile application, specifically Android applications. 
For example, it was discussed that most mobile users in Spring Land had been targeted by 
malware attacks, which is considered as a big dilemma due to lack of user awareness. 
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“We have noted that most of mobile users in Spring Land is a target to malware attacks, and 
this a big problem we are currently facing” - Head of Awareness & General Relations 
Division. 
Furthermore, NCSA has reported that some members of an organised crime group in Tripoli 
have been arrested. This group was supported by external parties for unknown reasons, which 
were likely to be political and the group are targeting certain individuals in Spring Land. 
‘‘There was an investigation by a security organisation in co-operation with the NCSA, and 
the result was discovered that a group of organised crime supported by external parties and 
for unknown reason, which is likely to be political, especially in Tripoli. This group is 
targeting certain individuals, and some of these group members have been arrested’’ - 
Deputy Director of NCSA. 
Another essential point that has been mentioned by the NCSA team is where there is a lack of 
skilled people and Cybersecurity awareness raising campaigns to deal with Cybersecurity 
incidents in most government sectors. Consequently, the cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities have been dramatically increased. 
With regards to confidence and trust on the Internet, some e-government services in Spring 
Land have been developed and implemented, but there is a lack of trust because there are no 
efforts to improve online security from most of the governmental sectors. Some examples of 
lack of trust in online services were given by NCSA members. In certain online services 
provided by most organisations using social media, such as Facebook, there is a lack of 
security procedures. As a result of this, a majority of the organisations were subjected to 
cyber-attacks and material losses. For example, one of the commercial banks had been hacked 
from outside of Spring Land with co-operation from employees working inside the bank by 
using fake Facebook pages. These pages were used to activate the VISA credit card and 
increase the limit of withdrawal of foreign currency (USA Dollar). The reason behind that is 
no national public key infrastructure or digital signature certificates were in place. 
‘‘Spring Land has been considered as a target of e-hunting; these are hackers from inside 
and outside Spring Land. These hackers are creating fake pages for banks to register your 
data in foreign exchange services, or activation of Visa card services, or increasing the 
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withdrawal limit. Most of these people are unfortunately from within the banking institutions 
acting in co-operation with people outside of Spring Land, and there are no public key 
structure and digital certificates to protect it’’ - Director of Internal Auditor Department. 
Furthermore, there is no legislation on privacy online that has been issued, and the maturity of 
this factor is considered in a Start-up stage. Spring Land has not taken steps to raise the 
maturity of this factor, except some initiative to issue law for electronic transactions. These 
initiatives are not accredited officially due to political issues and absence of the legislative 
body. 
5.4.3 Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills Indicators 
This dimension reviews the availability and superiority of national Cybersecurity education, 
training, and skills development (GCSCC 2017). Through the discussion, it has been noted 
that Cybersecurity education, training and skills capacity in Spring Land is appearing in Start-
up level. There are no plans at the national level to raise the efficiency of education in the 
field of cybersecurity. 
‘‘There are no plans at the state level in defining the required educational curricula in 
cybersecurity’’ - Head of Awareness & General Relations Division. 
Additionally, there are no financial allocations for it at the state level. There is no co-
ordination between universities and private companies related to Cybersecurity training, and 
there are no plans to continue with training government employees in Cybersecurity. 
‘‘There are no plans at the level of the state in the field of raising the efficiency of employees 
in public and private sectors’’ - Deputy Director of NCSA. 
Through the discussion, participants mentioned that NCSA have their own plan to train the 
authority staff, and tried to make it as a guide to all sectors, but most of them were not 
interested. The NCSA team had joined some international workshops, cyber drill and 
conferences related to Cybersecurity. 
‘‘The authority participated in some workshops and international cyber drill, several 
international conferences in Tunis, Qatar. Also, the cyberspace evaluation’s conference in 
Amman, and attended the annual meetings of the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation 
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(OIC), accompanied by training courses to improve the efficiency of our employees’’ - NCSA 
team. 
Moreover, the NCSA team noticed that within some enterprise boards, their executives within 
private and state-owned companies understand the seriousness of the subject, but there is no 
real training plan for the staff. The executive director depends on IT departments to deal with 
Cybersecurity issues in the organisations. 
‘‘The awareness exists, but there are no real initiatives, and there is no plan in the field of 
raising the efficiency of employees in public and private sectors’’ - NCSA team. 
5.4.4 Legal and Regulatory Frameworks Indicators 
This dimension looks intently at the government’s capacity to design and develop national 
legislation and accompanying by-laws, directly and indirectly relating to cybersecurity. This 
particularly focuses on the topics of ICT security, privacy and data protection issues, 
cybercrime, and on the law enforcement, prosecution services, and courts (GCSCC 2017). 
In Spring Land, the level of maturity for this dimension is considered at Start-up phase. There 
is no cyber and ICT security related legislation or regulation, except some initiative by the e-
Commerce Chamber of the Ministry of Economy in co-operation with some specialised 
companies from Korea. This is to prepare a proposal generally aimed towards the issues of 
the Electronic Transaction law and Electronic Crime law. These initiatives are facing many 
problems, but the crucial problem is jurisdictional fragmentation due to political instability. 
‘‘The e-Commerce Chamber of the Ministry of Economy in co-operation with some 
specialised companies from Korea prepares a proposal and that generally aims to draft an 
electronic crimes law to conduct electronic government transactions and services in 
cooperation with the authority, and the participation of the former committee. But these 
initiatives are not issued yet due to jurisdictional fragmentation from political instability’’ - 
Director of Internal Auditor Department. 
Moreover, there is a Digital crime unit in the Ministry of the Interior that deals with this type 
of crime by applying other laws relating to ordinary crime. For example, where a theft may 
occur that would be dealt with under traditional laws, rather than cyber-specific laws. 
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Regarding Privacy, data protection and human rights, Spring Land does not have any related 
regulations or laws. 
‘‘There are no laws related to protect systems and data’’ - NCSA team. 
In addition, law enforcement, along with the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime 
services in Spring Land are facing a shortage of skills to handle cybercrime cases. Moreover, 
there is no national mechanism to report or disclosure cyber related crime and vulnerability. 
Also, there are no specific courts dealing with digital crime, and no training provided to build 
capacity in this particular dimension.  
5.4.5 Standards, Organisations, and Technologies Indicators 
According to CCMM model, this dimension explores the significance of employing 
Cybersecurity standards, and at least minimal adequate practices (GCSCC 2017). Through the 
discussion, all participants agreed with the statement that Spring Land is at Start-up stage. 
There are no Cybersecurity standards adapted to procurement and Software Development in 
all governmental sectors. As explained by the NCSA team, there is an attempt to start the 
project of implementing international standards, but there is a shortage of skilled people and 
financial resources. 
‘‘There is an attempt to start the project of implementing international standards, but we have 
a lack of resources and expertise in the public and private sectors’’ - NCSA team. 
There is no national agency or framework to monitor the implementation of standards, and 
minimal acceptable practices in all governmental sectors. In addition, there is a lack of 
research centres in this field and poor co-operation between the public and private sector in 
training and skill development. 
‘‘There is no national framework or organisation to monitor the adaption of international 
standards. But, there is some future plans from the authority. In addition, there are no 
existing national research centres in this field’’ - NCSA team. 
As motioned by participants in the discussion of Dimension 1, not all sectors have a Disaster 
Recovery plan or Business Continuity plan. All participants pointed-out that the government 
does not have a plan to manage, monitor, and evaluate national infrastructure resilience. 
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5.5 Critical Reflection of Nation State Posture 
A discussion of the focus group was recorded using a smartphone application, then later 
transcribed into a word document in Arabic language, which the researcher then translated 
into the English language. For more information, please refer to in Appendix (4).  
The analysis method used in this stage was content analysis as a qualitative approach. Since 
the data were captured the themes are identified based on the indicators of the CCMM. The 
input template analysis that constructed in Section 3.5.1 was used to analyse the data. Table   
(5.5), presents the maturity levels of all dimensions of Spring Land cybersecurity capacity 
based on the CCMM. These results were mapped with ITU GCI Pillars to validate and verify 
the results. The GCI report 2017 and 2018 (ITU 2017a)  along with other official government 
or ministry websites will provide further information used to define the particular stages of 
maturity for each factor of the CCMM. 
The 2017, 2018 GCI reports are finer grained having 25 indicators with 157 binary, (0) for 
none compliance or (1) full compliance questions distributed among the indictors. These 
indictors have been selected based on the five pillars (Organisational, Legal, Technical, 
Capacity Building and Cooperation). Each of the indictor is associated with a specific colour. 
The report summarise the countries’ level of commitment to every pillar and sub-pillars 
(green for high, yellow for medium, and red for low) (ITU 2017a). The ranking is calculated 
based on the following notations: 
GCI2017, 2018: CIc = 𝐼𝐼𝐼
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Where: Iqc is a Normalized value of individual indicator q for country c. 
CIc is a Value of the composite indicator for country c. 
The 2017 report indicates that, Spring Land scored CIc = 35.12 out of 157 which is 0.226 
GCI out of 1 as shown in Table (24). In the 2018 report Spring Land scored CIc = 32.34 out 
of 157 which is 0.206 GCI out of 1 as shown in Table (5.3). The difference between scores 
from 2017 and 2018 demonstrate dramatic changes in the GCI scores with Spring Land being 
the highest negative change of (-2.78). The GCI reports show that Spring Land’s 
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preparedness for cyber threats has descended from 104 out of 136 in 2017 to 117 out of 155 
worldwide countries.  
Index score Regional Rank  Global Rank 
2017 2018 2017 out of 17 Member States  
2018 out of 22 
Member States 
2017 out of 136 
Member States 
2018 out of 155 
Member States 
0.224 0.206 - 16 104 117 
Table  5.3 GCI index 2017, 2018 Spring Land results 
The both reports show that, Spring Land government officially established the National 
Cybersecurity Authority (NCSA). NCSA’s primary mission is to encourage and sustain 
secure use of ICTs as well as to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to the associated 
cyber risks (NCSA 2013). Additionally, NSCA is responsible as standardisation body to set 
the cybersecurity good practices and provide professional training courses for government 
sectors. In the same year, with the support of (ITU), Spring Land-CERT has been established 
with national-level responsibilities and is charged with prevention, detection, and mitigation 
of cyber threats. Due to the current political conflict and the austerity measures, NCSA faces 
lack of funding which hindered most of the attempts of advancing Cybersecurity in the 
context (Matsubara 2014).  
In stark contrast, despite these lacks, Spring Land has been demonstrating strength in the 
cooperation pillar specifically in International participation. Spring Land is a member in 
different international such as the Organisation of The Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Africa-
CERT and the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) (NCSA 2013). The 
overall results of GCI index from ITU are mapped to the results of the focus group and 
presented in Table (5.4). The results show that, Spring Land’s ability to address cybersecurity 
concerns is currently not at a level that inspires sufficient public confidence; hence, a cogent 
methodology to optimise its IT resources is most necessary.   
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The GCI reports 2017 and 2018 results (ITU 2017a, 2018a) Focus group results 
Spring Land has Responsible Agency has been established.  “NCSA leads the security of information and cybersecurity in Spring Land and there 
is no body or group related to cybersecurity in Spring Land. In general, we can say 
that we are in a strategic level with lack of financial support because of the political 
situation’’- N1. 
The Responsible agency is presents Spring Land in 
international community and responsible for international 
cooperation. 
‘‘In general, we have national accreditation to represent Spring Land in the world’’ 
N2 
Spring Land does not have an officially recognised national 
cybersecurity strategy. However, NCSA is currently 
developing a national cybersecurity strategy. 
‘‘In general, we have national accreditation to represent Spring Land in the world, 
but there is no national cybersecurity plan or strategy” N2,N5 
Spring Land-CERT is up and running since February 2013 
providing some basic services under the umbrella of the 
National Cybersecurity Authority (NCSA). 
“NCSA had created a national Computer Emergency Response Team (SPRING 
LAND-CERT), which is working at the level of NCSA departments only” N2,N5. 
Spring Land has officially recognised partnerships with the 
following organizations: as the Organisation of The Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), Africa-CERT and the Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams (FIRST) 
‘‘there is a good cooperation on the international level as Spring Land is a member 
in different international organisations such as; the Organisation of The Islamic 
Cooperation – Computer Emergency Response Teams (OIC-CERT); AfricaCERT; 
and for the future has a plan to get a membership in the global Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams (FIRST) by 2019’’ N1,N2,N5 
NSCA is running a national program in raising the awareness “NCSA has conducted awareness activities for the governmental sectors. As a result 
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and promoting cybersecurity specific educational program 
among the public and private sectors. 
of these activities, NCSA reported a lack of awareness program in all governmental 
sectors and society’’ N1,N3,N4 
Spring Land does not have any officially recognised national or 
sector-specific research and development (R&D) 
programs/projects for cybersecurity standards, best practices 
and guidelines to be applied in either the private or the public 
sector. 
‘‘There are no plans at the state level in defining the required educational curricula 
in cybersecurity’’ N3. 
‘‘There are no plans at the level of the state in the field of raising the efficiency of 
employees in public and private sectors’’N1 
Spring Land does not have specific legislation pertaining to 
cybercrime. 
‘‘There are no laws related to protect systems and data online’’ - NCSA team. 
Spring Land does not have any certified government and public 
sector agencies certified under internationally recognised 
standards in cybersecurity. 
‘‘There is no national framework or organisation to monitor the adaption of 
international standards. However, there are some future plans from the authority. In 
addition, there are no existing national authority’’ - NCSA team. 
Table  5.4 Mapping Focus group results with GCI reports result
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After mapping the results with the GCI pillars, the input template analysis was used to 
analyse the data collected from focus group discussion to identify the maturity level of each 
dimension. Based on the CCMM, each dimension has multiple factors and attributes 
(GCSCC, 2017), each making a significant contribution to capacity building. Each factor, 
involves five stages of maturity (Start-Up (S-UP), Formative (F), Established (E), Strategic 
(S) and Dynamic (D). The lowest indicator implies a non-existent, or inadequate, level of 
capacity, and the highest indicates both a strategic approach, and ability to dynamically 
enhance environmental considerations, including operational, socio-technical, and political 
threats. The rating scale from 1 to 5 is based on the CCMM model, where 1 means there is no 
Cybersecurity maturity or it is primitive in nature, and 5 is in a dynamic level of maturity. 
To concluded, the results of the discussion indicate that the level of maturity of Spring Land’s 
Cybersecurity capacity, which has been evaluated using the five dimensions of the CCMM, is 
in Start-up level. In some dimensions, such as the policy and strategy dimension, despite the 
fact that there is no national Cybersecurity strategy, certain factors are considered to be in a 
formative or strategic level. For instance, the organisation leading Cybersecurity program 
(NCSA) and national CERT in Spring Land has been identified. This means that raising the 
level of maturity of these factors helps to fill some gaps in the Spring Land Cybersecurity 
ecosystem. 
Furthermore, one of the most significant findings to emerge from this assessment is that 
Spring Land does not have a blueprint of a cyber defence strategy in place; this is the result of 
the political fragmentations. Consequently, without any existing cyber defence strategy, 
Spring Land faces a big challenge in dealing with cyber threats from other states, and 
therefore the threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability increases.  
Dimension 2, concentrated mainly on Cyber Culture and Society Indicators. Despite the fact 
that the NCSA has conducted some awareness activities that are needed to change the mind-
set of governmental sectors, there is still poor awareness across public and private sectors. 
Additionally, there is a lack of information sharing and vulnerability disclosure mechanisms 
which places all sectors at risk of potential cyber threats. 
In other dimensions, such as the national education capacity building initiative, and the legal 
and regulatory frameworks, there was no existing capacity regarding these factors. There is 
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no national plan for enhancing the efficiency of education in the field of cybersecurity. As a 
result of this, there is a shortage of skilled people. Moreover, there are no comprehensive 
national legal and regulatory frameworks that address cyber related crime, or adequate 
capacity to enforce the existing laws. The implication of this is the possibility that Spring 
Land will continue to face challenges in tackling and responding to a cybercrime. 
Finally, the last dimension in the CCMM revealed a lack of international standards adoption 
across all organisations. Similarly, there is a lack control over mixed technologies which 
increases the vulnerabilities in all systems in which the government rely on. More 
importantly, there is deficiency of disaster recovery and business continuity plan in all 
governmental sectors. And thus, the Spring Land government does not have a plan to manage, 
monitor or evaluate of national infrastructure resilience. 
The most obvious finding obtained from the analysis is that, the unstable situation in Spring 
Land has a big influence on physical security and hinders the development of Spring Land 
Cybersecurity in all aspects. As a result of the instability and transitional stage within the 
state, there is an absence of a legislative system, a lack of cyber defence strategy, and 
insufficient funding from the government to support the national Cybersecurity program. 










Dimensions Factors S-Up F E S D 
D1 
 
D1-1 National cybersecurity strategy    *  
D1-2 Incident Response  *    
D1-3: Critical National Infrastructure 
(CNI) Protection *    
 
D1-4: Crisis Management  *     
D1-5: Cyber Defence Consideration  *     
D1-6: Digital Redundancy  *     
D2 
 
D2-1: Cyber Security Mind-set *     
D2-2: Cyber security Awareness *     
D2-3: Confidence and trust on the 
Internet *    
 
D2-4: Privacy online *     
D3 
 
D3-1: National availability of cyber 
education and training *    
 
D3-2: National Development of 
cyber security education  *    
 
D3-3 Corporate training & 
educational initiatives within 
companies 
*    
 
D3-4: Corporate Governance, 




D4-1: Cybersecurity legal 
frameworks *    
 
D4-2: Legal Investigation *     
D4-3: Responsible Disclosure *     
D5 
D5-1: Adherence to standards *     
D5-2: National Infrastructure 
Resilience *    
 
D5-3: Cybersecurity marketplace *    
 
Table  5.5 maturity levels of all dimensions of Spring Land cybersecurity capacity
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These findings contribute in several ways to our understanding of the Spring Land 
Cybersecurity capacity, and provide a basis for the requirements of the NCCBF. The maturity 
levels are presented in Figure (5.1) using the radar chart. The next chapter discusses the 
development of a proposed NCCBF framework to improve national cybersecurity capacity 
for countries in transitional phase. 
 
Figure  5.1 Results of all CCMM dimensions 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the results of the assessment of the level of maturity of Spring 
Land’s Cybersecurity capacity, which has been assessed using the five dimensions of the 
CCMM. From the findings of the research undertaken this has assisted in areas of focus and 
supported the introduction of the CCMM. When aligning the output of the focus groups with 
the literature review findings and results of Chapter 4, this enabled a clear picture towards 
identifying research gaps that need to be addressed. 
The next chapter will describe and discusses the development of a proposed NCCBF 




6. CHAPTER 6: DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CAPACITY 
BUILDING FRAMEWORK (NCCBF) FOR 
COUNTRIES IN A TRANSITIONAL PHASE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the development of a proposed NCCBF framework to improve 
national cybersecurity capacity for countries in transitional phase. The NCCBF incorporates 
the 5-dimensions of national cybersecurity capacity derived from the Oxford University’s 
Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (CCMM) for Nation States. The University’s Global 
Cybersecurity Capacity Centre developed this maturity model through collaboration with 
international stakeholders. These include the Organization of American States (OAS), World 
Bank, Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation (CTO) and the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). In addition, these dimensions represent an accumulation of 
syntheses and issues derived from the experience and perspectives of a range of cybersecurity 
professionals in Spring Land and other existing international frameworks for cybersecurity. 
These dimensions are presented in Figure (6.1) and summarised below: 
• Dimension one: build strategic capacity (D1). This dimension looks at the steps 
required to implement and review a national cybersecurity strategy and the capacity 
in terms of incident response, crisis management, critical infrastructure protection, 
communications, redundancy, crisis management and cyber defence. 
• Dimension two: build cyber cultural and society capacity (D2). This dimension 
covers vital features of a cyber-culture across stakeholders at the individual, public, 
private, and societal levels that contribute towards enhancement the maturity levels 
of the cyber ecosystem. 
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• Dimension three: build cybersecurity Education, Training and skills capacity (D3). 
This dimension is used to deliver essential steps for cybersecurity education, 
training, and skills development.  
• Dimension four: Build legal and regulations capacity (D4). This aspect offers a 
different step required to form and update the national legislation and laws relating 
to cybersecurity.  
• Dimension five: build technical capacities (D5). This dimension discusses the CCB 
steps that a country or organisation can implement to employ cybersecurity 
standards, and at least minimal adequate practices.  
These 5-dimensions are then decomposed to three activities used to improve the capacity of 
each dimension. The activities have been chosen based on the most important objectives that 
were created by various stockholders during the contextualising and assessment of the NCCB 
in Spring Land.   
 
Figure  6.1 The Five dimensions of NCCBF 
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6.2 Designing and Developing the Framework (The Artefact)  
The framework was developed based on the outcome from Chapter 2 the literature review as 
well as contextualisation and assessments of the problem space in Spring Land in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5. The OODA loop steps were used to construct and guiding the requirements 
of IDEF0. These steps were instantiated with the CCMM and finding from the conducted 
empirical studies and literature. The framework is illustrated by a modelling function 
technique IDEF0, which outline various issues identified by the research. These steps address 
the following question: What can be developed to provide a National Cybersecurity Capacity 
Building Framework (NCCBF) for transitional state countries? 
As argued in Chapter 1, to validate and resolve the NCCBF challenge we required further 
analytical questions to develop notions posed by this challenge, in that: 
Q1- What are the known challenges in delivering effective Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Platform? 
Q2- What are the key elements of a successful Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
and consequentially what are the possible modelling approaches for better and effective 
guiding Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework?  
Q3- What are the current issues of cybersecurity capacity within a metaphorical Spring Land 
and what would be done to address cybersecurity across Spring Land? 
Q4- How do we measure the current maturity levels of cybersecurity capacity in a 
metaphorical Spring Land? 
Q5- How to translate the finding of Q2, Q3 and Q4 into a transformative design method 
which could help to develop a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
(NCCBF) for countries in a transitional phase? 

































 and Assessment Template
 
Figure  6.2 Generic NCCBF Implementation using OODA Loop 
• OODA- Observation phase:  this phase is the earliest stage of OODA loop process 
where the observation phase continuously analyse the social, internal, and external 
challenges. Within the 5th Domain – Cyberspace, this phase can be applied to 
contextualise the cybersecurity capacity challenges based benchmarking models. The 
NCCBF contextualisation step will analyse the security operations of the state within 
the transitional phase, with stakeholders, by performing a risk analysis, SWOT and 
PESTEL models. In pursuit of this research an input template analysis was created 
and IM techniques (Idea Writing (IW), Nominal Group Techniques (NGT) and 
Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM)), were used to capture the challenges of NCB 
in Spring Land as described in Chapter 4. In addition, a set of objectives was derived 
to support identified the key initiatives for the development  of national cybersecurity 
capacity in the country. These objective were employed to support the management 




• OODA - Orientation phase: this phase is the most critical part of the OODA loop. 
The raw of information obtained from the observation phase will be analysed and 
synthesised into usable information that can be used to support Decision phase. 
According to Coram (2002) the Orientation phase is a "nonlinear feedback system" 
that spontaneously generates a new cognitive image of the unfolding circumstances as 
seen in 5th Domain Lens. This phase can be adopted to assess the cybersecurity 
capacity maturity levels of the state by using the maturity model such as the CCMM 
and determine areas of capability that are required by the State in order to improve 
Cybersecurity capacity. 
 In this research the focus group discussion were employed to assess the national 
cybersecurity capacity in Spring Land based on the CCMM dimensions as described 
in Chapter 5. The focus group method and input template analysis were used to 
determine areas of capability that are required by are required by any Government in 
order to improve the cybersecurity capacity of the State. As determined throughout the 
Observation Phase, the Orientation challenges that were captured in the previous step 
were validated in this stage by NCSA. The step-phase outcomes were employed with 
the objectives from previous stage to support the next step the OODA-Decision phase. 
It should also be noted that both the Observe and Orient steps were also used to 
identify requirements of AS-IS stage in IDEF0. 
• OODA - Decision phase: the information gained from the observation and 
orientation phases including, social internal and external challenges, implicit 
and explicit guidance within the State, and the context of the circumstances 
under consideration, leads to the point at which a decision is made.  Building 
cybersecurity capacity within the NCCBF requires a detailed evaluation of 
cybersecurity capacity dimensions. This phase will be used to establish 
policies and legislation, build awareness program and create education 
framework that that are relevance and succinct to the current cyber 
environment and the Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) 
of the 5th Domain-Cyberspace. The threshold for the OODA-Decision phase 
will be based upon the existing cybersecurity frameworks and best practice as 
discovered in Chapter 2. In this Research Study, the outcomes of observe and 
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orient steps are used to develop the functions, mechanisms and controls for 
each dimension by using the template analysis that created in Chapter 3. 
• OODA - Action phase: As outlined in Boyd’s diagram, one can consider this 
process of acting upon opportunities discovered in the decision phase. Once the 
action is executed, the OODA loop closes (Coram 2002). For building cybersecurity 
capacity, this phase can be used to define work deliverables and work standards, and 
provides a way to measure the work deliverables. States  need  to  mature  
cybersecurity  capacity and capabilities  at  national level  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
requirements expressed through national authoritative or stakeholders. These 
national cybersecurity capabilities typically consist of people, processes and 
technology (Jacobs et al. 2017). The output template analysis is used in this stage. 
This template has been created based on CCMM and other maturity models to check 
the improvement level for each dimension. Figure (6.3), show the steps and 
methodology approaches that were taken to develop the NCCBF for the Spring Land 
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Section 3.5.1 
Review 
Existing NCSF Literature and 
Best practice “Chapter 2”






“Chapter 4” Focus Group
“Chapter 5”
Implement
NGT and ISM Results 








and Controls template analysis
 “Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3”
 
Figure  6.3 Detailed NCCBF implementation using OODA Loop
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The elements of the OODA Process within the Framework were first described in Chapter 2’s 
Section 2.9.1 where the IDEF0 model presents a progression of the steps that support the 
development of the NCCBF. The top-level function of the NCCBF is numbered A0 based on 
IDEF0. Subsequently, A0 activity is segmented into five activities (dimensions) based on the 
CCMM model (GCSCC, 2017). The top-level function of the NCCBF is numbered A0 based 
on IDEF0. Subsequently, A0 activity is segmented into five activities (dimensions) based on 
the CCMM model (GCSCC, 2017). Figure (6.4) shows how the top level of the NCCBF is 









Figure  6.4 Demonstration of the NCCBF Top-level within the OODA loop. 
6.3 Developing OODA Activities into NCCBF Artefacts 
As described in the above Figure 6.4, the OODA process of four phases: observation, 
orientation, decision and action phase allow for an iterative loop of many cycles and hence 
provides a progressive methodology for constant validation and hence a valuable defensive 
asset to APTs, and a key design feature and NCCBF artefact. In this section, every phase is 
described in depth, which also shows how this phase or step is used to develop the NCCBF. 
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6.3.1 Observation phase (to the NCCBF Artefact) 
The first step is to observe the AS-IS situation. This step, aimed to contextualise the problem 
space based on dimensions of CCMM. The contextualisation will analyse the security 
operations of the state based on the CCMM’s five dimensions. In this research an input 
template analysis and IM techniques (Idea Writing (IW), Nominal Group Techniques (NGT) 
and Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM)), were used to capture the challenges of NCB in 
Spring Land. In addition, a set of objectives was derived to support identified the key 
initiatives for the development of national cybersecurity capacity in the country.  
The Challenges generate a number of complex situations within the 5th Domain-Cyberspace 
and utilising IM techniques which requires groups of people, who are knowledgeable in terms 
of the situation, to collaborate in tackling the main aspects of an issue, to develop a deep 
understanding of the situation under analysis as it provide effective details and safeguards for 
assured action.  During this stage a trigger question, “What are the current issues of 
cybersecurity in Spring Land?” is presented to the participants with a forum to brainstorm and 
exchange ideas based on five dimension of CCMM. A template analysis is used to capture the 
challenges of NCB in Spring Land and has been discussed in second phase of the loop 
(Orientation). Following the organising and numbering of the challenges and ideas, the ideas 
were transformed into a set of objectives, which were used to create an interpretive structural 
model (ISM), and to summaries the interactions between them.  
The final part of this stage, the NGT technique were employed to select the top three 
objectives from the list for each dimension, with one being the least important, and three the 
most important. These top objectives were used after summaries the interactions between 
them to develop the functions for each dimension in the NCCBF. This step is applied for all 
dimensions of the NCCBF and more details how to use it each dimension will be discussed in 





What are the current issues 































6.3.2 Orientation phase (to the NCCBF Artefact) 
Earlier research argued to assess the current maturity levels of a State can be done by 
applying the CCMM and determine areas of capability that are required by the State in order 
to improve its cybersecurity capacity. Assessment is one of steps corresponding to OODA’s 
Orient. In this research, focus group method and input template analysis were used to 
determine areas of capability that are required by the State’s government in order to improve 
cybersecurity capacity of that State. The challenges that captured in previous step OODA-
Observe step were validated at this stage by NCSA, but other recognised institutions, such as 
the UN’s ITU or the WEF could have been employed. The rationale was for that, stakeholders 
might not be always aware of recent developments in their country, for instance whether the 
country has signed a convention on child protection or not.  
During this stage a generic question, “What are the maturity levels of cybersecurity 
capacity?” was presented to the participants with a set of questions, based on five dimension 
of CCMM. These questions were used to guide the discussion around the indicators to 
provide evidence on how many indicators have been implemented by a country and to 
determine the maturity level of every aspect of the CCMM. Additional information about the 
questions can be found in Appendix (3). The authors uses a focus group method since it offers 
a richer set of data compared to other qualitative approaches (Williams 2003). The method is 
valuable for exploring people's knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not 
only what people think but how they think and why they think that way. It is this interaction 
and tension that offers benefit over other methods, making it possible for a level of consensus 
to be reached amongst participants and for a better understanding of cybersecurity practices 
and capacities to be obtained (Kitzinger 1995b; GCSCC 2019) . 
In addition, an input template analysis was used to capture the maturity level indicators and 
challenges for each dimensions of CCMM.   These indicators of maturity levels have been 
validated using international cyber security indexes such as Global Cybersecurity Index 
developed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The motivations of using 
the international indexes are to categorise the cybersecurity capacity requirements, as well as 
the opportunities for action in the country (Hohmann et al. 2017). In addition, it used in order 
to validate and verify the results. The outcomes of this step are employed with the objectives 
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from previous stage to support the next step (Decide). Observe and orient steps are used to 
identify requirements of AS-IS stage in IDEF0. Figure (6.6) shows how this step is 
established. 
What are the maturity levels 
















Maturity levels of the 
NCCB are evaluated
Analysis of Maturity levels of the 
NCCB and validate it  using 
international cyber indexes
 




6.3.3 Decision phase (to the NCCBF Artefact) 
In this phase, the OODA Decision phase to building the NCCBF artefact, the functions, 
mechanisms and controls for the proposed framework were created for each dimension using 
template statements analysis. Figure (6.7) shows how this step is designed and conducted. 
This step address the following question, “What can be developed to provide a National 
Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) for transitional state countries?”  
What can be developed to provide    
a National Cybersecurity Capacity 
Building Framework (NCCBF) ? 


















Figure  6.7 Adaptive Decision phase of the NCCBF model development 
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The function statements were created based on the stakeholders’ view from within the case 
study country based on CCMM and the existing national cybersecurity frameworks. The 
mechanisms are the different types of resources; such as the cross-functional team, systems, 
and technology that used to support functions (activities) to achieve change. The controls are 
tools or checklists that ensure adherence to best practices such as the budget, knowledge, and 
regulations.  
6.3.4 Action phase (to the NCCBF Artefact) 
In this final phase of the OODA loop, the output template statements that created in Section 
3.5.4 were used to perform two major activities:  
1) Find the gaps in the implementation process in each dimension, and  
2) Measuring maturity levels improvement in each dimension. 
 This template has been created based on CCMM and other maturity models to check the 
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Figure  6.8 The Adaptive Action phase of the NCCBF model development 
6.4 Further development of the National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Dimensions based on OODA’S Loop utilising the Spring Land Case Study 
6.4.1 Dimension (D1): Build strategic capacity 
According to the CCMM this dimension looks at the crucial steps required to implement and 
review national cybersecurity strategy capacity. The top level activity (D1) is represented 













Figure  6.9 Top-level activity for D1 
6.4.1.1 Oservervation phase for Dimension one (D1)  
At  this stage an input template analysis and IM techniques (Idea Writing (IW), Nominal 
Group Techniques (NGT) and Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM)), were used to capture 
the challenges of NCB in the metaphorical Spring Land Case Study. The IW technique was 
employed to reveal the issues relating to a given trigger question, providing the participants 
with a forum to brainstorm and exchange ideas. The participants were divided randomly into 
three groups to discuss the question and to provide their views concerning the issues relating 
to cybersecurity in Spring Land. The trigger question employed was: What are the current 
issues of cybersecurity capacity in Spring Land? 
After the session, the statements produced were numbered, organised and sorted into 
categories according to each of the CCMM dimensions. The ideas generated by the groups in 
response to the question are summarised in Table (6.1). In addition, a set of objectives was 
derived to support identified the key initiatives for the development of national cybersecurity 




Dimensions Challenges and issues (Ben Naseir et al. 2019) 
 
D1 
• D1-1. Lack of national cybersecurity strategy. 
• D1-2. Lack of national risk management plan and threat of cyber space 
has not identified on the national or sectors level. 
• D1-3. There is no national roadmap for Cyber Defence strategy. 
• D1-4. Difficulties in implementing the cyber security strategy due to 
political issues and scarcity of resources for preparation of national cyber 
security blueprint (government funding and human resources). 
• D1-5. Lack of public and private partnership. In addition, there are no 
government forums to share information. 
• D1-6. There is no national crisis management protocol and Incident 
response plan for national critical infrastructure assets have not been 
prioritised. 
• D1-7. There is no national cyber security framework to monitor the 
adoption of international cybersecurity standards in the government 
sectors. 
Table  6.1 Challenges of cybersecurity capacity of D1 
The NGT was employed to generate, simplify, edit and obtain an initial rating for a set of 
objectives. At this stage, the participants were asked to select and vote for their top three 
objectives from the list for each dimension (1 = the least important, 3 = the most important). 
A total of 19 participants then voted on the objectives. A further outlying 7 of the participants 
failed to vote owing to security and sensitivity issues. After capture the most three objectives 
for this dimension, the Interpretive structural modelling (ISM) technique was applied. The 
ISM technique helped the participants to examine the inter-relationships between the 
elements gained through the NGT process and provided a structure for tackling its complexity 
(Checkland 1999; Trist 1981). In order to create a clear ISM, the objectives from the NGT 
stage were grouped according to similarities to facilitate the identification of the three most 
important objectives from each dimension. The three most important objectives for this 
dimension are organised using function template analysis (more details in Section 6.3.1.3). 
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6.4.1.2 Orientation phase for Dimension one (D1) 
In this stage the maturity level of all factors of D1 using an the input template statement. 
Table (6.2) provides how the input template statement is used to capture the maturity level of 
certain factors related to this dimension. D1 refers to dimension one, D1.1 concerns the 
national cybersecurity strategy maturity level, D1-2 indicates the incident response 
capabilities maturity level, D1-3 refers to the critical national infrastructure (CNI) Protection 
maturity level and D1-4 indicates crisis management maturity level. Each factor, involves 
five stages of maturity (Start-Up (S-UP), Formative (F), Established (E), Strategic (S) and 
Dynamic (D). The lowest indicator implies a non-existent, or inadequate, level of capacity, 
and the highest indicates both a strategic approach, and ability to dynamically enhance 


























Table  6.2 Maturity levels Indicators for D1 
The outcomes of this stage show that the maturity level of this dimension can be classified 
from start-up to strategic stages. Despite the fact that there is no national cybersecurity 
strategy, certain factors are considered to be in either a formative or established level. For 
instance, the organisation leading the cybersecurity programme and national CERT in Spring 
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Land has been identified. Furthermore, one of the most significant findings to emerge from 
this assessment is that Spring Land does not have a blueprint for a cyber defence strategy in 
place as result of political fragmentation. Consequently, without any existing cyber defence 
strategy, Spring Land faces a big challenge in dealing with cyber threats from other states, 
and therefore the threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability increases.This means 
that raising the level of maturity of these factors helps to fill certain gaps in the Spring Land’s 
cybersecurity ecosystem. 
6.4.1.3 Decision phase for dimension one (D1) 
In this section the statement template were used to capture the functions,  mechanisms and 
controls to improve the CCB in this dimension were chosen based on the existing national 
cybersecurity frameworks and the stakeholders’ view from within the case study country in as 
discribed in Section 4.3.3 (Ben Naseir et al. 2019).  In this dimension the top three objectivies 
are as follows: 
1. Adopt a national Cybersecurity framework and create collaborative model for 
include all stakeholders to write the national Cybersecurity strategy. 
2. Establishment of a central committee for cybersecurity. 
3. Create a national list of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) assets and identify the 
risk priorities. 
Based on the evaluation of the proposed framework in Chapter 7, these objectiove 
(functions) has been modifided and a function template was used to create these functions and 
establish the interaction between them statement is used as shown in Table (6.3).  
The purpose of the NCS is to provide direction and framing for national policies and actions 
pertaining to cybersecurity over the medium-to-long (ENISA 2016; Bellasio et al. 2018; ITU 
2018b). The NCS in the 5th Domain – Cyberspace is important because state interactions in 
cyberspace are characterised by uncertainty, rather than predictability of this era. To develop 
the NCS it is necessary to go through a number of mechanisms and controls that are described 
in the next section. Once developed the function will support other functions such as D1.2 
and D1.3, because it will guide the preparation and enforcement of other functions. In 
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addition, it depends on national legal framework the outcome of dimension two in the 
NCCBF. 
Dimension ID 
Functions ID and 
description (Activities ) 
Interaction 
D1. Build strategic capacity 
D1.1 Develop NCS. 
• Supports D1.2,D1.3 
• Depends on D2 
D1.2 Building a Risk 
management approach  
• Supports D1.3 
• Depends on D1.1 
D1.3 Building a National 
Incident Response 
Capabilities 
• Depends on D1.3, D2 
Table  6.3: List of functions used in D1 
Building a risk management approach helps to identify and prioritise the risks facing the 
Critical National (CI) assets and critical National Information infrastructure (CNI) (ENISA 
2016; Bellasio et al. 2018; ITU 2018b). A different set of mechanisms and controls are used 
to develop a risk management approach and this is elaborated in the next section. 
Building national incident response capabilities is another function used to build the CCB of 
the country. It allows government to identify national-level cyber incidents and coordinate a 
response to ensure that harm is contained, the attacker is no longer present, and the 
functionality and integrity of the network and system are restored (ENISA 2016; Bellasio et 
al. 2018; ITU 2018b). 
To support these function or activities to achieve desired change a list of mechanisms and 
controls are created based on the existing literature and best practices. Table (6.4) shows how 
mechanisms and controls are defined and represents the justifications and rationale for the 
selected ones. For instance, to develop function (D1.1 Develop NCS), an establishment of a 
National Council for Cybersecurity with a clear mandate, appropriate statutory powers, and 
an organisational structure is required (M1.1.1). Organisational structure as described in 
Section 2.8.2.1, many countries around the world have established, or are looking to 
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establish, agencies or other administrative bodies to manage their cybersecurity strategy 
(Ciglic 2018; ITU 2018b). The rationale for creating the council is to perform a crucial 
function in coordinating across different organisations in the public and private sectors. Also, 
forming a strong leadership role at the highest level contributes to recognition of the NCS. To 
some extent, literature shows that, the national cybersecurity council will be expected to steer 
a complex environment that spans other government sectors, national legislatures, established 
regulatory authorities, civil society groups, public and private sector organisations, and 
international partners. It is also critical that the responsibilities of the national cybersecurity 
agency are distinct from those of other governmental groups involved in cybersecurity. In this 
research, based on the evaluation of the NCCBF,  the “Organisational structure should 
include advisory committee and counter-terrorism committee and build capacity of these 
committees in field of cybersecurity in the country”. 
The roles and responsibilities can be defined using an assignment chart such as the RACI 
matrix that maps out every task, and assigns roles are Responsible for each action item,  the 
personnel  who are Accountable, and, who needs to be Consulted or Informed (CTO 2015). 
This matrix can be used with the Enterprise governance of IT, as defined through COBIT 5 
(ISACA 2013), as a control tool (C1.1.1) to ensure adherence to best practice. After capturing 




Mechanism ID Rational  Control ID  Reference and Access 
M1.1.1 Establish a national council 
Performs a crucial function in 
coordinating across different 
organisations in the state. 
C1.1.1, Regulatory framework 
,assignment chart , Advisory group, 
counter-terrorism committee and 
EA governance 
RACI matrix is open source. 
COBIT 5 is not free, the proprietary 
rights are from ISACA, 
(www.isaca.org) 
M1.1.2 Human Capital 
To close the cybersecurity skills 
gap and to strengthening 
cybersecurity skills and 
competences in the state. 
The dearth of cybersecurity 
professionals to address cyber risk, 
and a lack of education programs to 
train these professionals leads to a 
human capital crisis 
C1.1.2 Cybersecurity Competency 
program 
Cybersecurity Competency Model 
(NICE 2016). It is open source.  
M1.1.3 Guiding principles To guide the preparation and 
enforcement of cybersecurity 
C1.1.3 International frameworks 
and national cybersecurity 




policies. strategies (Goodwin and Nicholas 2013; CTO 
2015; ENISA 2016; ITU 2018b) 
Open source.  
M1.2.1 Identify the Critical 
National (CI) assets and critical 
National Information infrastructure 
(CNI) 
To develop measures and 
procedures for the protection of 
CNI and reduce the risk of 
cyberattacks.  
 
C1.2.1 Good practices for the 
identification of CI sectors and CNI 
sectors 
Checklist by Eric Luiijf and 
Marieke Klaver (Luiijf and Klaver 
2019). Methodologies for the 
identification of Critical 
Information Infrastructure assets 
and services (Mattioli and Levy-
Bencheton 2014) 
M1.2.2 Risk assessment  
To identify the threats to national 
security on cyberspace 
C1.2.2 Risk assessment techniques 
(including threat assessment, 
vulnerability assessment and 
impact analysis). 





M1.2.3 Develop Military 
To develop capabilities in both the 
cybersecurity and cyber defence 
C1.2.3 Cyber defence doctrine 
• Ormrod, D. & A. Turnbull. 
2016. The cyber conceptual 
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capabilities areas. framework framework for developing military 
doctrine. Defence studies. Vol 
16(3) pp. 270-298. 
• Klimberg, Alexander (Ed). 
2012. National Cyber Security 
Framework Manual Tallinn: NATO 
CCD COE Publication. 
• Robinson, Neil, Agnieszka 
Walczak, Sophie-Charlotte Brune, 
Alain Esterle, Pablo Rodriguez. 
2013. Stocktaking study of military 
cyber defence capabilities in the 
European Union (milCybeCAP): 
Unclassified Summary. Santa 
Monica, UK: RAND Corporation. 
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M1.3.1Establishment of a National 
CSIRT 
To react to computer security 
incidents those are deemed to be of 
national importance. A National 
CSIRT can also provide the 
government with a conduit for 
coherent, consistent messaging on 
cyber security issues. C1.3.1 The National CERT 
Structure 
And identify relevant stakeholders 
and legal framework. 
• OAS (Organization of 
American States). 2015. Best 






•  National/governmental 
CERTs - ENISA's 







M1.3.2 Define, document and 
To define the steps that a CSIRT 
will follow to effectively counter a 
C1.3.2 Incident response 
framework  
Computer Security 
Incident Handling Guide from 
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operate incident response processes 
and Maintain Trust Relationships. 






To ensure that incidents are 
handled and organised effectively 
C1.3.3 Cybersecurity Workforce 
Framework 
Cybersecurity Competency Model 
(NICE 2016). It is open source. 
Table  6.4:list of mechanisms and controls for D1
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After capturing the required functions, mechanisms and controls, we represent these activities 






































Figure  6.10: An IDEF0 representation for Dimension 1 
6.4.1.4 Action phase for dimension one (D1) 
As mentioned in Section 6.3.4, the output template statements were used to perform two 
major activities: 1) Find the gaps in the implementation process in each dimension, and 2) 
Measuring maturity levels improvement in each dimension. In this dimension, first of all the 
mechanisms and controls are cross-examined to the fullest for a cost-effective and find the 
gaps in the implementation process in this dimension. The literature of existing framework 
and best practices were used to review them. After reviewing the selected function, 
mechanisms and controls, the template analysis is used for measuring maturity levels 
improvement in this dimension. Due to time limitation during conducting of this study, this 
phase has not applied on real case. 
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These steps were used for the all dimensions of the proposed framework (NCCBF) and were 
not discussed in details. The next section provides a snapshot of the list of functions that 
created for other dimensions. The details of list of mechanisms and controls for each 
dimension can be found in Appendix (4). 
6.5 Development of the Other Dimensions of the National Cybersecurity 
Capacity Building (NCCBF)  
In this section, a snapshot of decision phase for dimensions 2, 3, 4, and 5. The list of 
functions that created for theses dimensions are presented. The details of list of mechanisms 
and controls for each dimension can be found in Appendix (5). The results of observation and 
orientation phases are captured in discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 and will not 
discussed in this section.  
6.5.1 Dimension (D2): Build Cyber culture and society capacity 
This section presents the main functions, mechanisms and controls that needed to build 
cybersecurity culture capacity for countries in transitional phase. These functions, 
mechanisms and controls will serve as input to the successful crafting of building a 
cybersecurity culture capacity for the grass root users of cyberspace in transitional phase 
countries. In addition, these functions, mechanisms and controls are considered part of the 
objectives of this study and will guide the researcher by way of depicting main issues to look 
at in the research. 
The functions have been chosen based on the most important objectives that were created by 
various stockholders during the contextualising and evaluation of the NCCB in Spring Land 
as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3. The mechanisms are the different types of 
resources, such as the cross-functional team, systems, and technology that used to support 
functions (activities) to achieve change. The controls are tools or checklists that ensure 
adherence to best practices such as the budget, knowledge, and regulations. The top level 





Build Cyber culture 







Figure  6.11: Top-level of D2 
The list of functions for dimension two (D2) are captured using the function template analysis 
and presented in Table (6.5). 
Dimension ID 
Functions ID and 
description (Activities ) 
Interaction 
D2. Build cyber cultural 
and society capacity 
F2.1 Develop a national 
awareness program that is 
compatible with the current 
situation. 
• Depends on 
F1.3,F2.2,F3.1,F3.3, and F5.1 
• Supports F1.1 and F2.2 
F2.2 Improve e-services, in 
order to promote the 
required level of trust. 
• Depends on F2.1 
• Supports F2.3 
F2.3 Develop an evaluation 
criterion 
• Depends  F2.2 
 
Table  6.5 : Functions list of dimension two (D2)  
The list of Mechanisms and Controls for this dimension were captured using a template 
analysis and can be found in Appendix (5). After capturing the required functions, 
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mechanisms and controls, we represent these activities using IDEF0 as shown in Figure 
(6.12). 
F2.1
F2.1Develop a national 
awareness program that is 
compatible with the current 
situation.
F2.2 
Improve e-services, in 
order to promote the 































Figure  6.12 : An IDEF0 representation for Dimension 2 
6.5.2 Dimension (D3): Build Cybersecurity Education, Training and skills 
This dimension is used to deliver essential steps for cybersecurity education, training, and 
skills development. In this section, the main functions, mechanisms, and controls that needed 
to build cybersecurity Education, Training, and skills for countries in transitional phase are 
represented. These functions, mechanisms, and controls will serve as input to the successful 
crafting of building a cybersecurity skills capacity for the grass root users of cyberspace in 
transitional phase countries. In addition, these functions, mechanisms, and controls are 
considered part of the objectives of this study and will guide the researcher by way of 
depicting main issues to look at in the research. The top level activity (D3) is represented 





Build cybersecurity Education, 







Figure  6.13 : The top level activity (D3) 
The list of functions for dimension three (D3) are captured using the function template 
analysis and presented in Table 6.6. 
Dimension ID 
Functions ID and 
description (Activities ) 
Interaction 
D3 Build cybersecurity 
Education, Training and 
skills 
F3.1 Develop national 
cybersecurity education 
program. 
• Depends on F3.2, and 
F3.3 
• Supports F2.1 
F3.2 Creating a certificate 
for national needs 
• Depends on F1.1 
• Supports F3.1and F4.3 
F3.3 Defining tasks and 
required knowledge 
• Supports F2.1and F3.1 
Table  6.6 : Functions list of dimension three (D3) 
The list of Mechanisms and Controls for this dimension were captured using a template 
analysis and can be found in Appendix (5). After capturing the required functions, 







 Develop national cyber 
security education program
F3.2

































Figure  6.14 : An IDEF0 representation for Dimension 3 
6.5.3 Dimension (D4): Build legal and regulations capacity  
This dimension offers a different step required to form and update the national legislation and 













Figure  6.15 : the top level activity (D4) 
The functions, mechanisms, and controls were captured using the template analysis that 
created in Section 3.6. The list of functions for this dimension is represented in Table (6.7).   
Dimension ID 
Functions ID and 
description (Activities ) 
Interaction 
D4 Build legal and 
regulations capacity 
F4.1 Development and 
adoption of relevant 
legislation supporting the 
policy that would enhance 
cybersecurity 
• Depends on F4.2,F5.1 
and F4.3 
• Supports F1.1,F5.3 
F4.2 Develop Criminal 
justice power 
• Supports F1.1 and F4.1 
F4.3 Establish effective 
informal cooperation 
mechanisms. 
• Depends on F3.2, and 
F3.3 
• Supports F2.1 
Table  6.7 : Functions list of dimension four (D4)  
The list of Mechanisms and Controls for this dimension can be found in Appendix (4). After 
capturing the required functions, mechanisms and controls, we represent these activities using 
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adoption    of    relevant    
legislation    
 
Figure  6.16 : An IDEF0 representation for Dimension 4 
6.5.4 Dimension (D5): Build technical capacity 
This dimension discusses the CCB steps that a country or organisation can implement to 
employ cybersecurity standards, and at least minimal adequate practices. The top level of this 












Figure  6.17 : the top level for Dimension 5 
The list of functions that used in this dimension is described in Table (6.8).  
Dimension ID 
Functions ID and 
description (Activities ) 
Interaction 
D5 Build technical capacity 
F5.1 All stakeholders to 
adapt and adopt 
international standards. 
• Supports F2.2,F4.1 
and F5.2 
F5.2 Build national 
resilience plan 
• Depends on F5.1, and 
F5.2 
• Supports F1.3 
F5.3 Enhance physical 
security 
• Depends on F4.1 
• Supports F5.2 
Table  6.8 : Functions list of dimension five (D5) 
The list of Mechanisms and Controls for dimension five can be found in Appendix (5). The 
required functions, mechanisms and controls are represented using an IDEF0 modelling 






































All stakeholders to adapt 
and adopt international 
standards.
 
Figure  6.18: An IDEF0 representation for Dimension 5 
 
After capture, all functions required for each dimension, the overall framework is represented 
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Figure  6.19 : The NCCBF Activities 
6.6 Chapter Summary  
The proposed National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) for countries 
in a transitional phase addresses many issues, which were found lacking or not effectively 
implemented in their 5th Domain –Cyberspace. The Case Study amplified the concerns and 
issues of NCB within countries in a transitional phase. The design and development of the 
NCCBF artefact provides guidance and activities towards developing and building national 
cybersecurity capacity in several cybersecurity dimensions. The original dimensions are 
based on the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CCMM), developed by 
Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre in the University of Oxford through collaboration with 
international stakeholders. This CCMM model has been selected, because it successfully 
demonstrates the global effects of a Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) solution - 
inclusive of all areas cybersecurity for building a robust cybersecurity platform does provide 
better GRC for the 5th Domain and effective security posture for a State’s policies and 
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institutions. This model is offering a comprehensive analysis of CCB through five different 
dimensions: Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy; Cyber Culture and Society; Cybersecurity 
Education, Training, and Skills; Legal and Regulatory Frameworks; and Standards, 
Organisations, and Technologies.  
The proposed framework’s key functions, mechanisms and controls for each dimension and 
their rationality were identified and guided by IDEF0 modelling function.  The framework 
also rely on existing national cybersecurity frameworks and best practices that countries in a 
transitional phase can adapt for building effective cybersecurity capacity. Moreover, the 
Hypothesis articulated and verified the interaction between all required activities to build 
cybersecurity capacities, which were, demonstrated when the NCCBF adapted the Observe, 
Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) model. For transitional States, the NCCBF will help 
countries to formulate and build their cybersecurity capacity in constantly changing 
environments.    
The next chapter present focuses on the purpose and objectives of the evaluation of the 
proposed framework (NCCBF). In addition, provides the key findings from the evaluation 
and summarises the key performance and acceptance criteria of the proposed framework.
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7. CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION OF THE 
FRAMEWORK 
This chapter focuses on the evaluation of the proposed framework and the resolution of the 
Research Questions and its objectives.  Can a collaborative research study bridge this gap? 
Will building capability to a transitional States be grounded in conducting, evaluating, and 
establishing resilience around a reliable National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Framework (NCCBF)? In answering the Hypothesis that, there is a demonstrable gap (an 
extensive and vibrant chasm!) between the assurance of a stable, self-assured State that 
adheres to ISO Standards, Policies, Procedures and Good Practice, underpinned by security 
technologies, training and skills as opposed by States in a transitional phase that exhibit little 
Governance, Risk Management and Compliance of their 5th Domain -Cyberspace. This 
chapter is proposed to achieve Objective 4 and Objective 5 of this thesis. 
• Objective 4 – (S) To develop the NCCBF framework. (M) The NCCBF will be 
manged and guided by modelling functions techniques. (A) The framework will be 
attained through acceptance of NCCBF in the Spring Land National Defence. (R) 
Realistically NCCBF will be developed for National Security. (T) This will be ready 
by 2019. 
• Objective 5 - (S) To evaluate the NCCBF for countries in a transitional stage. (M) 
The NCCBF will be evaluated against a set of criteria (Completeness, Correctness, 
Acceptability and the Overall Evaluation of the framework. (A) The NCCBF will be 
evaluated by conducting a focus group with experts from different countries 
including experts from countries that in transitional phase. (R) Realistically an 
enhanced NCCBF for countries in transitional stage will be developed. (T) The 
evaluation will be completed by 2020. 
This chapter will demonstrate that Collaborative research has been able to bridge the gap with 
the proposed NCCB framework where our evaluation using various user experience and HCI 
techniques has been conducted and observations drawn. Focus group of subject matter experts 
from different countries including those from countries that are in a transitional phase was 
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conducted to ask and refine a set of requirements and questions which were developed to 
gather participants’ views on the framework.  
Given the design science method framework adopted in this thesis, the artefact developed in 
previous Chapter 6 clearly closed the SMART milestones for Objective 4 in realistically 
delivering a timely framework and with the results presented at the 22nd International 
Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (Ben Naseir  et al. 2020).  
7.1 Introduction 
This evaluation was developed to assess the proposed NCCBF framework.  The validation 
and evaluation process according to Straub (1989)and Sperber (2004) are crucial to research.   
Kitchenham (1996), classified the evaluation activity into three main types objective, 
subjective and hybrid evaluations. In an objective evaluation, the focus is on identifying the 
benefits of the proposed design by evaluating its effects quantitatively, such as a reduction in 
time or a change in cost figures. In the subjective activity involves qualitatively evaluating the 
suitability of the method in terms of meeting the organisation’s requirements. The hybrid type 
is a mixture of objective and subjective assessments.  
In addition, Kitchenham (1996) had proposed another classification focuses on the  three 
methods applied to evaluate an artefact. These methods are formal experiment, case study and 
survey method. In a formal experiment, the data can be collected statistically by involving 
participants in accomplishment the task. A case study is the second approach, can be 
conducted based on the standards and procedures of a similar project. This thesis utilises a 
case study evaluation method using focus group approach, as discussed in Section 7.2.  The 
survey method the evaluation can be done through collecting data statistically from other 
associations or the contexts in which the project is applied. 
7.2. Research Strategy  
The plan of actions designed to achieve the research goal are called research strategy. The 
research strategy used for evaluating the proposed framework (NCCBF) is a focus group 
method following the University’s ethics procedures. The motivation for choosing as research 
strategy was to obtain a broad set of expert opinions in the 5th domain. In addition, focus 
218 
 
group method offers a richer set of data compared to other qualitative approaches (Kitzinger 
1995a). An introduction was given to participants highlighting some information about the 
framework and the purpose of this evaluation. The participants were asked to complete a 
participant agreement form before the commencement of the discussion. Furthermore, the 
researcher also prepared a form to profile the characteristics of each participant, such as their 
roles in their organisation or country and their years of experience. Related information is 
demonstrated in Section 7.3. 
7.2.1 Participants' profile  
Cybersecurity capacity building framework recommends the participation of different 
stockholders in building of state capacity in cyberspace. Cybersecurity capacity building 
requires a horizontal approach across different development policy fields, focusing on 
improving governance, protecting infrastructure, endorsing the rule of law and providing 
training and educations (Muller 2015). Therefore, a total of 13 experts in the field the 
cybersecurity as described in Table 23, taking each actor from different countries including 
experts from countries that in transitional phase were recruited, during a workshop session by 
using the focus group technique.  
The participants were selected due to their contributions in their decision-making in security 
development from areas such as Defence, e-services, Private Sector, Banking, Regulations of 
ICT sectors, National cybersecurity agencies, Technical Advisor and capacity Buildings, 
High Education, and Integrated Digital application. The participants were recruited through 
personal and professional networks and they were selected based on their availability and 
convenience to participate in the study.  
Critical topics such as cybersecurity capacity, as defined in this research, can be seen as 
challenging to discuss conveniently in some countries and organisations due to its effect on 
the state secrets. Thus, recruiting participants required a trust relationship between the 
researcher and the participants to effectively evaluate the proposed framework and gain more 
information about the research problem.  
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The researcher had attended the ITU Interregional Workshop for Africa and Arab regions on 
“National Cybersecurity Strategies”, Tunis - Tunisia, 10-13 Dec. 2019 were the researcher 
evaluates the NCCBF (ITU 2019).  
The rational of choosing this workshop for Objective 5 was its convenience in the research 
timescale and the abundance of willing participants. First, the respectful ITU Interregional 
Workshop was designed to address mid to senior level management from policy makers, 
regulators, corporate executives and managers undertaking cybersecurity responsibilities in 
their respective organisations and countries. Second, the senior level management are 
specifically cybersecurity officials in charge of drafting ICT national policies and strategies 
(including from the legislative perspective) as well as the representative of the entities in 
charge of implementation of such policies, legal frameworks and regulations.  Third, the 
workshop had provided many lessons learnt from different countries including countries in 
transitional phase.  Fourth, the workshop had offered many activities to participants to gain 
more knowledge about national cybersecurity strategies and sharing experiences with other 
participants from other countries.  These activities such as, hands - on exercise, National 
Cybersecurity Strategy Good practise and Lessons learnt from cybersecurity using the 
CCMM capacity maturity assessments, which applied in this study. Finally, it offers much 
savings in time and cost, and ensures a close contact and coordination with potential 
participants. Table (26) provides participants details in the evaluation study.  
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No Gender Country 
Category of 
Organisation 




P1 Male Tunisia Private Cybersecurity CEO 7 years Yes 
P2 Male Gambia Public 
Regulator (ICT, 
Multisector) 
Head of IT and Regulations 7 years Yes 
P3 Female Palestine Public E- government Director of Integrated applications 9 years Yes 
P4 Female Tunisia Public High Education Teaching engineer 25 years Yes 
P5 Female Tunisia Public Finance 
Technical Advisor and capacity 
Buildings 
10 years Yes 
P6 Male Burkina Faso Public ICT sector Auditing 2 years Yes 
P7 Female Somalia Public Government Telecom Engineer 1 year Yes 
P8 Male Mauritania Public Cybersecurity Head of IT security division 12 years Yes 
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P9 Female Syria Public Government General manager 7 years Yes 
P10 Female Jordan Public Finance Cybersecurity specialist 3 years Yes 
P11 Male Libya Public 
National cybersecurity 
authority 
Director of planning and projects 1 year Yes 
P12 Male Tunisia Public 
National cybersecurity 
agency 
CEO 6 years Yes 
P13 Male  Oman  Public  Technology  Consultant  10 yes 
Table  7.1: Participants details in the evaluation study
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7.3 Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation  
The main purpose of this evaluation is to validate each of the following: the framework, its 
main dimensions, functions, mechanisms and controls. At the time of the development of this 
evaluation, the aim was to meet the following objectives: 
1. Completeness: the aim of this objective is to evaluate the level of completeness 
and self-explanation of the dimensions of the NCCBF and their descriptions. Thus, 
attention is paid to ensuring the completeness of the proposed functions, mechanisms 
and controls in terms of achieving the main goal of the NCCBF.  
2. Correctness: this objective is aimed to find out which functions, mechanisms and 
controls in the proposed framework are unclear and whether need to be changed (i.e. 
amendment/addition/removal). 
3. Acceptability: The focus here is on measuring the extent to which practitioners 
can benefit from the proposed framework in their organisation or country.  
4. The Overall Evaluation of the framework including:  
• Inclusive: this aimed to find out if the proposed framework involves as many 
stakeholders as possible or not. 
• Coherent: this aimed to find out if the proposed framework recognises current 
International Standards, Protocols and Interoperability. 
• Multi-Dimensional: this aimed to find out if the proposed framework includes 
Domestic and International Tools. 
• Risk Based: this aimed to find out if the proposed mitigation functions, 
mechanisms and controls in accordance with the level of risk. 
7.4 Sessions’ Plan  
The evaluation study of the NCCBF involves one meeting and two sessions: inductions session 
and evaluation session. The first session had taken approximately 30 minutes and the evaluation 
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had taken approximately 90 minutes with a break of 30 minutes in between. Figure 40 illustrates 
the protocol of these sessions. 
Induction session- 30 Minutes 
• Welcome
• Research themes 
• The framework to 
be evaluated






Evaluation Session- 90 Minutes




• The overall 
evaluation of the 
framework
 
Figure  7.1 : PROTOCOL FOR EVALUATION SESSIONS 
For each session, there will be a set of activities to be carried out in order, and questions to be 
discussed and answered, as follows: 
1. Induction session: In this session, the participants were first welcomed. Using the MS 
PowerPoint the researcher then presented:  
• The themes of research; in order to ensure that practitioners had the required level of 
understanding of the materials and documents that were given to each one. These 
materials including research overview, which contained Cybersecurity Capacity 
Maturity Model for Nations (CCMM) and the IDEF0 modelling language. 
• The framework to be evaluated, the experts were given a brief presentation about of 
the NCCBF; In addition, plain text versions of the framework description were given 
with a set of questions used for the evaluations. 
• Outlying the way by which this focus group research was to be conducted;  
• The way the research materials (templates) are used for answers and comments. 
Experts were given a form with two questions about the completeness, four 
questions about the correctness, and two questions about the acceptability of the 
224 
 
framework. In addition, there was one question to evaluate the NCCBF based on a 
set of requirements was given to them. These questions are presented in Table 27. 
Activities Questions Notes 
Completeness 
• Which factors, mechanisms and controls are missing in this 
framework? 
• Which factors, mechanisms and controls in this framework 




• Which factors, mechanisms and controls are unclear to you?  
• Which ambiguities are currently in this framework? 
• What changes (i.e. amendment/addition/removal) to the 
artefacts do you suggest (labels, names, orders? Why? 
 
Acceptability 
• Would you find it useful to use this framework to build a 
cybersecurity capacity for your organisation or country? 







• To what extent do you think the framework is: (Please 
specify why, or why not using the sheet provided) :- 
  Inclusive: Involves as many Stakeholders as possible. 
  Coherent : Recognizes Current International Standards, 
Protocols and   Interoperability 
 Multi-Dimensional : Includes Domestic and International 
Tools 
 Risk Based: Mitigation factors, mechanisms and controls 
in Accordance with the level of risk. 
 
Table  7.2 : the Evaluation Questions  
2. Evaluation Session: After the induction session, the experts were asked to form 
groups of 2 or 3 persons, resulting in 4 groups. The purpose of this session was to 
determine and examine how well the NCCBF artefact has addressed the practical 
problems explicated. The list of requirements and their definitions, against which the 
artefact was evaluated, have been presented in Section 7.4. The participants were asked 
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to write down their comments on the overall contribution of the artefact. These 
comments were openly discussed between the groups in order to come up with new 
ideas and recommendations for improving the artefact. The key finding from this 
session are discussed in following section. 
7.5 Key findings from the Evaluation  
The data obtained from the evaluation session were analysed qualitatively through content 
analysis. The researcher started by selecting appropriate texts from the templates of the 
evaluation session, analysing the texts, verifying their relation to the requirements categories, and 
finally presenting them as suggestions of change and improvement based on objectives of the 










Finical resources are missing in D1, it must be mentioned clearly and how to get the 
funding? 
8 D1 
Communication channel is missing 7 D1,D3,D4  
Monitoring reporting mechanism is missing in D4 4 D4 
Legal framework should control D1 is missing 13 D1 
Cooperation in case of instability and during the crisis, also think about actors outside the 
country that might support the state (good international cooperation). 
9 D1,D4,D5 
Performance measurement is messing and measuring capabilities after selecting functions, 
mechanisms and controls  
13 All dimensions  
Evaluating the internal and external environment landscape in the AS-IS step is not enough. 13 All dimensions 
Correctness 
 
Add continues review of the model auditing.  6 D4 
Create coordinated mechanisms with regional and international partners during crisis. 13 D1,D4,D5 
Use risk management instated risk based approach in D1 and mirage M1.1.2 with M1.1.1. 13 D1 
Add regional agreement mechanism.  13 D4 
Add physical security policies in D5 and regional cooperation’s. 3 D5 
Add Big data sharing mechanisms (Regional and international) to D4. 5 D4 
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Change cybersecurity awareness-raising campaigns to cybersecurity awareness-raising 
program (M2.1.2). 
5 D2 
“Use a probabilistic graphical model to evaluate this framework such as, that Bayesian 
networks”. 
1 All dimensions 
“Use Performance measurement such as (KPI, Balanced Scorecard (BSC)) or other 
capabilities measuring frameworks”. 
13 Action phase 
“Organisational structure should include advisory committee and counter-terrorism 
committee and build capacity of these committees in field of cybersecurity in the country”.  
13 D1 
“Use the development of the NCS as function not as a mechanism and swap it with 
“Establish a National Council”. 
13 D1 






“Yes it is useful and acceptable” 10 All dimensions  






All participants confirmed that the framework is inclusive, Coherent, multi-dimensional and 
risk based. 
13 All dimensions 
“In our opinion this framework is Inclusive, Coherent, Multi-Dimensional and Risk Based 
because it based on a well know and internationally acceptable model (CCMM)”. 
4 All dimensions 
Table  7.3 : Key findings from the Evaluation
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As presented in Table (7.3), some activities were missing. For instance, all of the experts 
mentioned that in the AS-IS step we should consider other methods to evaluate the internal and 
external landscape such as SWOT and PESTEL approaches. Also, eight of the experts clearly 
confirmed that the financial resources and how to obtain the funding are missing in the NCCBF. 
Moreover, nine experts confirmed that cooperation in case of instability and during crises is 
missing and we have to create coordinated mechanisms with regional and international partners. 
All experts mentioned that some activities should be added to the framework such as, 
performance measurements, auditing mechanisms to be added to legal capacity building. 
Moreover, all of participants stated to use the NCS as function not as a mechanism and swap it 
with “Establish a National Council”. Another interesting point is that all of the participants 
stressed that the national council should include the advisory committee and counter-terrorism 
committee. Ten experts from thirteen, agreed that this framework is “useful and acceptable”. Two 
of them said that, they liked how the capacity building in educations and private sectors has been 
defined and developed. All of the participants acknowledged that the framework is inclusive, 
coherent, multi-dimensional and risk based. Four of them commented that in their opinion this 
framework is inclusive, coherent, multi-dimensional and risk-based because it is based on a well 
know and internationally acceptable model (CCMM). 
7.6 Modification to the framework  
This section summarises the main updates and amendments to the activities of the proposed 
framework. As described in the results in the previous section some suggested amendments 
suggested by the participants and the actions taken by the researcher are presented in Table 
(7.4). The new versions of the NCCBF dimensions were updated in the development section 









Add continues review of the model auditing.  6 D4 Added 
Create coordinated mechanisms with regional and international partners during crisis. 13 D1,D4,D5 Added of D1,D4,D5. 
Use risk management instated risk based approach in D1 and mirage M1.1.2 with M1.1.1. 13 D1 Changed 
Add regional agreement mechanism.  13 D4 Added 
Add physical security policies in D5 and regional cooperation’s. 3 D5 Added 
Add Big data sharing mechanisms (Regional and international) to D4. 5 D4 Added 
Change cybersecurity awareness-raising campaigns to cybersecurity awareness-raising 
program (M2.1.2). 
5 D2 Changed 
“Use Performance measurement such as (KPI, Balanced Scorecard (BSC)) or other 
capabilities measuring frameworks”. 
13 Output stage Addressed 
“Organisational structure should include advisory committee and counter-terrorism 
committee and build capacity of these committees in field of cybersecurity in the 
country”.  
13 D1 Added 
“Use the development of the NCS as function not as a mechanism and swap it with 
“Establish a National Council”. 
13 D1 Swapped 
“Consider other methods to assess the internal and external landscape such as SWOT and 
PESTEL approaches”. 
13 AS-IS step Added in observation phase 
Table  7.4 Modification to the framework 
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7.7 Threats to Validity  
The evaluation of the NCCBF in this chapter has the following threats to validity and some 
limitations. One was that the researcher has invited 20 participants from the workshop and the 
research material has been given to them. A total of 13 of the selected participants then 
attended the evaluation sessions, although seven of the participants failed to attend, owing to 
external commitments or issues.  Second, the researcher was not able to demonstrate the 
proposed framework with the same participants due to the difficulty to arrange another 
separate meeting and get a consensus among all participants on the time of the two focus 
group meetings. The meeting was ultimately arranged in one focus group meeting on the 
same day at the same time. Third, some of participants failed to assess the IDEF0 modelling 
function template analysis such as (AS-IS) and (AS-TO-BE), due to lack of understanding the IDEF0 
technique.  This gave insight into the need to apply this artefact to another country with a set of 
experts from different domains. 
7.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the approach to the evaluation of the proposed framework 
(NCCBF) for countries in a transitional phase. This framework has been evaluated by 13 
experts in the field the cybersecurity from different countries including experts from countries 
that in transitional phase, during an ITU workshop session by using the focus group technique 
and where the limitations of this evaluation study were also voiced and noted.  
The evaluation demonstrated the valuable contribution of the NCCBF’s at the United Nations 
organised event where it concepts, design principles, methodology and framework procedures 
were discussed in-depth as where the challenges in National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
and the complexities associated with their builds. The results of evaluation including critical 
suggestions and procedural amendments were provided, and the finalised version of 







8. CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
WORK 
This chapter summarises the findings and outcomes of the research. In addition, the research 
contributions to knowledge are defined as well as future work. 
8.1 Key findings and outcomes 
This thesis investigated the Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) issues and challenges in 
countries that in a transitional phase. Building cybersecurity capacity has become 
increasingly a subject of global concern in both stable countries and those countries in a 
transitional phase. The following are the key research findings: 
•  National and international Research & Technology Organisations (RTOs) have 
developed a plethora of guidelines and frameworks to help with the development of a 
national cybersecurity framework. Although extensive research has been carried out 
on CCB, to our knowledge no single study exists which focuses on countries in a 
transitional phase. In addition, there are no efforts so far in linking existing 
frameworks and initiatives with benchmarking models, and thus this effort from the 
CCMM is presented (Hameed et al. 2018; Ben Naseir  et al. 2020).  
• Existing models and assessments of Cybersecurity Capacity Building (CCB) are 
successful in evaluating national levels of CCB in individual countries, however, the 
ability to aid countries in how to improve their cyber capacities is still lacking (Muller 
2015). 
•  Many countries including countries in a transitional phase with poor infrastructure 
and poor governance are rapidly starting to establish their presence in cyberspace. 
However, this may provide a new breeding ground for organised crime, terrorism, and 
being used as an instrument for committing international cybercrime (Garlock 2018). 
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•  The research findings indicate that countries in a transitional phase are vulnerable to 
cybersecurity risks, such as cybercrime and cyber terrorism, and that they lack of 
cybersecurity capacity areas such as; an adequate knowledge and awareness of 
cybersecurity, cybersecurity strategies and policies, technical controls, and incident 
response capabilities.  
• Managing cyber risk to national critical infrastructure and information infrastructure 
is crucial in cyberspace. However, the results of this research show that many 
countries in a transitional phase lack of proper risk management process, lack of 
knowledge and skills in risk management.  
• Existing literature highlighted that many countries in a transitional phase are facing 
numerous challenges in adopting e-services in, e.g., e-government  (Ahmed et al. 
2013; Karaim and Inal 2019), e-banking (Farag and Hilles; Elgahwash et al. 2014; 
MTMC 2016; Ward et al. 2017), e-commerce (Moftah et al. 2012; NISSA 2013; 
GCSCC 2017) and e-learning (Kitzinger 1995a; Warfield et al. 2002; Gill et al. 
2008; Goldman 2010; Herrington and Aldrich 2013; DOE 2014; Hult and Sivanesan 
2014). In addition, many of these countries suffer from the digital, and  they  are  not  
able  to deploy the appropriate ICT infrastructure for  e-government  deployment 
(Alshehri and Drew 2010; Forti et al. 2014). Government departments in some of 
these countries such as Spring Land are using different ICT tools, which make it 
difficult to centralise the services from various departments and avail to citizens 
through e-Government platform (Forti et al. 2014). 
• The results show that countries in a transitional phase are facing many issues due to 
current political unrest and the austerity measures that affect local government. 
These issues such as, lack of funding has hindered most of the attempts of advancing 
cybersecurity including education (Symantec 2016).  Muller (2015), stated that 
cybersecurity capacity is challenge in these countries due to many reasons including 
institutional stability, and building knowledge. Cyber education in these countries is 
concisely mentioned as a part of the discussion and as a crucial part of securing 
cyberspace (Muller 2015). 
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• Literature and body of knowledge show that no scholarly research has currently been 
done on countries in a transitional phase posture to implementing appropriate 
Cybersecurity Capacity Building frameworks. In addition, there are no studies 
addressing the factors that influence the development of a National Cybersecurity 
Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) in a chaotic ecosystem.  
Based on the research findings and analysis, a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Framework (NCCBF) is proposed, highlighting the significant capacities necessary for 
improving cybersecurity in transitional phase countries. The NCCBF is inspired by a Design 
Science Research methodology (DSR) and guided by utilising modelling approaches. The 
OODA was used as a modelling baseline, selected for its simplicity and adaptability, OODA 
steps were used to construct and guiding the requirements of IDEF0. These steps were 
instantiated with the CCMM and finding from the conducted empirical studies and literature. 
Furthermore, the NCCBF has been evaluated by a focus group against a structured set of 
criteria. The evaluation demonstrated the valuable contribution of the NCCBF’s in 
representing the challenges in the National Cybersecurity Capacity Building and the 
complexities associated with the build. It is hoped that the contribution of the qualitative 
studies and proposed framework in this thesis will benefit governments in transitional phase 
countries. 
8.2 Research Contributions 
This research contributes to both theoretical and practical understanding of national 
cybersecurity capacity in the context of transitional phase countries. The finding and 
outcomes of this study have numerous implications to academia, decision makers, 
cybersecurity practitioners, professionals, and general cyber space users as follows: 
• Theoretically, this research contributed to the existing body of Cybersecurity 
Capacity Building research, mainly through problem space contextualisation. This 
has been done by filling the knowledge gap in understanding how countries in a 
transitional phase are managing cybersecurity capacity challenges and understanding 
the existing weaknesses in cybersecurity capacity domain in those countries. The 
outcomes highlighted in this research could influence the strategies and decisions on 
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an efficient framework which help to improve the contribution level of cybersecurity 
capacity for countries in a transitional phase.  
• The research study has investigated the concept of national cybersecurity capacity 
framework and indices adopted by developed countries and international models and 
security standards to secure cyberspace and build cybersecurity capacities. These 
models were examined to understand their pros and cons and how could be adopted 
to enable countries in a transitional phase to transform their current cybersecurity 
posture by applying activities that reflect desired outcomes. 
• This research involved active participants of expert and stakeholder utilising two 
qualitative studies. A significant contributing factor for this type of study closes the 
gap between academia and practitioners and creates the Knowledge Exchange 
Environment that will sustain Information Exploitation, Information Operations, and 
Digital Transformation for the NCCBF. According to Hevner et al. (2004), the 
artefact may enable the solution of an unsolved problem by either extending the 
knowledge base or applying existing knowledge in new innovative ways. For this 
research study, the variety of existing standards, guidelines, and practices based on 
criteria have been innovatively mapped t to address the research problem for 
understanding cybersecurity capacity building activities. 
• The Macro-Development of a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework 
(NCCBF) that secures the 5th domain for countries in a transitional phase.  
8.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Research 
Since the states around the world are facing similar cyber threats, developing a National 
Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework to enhance National Security attracts more 
attention in recent years. The study’s strength lies in the fact that this research fills the 
knowledge gap in understanding how countries in a transitional phase using Spring Land as a 
case study are managing and approaching Cybersecurity risks and threats. The study focuses 
on the strategic level challenges and develops a framework to overcome emerging 
Cybersecurity threats. The said framework will encompass convenient and efficient 
frameworks, which shall aid to contribute strongly to efficient Cybersecurity capacity for 
countries in a transitional phase. 
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In this research, adopting and adapting the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (CCMM) 
for Nation states developed a Common Operational Picture (COP) of the State-of-Art of the 
Spring Land Cyber defence and its threat landscape. The Interactive Management technique 
and Focus Group discussion are used in order to capture the required analysis framework for 
the National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework suitable for National security for 
countries in a transitional phase. This analysis is based on the Cybersecurity Capacity 
Maturity Model for Nations (CCMM) that was developed by the University of Oxford. While 
the research findings are limited to Spring Land, some generalisations are possible. In 
addition, other countries’ Cybersecurity strategies, also existing global Cybersecurity 
frameworks, and Cybersecurity Capacity models are used as a base for the comprehension of 
the best practice around the world. The audiences of this research are decision makers, 
government officials, managers, and general employees participating in security development 
in Spring Land.  Furthermore, the framework has been evaluated by international experiences 
from different countries including experts from countries that in a transitional phase.  
 
Figure  8.1: The scope of the research 
This research is focused on the field of Cybersecurity Capacity Building for counties in a 
transition state using Spring Land as a case study. It is limited with respect to models applied 
in the study as it primarily concentrates on the strategic level and provides some of the 










study was limited to one state (Spring Land) at a given point in time and there is a lack of 
good data collection on cyber incidents and threats in Spring Land.  
In addition, many efforts have been made to reduce research biases. However, this study 
recognise that certain research biases may have influenced the study results, such as 
participants are not understanding the questions or methods proposed in this study (Jackson 
2015), the interaction between main functions in Section 4.2.4, was based on the judgment of 
the researcher which may influence the findings. Furthermore, the framework has been 
evaluated against a based on a set of requirements, but it has not been tested in a real-life 
environment as of yet. 
8.4 Future work 
Since this study is the first of its kind related to cybersecurity capacity building, there are 
many opportunities for future research on cybersecurity issues in countries that in a 
transitional phase. These opportunities such as the following: 
• Conducting comparative studies to obtain a complete understanding of how stable or 
developed counties are managing and building their cybersecurity capacities. 
• This research can be extended to evaluate the pertinence and usefulness of the 
proposed framework to other countries in addressing cybersecurity challenges. 
• This research identified the critical success factors for cybersecurity capacity building 
for countries in a transitional phase by adapting CCMM dimensions. Therefore, it 
would be useful to explore and analyse these dimensions using other approaches such 
as Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal (PESTEL) 
approach.   
• The framework has been evaluated against a based on a set of requirements, but it has 
not been tested in a real-life environment as of yet. Therefore, further research can be 
considered including testing this framework in other countries. 
• More research can be done to refinement the components of the framework such as 
using performance measurement techniques to monitor the performance of each 
dimension in the NCCBF. In addition, the Enterprise Architecture components can be 
adapted in the proposed CCB framework. 
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• The NCCBF provides five dimensions with concurrent and continuous functions for 
each dimension. The framework provides an easy to follow set of activities to build 
national cybersecurity capacity, however, a web tool can be developed to facilitate 
communication of these activities and outcomes across the country from the strategic 
to operations levels. 
8.5 Conclusions 
In this study, a National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) is proposed 
to enable countries in a state of transition to transform their current cybersecurity posture by 
applying activities that reflect desired outcomes. The NCCBF provides the means to a better 
understanding of how NCCB can be defined and developed. The research findings showed 
that countries in a transitional phase are vulnerable to cybersecurity risks such as cybercrime 
and cyber terrorism.  
As no previous studies have been conducted on countries in a state of transition, the research 
findings and results could influence the policies and decisions on building cybersecurity 
capacity in these countries. 
8.6 Recommendations 
Cyberspace has become an essential element in the development of modern economies. A 
robust cybersecurity capacity is vital for states to progress and advance in economic, political 
and social terms (Pawlak 2014; Muller 2015). Spring Land is beset with numerous challenges 
but needs to prioritise cybersecurity capacity to ensure it has the ability to react swiftly to 
protect its wellbeing and ensure continued economic growth and prosperity for its citizens. 
These issues have been raised due to political concerns and the scarcity of government 
funding and human resources to prepare a national cybersecurity blueprint. There are 
numerous recommendations arising from the research that could help the government to 
intervene in a constructive manner. These recommendations are articulated below:  
1- Devise a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS)  
A NCS should be considered by the government because state interactions in cyberspace are 
characterised by uncertainty, rather than predictability in this era. Therefore, by devising a 
NCS, the state is able to decide how to concentrate its efforts based on their relative strengths 
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and weakness. The strategy process should involve as many stakeholders as possible and 
centralise competence. Based on the existing frameworks in Section 2.8.2.1 and the proposed 
framework in Section 6.4.2, the strategy should be guided by numerous principles taken 
together in the development of the NCS. These guiding principles are: Risk-based; Outcome-
focused; Prioritised; Practicable; Respectful of privacy and civil liberties; Globally relevant; 
and Appropriate set of policy instruments. In addition, a National Council for Cybersecurity 
with a clear mandate, appropriate statutory powers and an organisational structure must be 
established to develop the NCS. The rationale for creating the council is to perform a crucial 
function in coordinating various organisations in the public and private sectors. Also, 
demonstrating strong leadership at the highest level enhances recognition of the NCS. 
2- Build a cyber defence doctrine 
Cyber defence capabilities should be developed. This is essentially because cyber has become 
a tool for politics, espionage and military activities and cybersecurity has become a central 
topic for national and international security. The government recognising cyberspace as a 
warfare domain will enhance deterrence in air, space and cyberspace by enhancing the state’s 
ability to attribute and defeat attacks targeting systems or supporting infrastructure (Pernik et 
al. 2016). To develop a cyber defence doctrine, several aspects should be considered by the 
government and these can be found in Section 2.8.2.2 and Section 6.4.2. 
3- Develop national incident response capabilities 
National incident response capabilities should be bolstered by establishing national computer 
security incident response teams (CSIRT) and ensuring that the technical, financial and 
human resources are adequate. In addition, it is necessary to establish clear processes and 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities. This research has found that Spring Land created a 
national computer emergency response team (CERT) but this is only working at the level of 
National Cybersecurity Authority (NCSA) departments. This is due to a lack of co-operation 
at the state level for various reasons including the lack of a national strategy, administrative 
complications, political orientations, poor awareness, and a lack of trust between all sectors 
(see Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.4.1). 
Therefore, developing national incident response capabilities will help the government to 
establish a culture of risk assessment and crisis management to assess risks and devise 
methods to mitigate them. There are several existing guides that outline the activities required 




4- Developing risk management and critical infrastructure protection capabilities  
 
Developing a risk management approach should be considered by the government of Spring 
Land because it delivers a process that integrates security and risk management activities into 
the system development lifecycle. The risk-based approach to security control selection and 
specification considers the effectiveness, efficiency and associated constraints arising from 
the applicable laws, directives, executive Orders, policies, standards and regulations. In 
addition, it identifies the critical infrastructure (CI) assets and critical national information 
infrastructure (CNI) which are crucial for efforts to develop measures and procedures for the 
protection of CNI and reduce the risk of cyberattacks. Also, it is necessary to create a national 
list of CNI assets and identify the risk priorities. There are various sources of guidance and 
also different approaches available to develop these capabilities. More information can be 
found in Section 2.8.2.2 and Section 6.4.1. 
 
5- Developing a national awareness programme  
 
The government must develop a national awareness programme that is compatible with the 
current situation, targeting all of society to influence the implementation of secure behaviour 
online. This study has revealed that there is a lack of skilled people and campaigns actively 
raising awareness of cybersecurity to deal with incidents in government sectors. 
Consequently, the associated cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities have been significantly 
increased (see Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.4.2). Therefore, establishing a formal national 
awareness programme can enable citizens, the public sector and private sector to develop a 
security-minded culture so that they behave securely in cyberspace. To develop such an 
awareness programme, the agency’s awareness and training needs to be identified and an 
extensive awareness and training plan must be developed. This will require organisational 
buy-in as well as priorities to be established (see Section 2.8.2.4). 
 
6- Creating a national cybersecurity education and workforce development framework 
 
The government should consider cybersecurity education and workforce development as a 
part of a national capacity building strategy. This study has shown that Spring Land does not 
have any plans at the national level to enhance the efficiency of education or workforce 
development in the field of cybersecurity due to there being no financial resources allocated 
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for such purposes at the state level. In addition, there is no co-ordination between universities 
and private companies with regards to cybersecurity training and there are no plans to 
continue training government employees in cybersecurity (see Section 4.3.2 and Section 
5.4.3). Therefore, the government should dedicate a national budget to harmonise 
cybersecurity education and research. Moreover, qualification programmes for cybersecurity 
should be developed to start amassing a cadre of professionals at the national and 
organisational level. Develop national cybersecurity education programme based on the 
existing frameworks will entail many steps. These steps will include the following: selecting 
the task owner and the audience for the cybersecurity education programme; mapping the 
existing cybersecurity education landscape and identifying gaps in provision; fostering 
research and development in cybersecurity; combining the education with practical training; 
and preparing the future cybersecurity workforce (McGettrick 2013; Newhouse et al. 2017; 
Bellasio et al. 2018). More information can be found in Section 2.8.2.5 and Section 6.5.2. 
 
7- Drafting a legal framework 
 
National laws and regulations related to cybersecurity and cybercrime should be drafted by 
the Spring Land government because the failure to establish a clear legal basis can lead to 
significant limitations on a country’s ability to successfully secure cyberspace (Bellasio et al. 
2018). The study has confirmed that no cyber- or ICT security-related legislation or 
regulations have been drafted by the Spring Land government (see Section 4.3.2 and Section 
5.5.4). The government should develop a legal framework and ensure that the framework 
satisfies various principles such as the territoriality principle, the responsibility principle, 
national and international cooperation, and human rights. These principles outline 
fundamental concepts and areas that must be included or addressed in a comprehensive legal 
approach to cybersecurity as well as the need to raise awareness about existing legal 
difficulties involving cybersecurity (Tikk 2011). In addition, the government should develop 
and strengthen national capacities in law enforcement and cyber-related crime investigation 
as well as prosecutors and judges. More information about how to develop the legal 
framework can be found in Section 2.8.2.6 and Section 6.5.3. 
8- Adhere to international cybersecurity standards 
All governments and stakeholders in Spring Land have to adhere to common ICT security, 
technology, cybersecurity, and risk-management standards and protocols such as those 
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published by ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). This is because 
the scope of cybersecurity includes the protection of complex environments resulting from 
the interaction of persons, software and services on cyberspace by means of technology 
devices and connected networks (ENISA 2019). This research has found that military and 
political conflicts have greatly affected the resilience of infrastructure and exposed the 
telecommunications, electricity and water sectors to greater risk. In addition, there is no 
national agency or framework to monitor the implementation of standards, and minimal 
acceptable practices across all government sectors. There is also a lack of research centres in 
this field and poor co-operation between the public and private sectors with regards to 
training and skill development (see Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.5.5).  
However, adhering to standardisations in cybersecurity would provide many benefits to the 
government and organisations of Spring Land. These benefits include: interoperability; 
reusability; knowledge development and cybersecurity awareness; harmonisation of 
terminology; consistency between different manufacturers, vendors and users; repeatability; 
performance checking; security evaluation; supply chain integrity and security (ENISA 
2019). The government of Spring Land can utilise a range of general resources to build 
capacity in ICT security standards, cryptographic controls, cybersecurity standards, risk-
management standards and audited assessment. These include standards derived from the 
International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC); the International Telecommunications Union – Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector (ITU-T); the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE); the World Wide Web Consortium; and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Bellasio et al. 2018). Further 
information can be found in Section 2.8.2.7 and Section 6.5.4. 
These recommendations were derived from two qualitative findings (see Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5) as well as existing frameworks which enabled the researcher to suggest relatively 
concrete recommendations. Enhancing national cybersecurity capacity will be more effective 
if it is structured and modelled under an overarching framework in a consistent way, as 







Abuzawayda, Y. I., 2016. Security Issues on Libya’s E-Government. Imperial Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Research, 3 (1). 
African-Union, 2014. African Union convention on cyber security and personal data protection. 
African Union: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Ahmed, A. M., Moreton, R., Mehdi, Q. H. and Elmaghraby, A., 2013. E-government services 
challenges and opportunities for developing countries: The case of Libya, 2013 Second 
International Conference on Informatics & Applications (ICIA) (pp. 133-137): IEEE. 
Ajzen, I., 2002. Perceived behavioral control, self‐efficacy, locus of control, and the theory of 
planned behavior 1. Journal of applied social psychology, 32 (4), 665-683. 
Aliyu, A. A., Bello, M. U., Kasim, R. and Martin, D., 2014. Positivist and non-positivist paradigm in 
social science research: Conflicting paradigms or perfect partners? Journal of Management 
and Sustainability, 4 (3), 79. 
Alshehri, M. and Drew, S., 2010. Implementation of e-government: advantages and challenges, 
International Association for Scientific Knowledge (IASK) (pp. .). 
AMC, 2017. Cybersecurity Curricula 2017. New York, NY: ACM, IEEE, AIS, IFIP.  
Andreewsky, E. and Bourcier, D., 2000. Abduction in language interpretation and law making. 
Kybernetes, 29 (7/8), 836-845. 
Appazov, A., 2014. Legal aspects of cybersecurity. 
Appelbaum, S. H., 1997. Socio-technical systems theory: an intervention strategy for organizational 
development. Management decision, 35 (6), 452-463. 
Archick, K., Ek, C., Gallis, P., Miko, F. T. and Woehrel, S., 2006. European approaches to homeland 
security and counterterrorism: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE. 
Argomaniz, J., 2015. The European Union Policies on the Protection of Infrastructure from Terrorist 
Attacks: A Critical Assessment. Intelligence and National Security, 30 (2-3), 259-280. 
Asadli, J., 2018. PROPOSING ACTION PLAN IN CYBER SECURITY CAPACITY BUILDING FOR AZERBAIJAN. 
Master Thesis (Master ). Tallinn University of Technology. 
Avdoshin, S. M. and Pesotskaya, E. Y., 2016. Software risk management: using the automated tools.  
Emerging Trends in Information Systems. Springer, 85-97. 
Avison, D. E., Lau, F., Myers, M. D. and Nielsen, P. A., 1999. Action research. Communications of the 
ACM, 42 (1), 94-97. 
243 
 
Azmi, R., Tibben, W. and Win, K. T., 2018. Review of cybersecurity frameworks: context and shared 
concepts. Journal of Cyber Policy, 3 (2), 258-283. 
Bada, M., Creese, S., Goldsmith, M., Mitchell, C. and Phillips, E., 2014. Computer security incident 
response teams (CSIRTs) an overview. Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, 1-23. 
Bada, M., Sasse, A. M. and Nurse, J. R., 2019a. Cyber security awareness campaigns: Why do they fail 
to change behaviour? arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.02672. 
Bada, M., Von Solms, B. and Agrafiotis, I., 2019b. Reviewing national cybersecurity awareness in 
Africa: an empirical study. 
Baker, M., 2013. State of cyber workforce development. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie 
Mellon University. 
Banathy, B. A., 1996. Information‐based design of social systems. Systems Research and Behavioral 
Science, 41 (2), 104-123. 
Bandura, A., Freeman, W. and Lightsey, R., 1999. Self-efficacy: The exercise of control: Springer. 
Baranowski, L. E. and Anderson, L. E., 2005. Examining rating source variation in work behavior to 
KSA linkages. Personnel Psychology, 58 (4), 1041-1054. 
Barata, J., da Cunha, P. R. and Abrantes, L., 2015. Dealing with risks and workarounds: A guiding 
framework, IFIP Working Conference on The Practice of Enterprise Modeling (pp. 141-155): 
Springer. 
Baskerville, R. L. and Wood-Harper, A. T., 1996. A critical perspective on action research as a method 
for information systems research. Journal of information Technology, 11 (3), 235-246. 
Baxter, G. and Sommerville, I., 2011. Socio-technical systems: From design methods to systems 
engineering. Interacting with computers, 23 (1), 4-17. 
Beesley, A. D. and Shebby, S., 2010. Evaluating Capacity Building in Education: The North Central 
Comprehensive Center. Online Submission. 
Bellasio, J., Flint, R., Ryan, N., Sondergaard, S., Monsalve, C. G., Meranto, A. S. and Knack, A., 2018. 
Developing Cybersecurity Capacity: A proof-of-concept implementation guide. 
Ben Naseir , Huseyin Dogan , Edward Apeh  and Raian Ali 2020. National Cybersecurity Capacity 
Building Framework for Countries in a Transitional Phase. the 22nd International Conference 
on Enterprise Information Systems. Science and Technology Publications. Available from: 
https://www.scitepress.org/PublicationsDetail.aspx?ID=0ngJLvAM5Mg=&t=1 [Accessed  
Ben Naseir, M. A., Dogan, H., Apeh, E., Richardson, C. and Ali, R., 2019. Contextualising the National 
Cyber Security Capacity in an Unstable Environment: A Spring Land Case Study (pp. 373-382). 
Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
244 
 
Benbasat, I., Goldstein, D. K. and Mead, M., 1987. The case research strategy in studies of 
information systems. MIS quarterly, 369-386. 
BenIbrahim, A., 2017. Libyana Mobile Phone goes 4G LTE [online]. Available from: 
https://www.libyaobserver.ly/tech/libyana-mobile-phone-goes-4g-lte [Accessed 
24/04/2017]. 
Berendt, B., De Paoli, S., Laing, C., Fischer-Hübner, S., Catalui, D. and Tirtea, R., 2014. Roadmap for 
NIS education programmes in Europe. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T., 1966. T.(1966). The social construction of reality. 
Bhattacherjee, A., 2012. Social science research: Principles, methods, and practices. 
Bigelow, B., 2019. What are Military Cyberspace Operations Other Than War?, 2019 11th 
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) (Vol. 900, pp. 1-17): IEEE. 
Boas, G., Bischoff, J. L., Reid, N. L. and Taylor III, B. D., 2011. International Criminal Law Practitioner 
Library: Volume 3: International Criminal Procedure. Cambridge University Press. 
Boehm, B. W., 1991. Software risk management: principles and practices. IEEE software, 8 (1), 32-41. 
Boes, S. and Leukfeldt, E. R., 2017. Fighting cybercrime: A joint effort.  Cyber-Physical Security. 
Springer, 185-203. 
Boodhoo, R. and Purmessur, R. D., 2009. Justifications for qualitative research in organisations: a 
step forward. The Journal of Online Education (New York). 
Boyd, J. R., 1996. The essence of winning and losing. Unpublished lecture notes, 12 (23), 123-125. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research in 
psychology, 3 (2), 77-101. 
Brechbühl, H., Bruce, R., Dynes, S. and Johnson, M. E., 2010. Protecting critical information 
infrastructure: Developing cybersecurity policy. 
Broome, B. J. and Keever, D. B., 1986. Facilitating Group Communication: The Interactive 
Management Approach. 
Bryman, A., 1984. The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: a question of method or 
epistemology? British journal of Sociology, 75-92. 
Bryman, A., 2016. Social research methods. Oxford university press. 
Bryson, J. M., 2018. Strategic planning for public and nonprofit organizations: A guide to 
strengthening and sustaining organizational achievement. John Wiley & Sons. 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., 1979. Two dimensions: Four paradigms. Sociological paradigms and 
organizational analysis, 21-37. 
245 
 
CabinetOffice, 2010. Strategic framework and policy statement on improving the resilience of critical 
infrastructure to disruption from natural hazards: Cabinet Office London. 
Campion, M. A., Campion, J. E. and Hudson Jr, J. P., 1994. Structured interviewing: A note on 
incremental validity and alternative question types. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79 (6), 
998. 
Capers, I. B., 2018. Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen. Columbia Law Review, 118 (2), 653-712. 
Carey, J. W., 1993. Linking qualitative and quantitative methods: Integrating cultural factors into 
public health. Qualitative Health Research, 3 (3), 298-318. 
Carr, M., 2016. Public–private partnerships in national cyber-security strategies. International Affairs, 
92 (1), 43-62. 
Caruso, J., 2002. Combating Terrorism: Protecting the United States. testimony of JT Caruso, Deputy 
Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division, FBI, before the 
House Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs, and International Relations, 
Washington DC, March, 21, 122. 
Cavelty, M. D., 2014. Breaking the cyber-security dilemma: Aligning security needs and removing 
vulnerabilities. Science and engineering ethics, 20 (3), 701-715. 
Cerezo, A. I., Lopez, J. and Patel, A., 2007. International cooperation to fight transnational 
cybercrime, Second international workshop on digital forensics and incident analysis (WDFIA 
2007) (pp. 13-27): IEEE. 
Cerullo, V. and Cerullo, M. J., 2004. Business continuity planning: a comprehensive approach. 
Information Systems Management, 21 (3), 70-78. 
Charmaz, K. and Belgrave, L. L., 2007. Grounded theory. The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology. 
Choo, K.-K. R., 2011. The cyber threat landscape: Challenges and future research directions. 
Computers & Security, 30 (8), 719-731. 
Christakis, A. N., 1985. The national forum on nonindustrial private forest lands. Systems Research 
and Behavioral Science, 2 (3), 189-199. 
Cichonski, P., Millar, T., Grance, T. and Scarfone, K., 2012. Computer security incident handling guide. 
NIST Special Publication, 800 (61), 1-147. 
Ciglic, K., 2018. Cybersecurity Policy Framework A practical guide to the development of national 
cybersecurity policy. Microsoft.  
Clarke, C., 2009. Paths between positivism and interpretivism: An appraisal of Hay's via media. 
Politics, 29 (1), 28-36. 
Coram, R., 2002. Boyd: The fighter pilot who changed the art of war. Hachette UK. 
246 
 
Craig, A., 2018. Risk Management for Cybersecurity: Security Baselines. Microsoft  
Creswell, J. W., 2013. Research design : qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method approaches 
[Non-fiction]. Los Angeles, Calif. : SAGE, 2013.Fourth edition, international student edition. 
Cronin, C., 2014. Using case study research as a rigorous form of inquiry. Nurse Researcher (2014+), 
21 (5), 19. 
CSFI, C. S. F. I., 2011. Project Cyber Dawn - Libya [online]. Available from: 
http://stefanomele.it/public/documenti/222DOC-395.pdf [Accessed 25-04-2016]. 
CTO, 2015. Commonwealth Approach for Developing National Cybersecurity Strategies: A Guide to 
Creating a Cohesive and Inclusive Approach to Delivering a Safe, Secure and Resilient 
Cyberspace. London, UK.: Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation (CTO)  
Cyberkov, 2016. Hunting-libyan-scorpions [Available from: https://cyberkov.com/hunting-libyan-
scorpions/ [Accessed 15-11-2016]. 
CyberSeek, 2016. Hack the Gap: Close the cybersecurity talent gap with interactive tools and data 
[online]. Available from: https://www.cyberseek.org/pathway.html [Accessed 07-08-2019]. 
Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M. and Jakobsen, L., 2001. Explaining society: an introduction to critical 
realism in the social sciences. Routledge. 
DCMS, 2018. DEVELOPING THE CYBER SECURITY PROFESSION IN THE UK. 
De Vaus, D. A., 2001. Research design in social research. Sage. 
Demchak, C., Kerben, J., McArdle, J. and Spidalieri, F., 2015. CYBER READINESS INDEX 2.0. 
Denning, D. E., 2001. Activism, hacktivism, and cyberterrorism: The Internet as a tool for influencing 
foreign policy. Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy, 239, 288. 
Dennis, A., Jones, R., Kildare, D. and Barclay, C., 2014. Design Science Approach to Developing and 
Evaluating a National Cybersecurity Framework for Jamaica. The Electronic Journal of 
Information Systems in Developing Countries, 62 (1), 1-18. 
Denscombe, M., 2014. The good research guide : for small-scale research projects [Book]. Fifth 
edition. edition.: Milton Keynes : Open University Press, 2014. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S., 2000. Handbook of qualitative research [Non-fiction]. Thousand Oaks, 
Calif. ; London : Sage Publications, 2000. 
2nd ed. 
DeRouen Jr, Karl Goldfinch and Shaun, 2012. What makes a state stable and peaceful? good 
governance, legitimacy and legal-rationality matter even more for low-income countries. 
Civil Wars, 14 (4), 499-520. 
247 
 
Dey, P. K., Kinch, J. and Ogunlana, S. O., 2007. Managing risk in software development projects: a 
case study. Industrial Management & Data Systems. 
DiCicco‐Bloom, B. and Crabtree, B. F., 2006. The qualitative research interview. Medical education, 
40 (4), 314-321. 
DoD, 2008. Defending a New Domain [online]. the U.S. Department of Defense. Available from: 
https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/lynn-article1.aspx 
[Accessed 16/06/2018]. 
DOE, U. S. D. o. E., 2014. Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 (15/10/2017). 
Dogan, H., 2013. Managing knowledge for capability engineering 
[https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/Managing_knowledge_for_capability_engineering/9
544058]. Loughborough University. 
Dogan, H., Pilfold, S. A. and Henshaw, M., 2011. The role of human factors in addressing Systems of 
Systems complexity, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 
(pp. 1244-1249). 
Donaldson, S. E., Siegel, S. G., Williams, C. K. and Aslam, A., 2015. Mapping Against Cybersecurity 
Frameworks.  Enterprise Cybersecurity. Springer, 231-239. 
Doody, O., Slevin, E. and Taggart, L., 2013. Focus group interviews. Part 3: analysis. British Journal of 
Nursing, 22 (5), 266-269 264p. 
Dorfman, M., 2007. Introduction To Risk Management And Insurance. 9 edition.: Pearson (1650). 
Draganidis, F. and Mentzas, G., 2006. Competency based management: a review of systems and 
approaches. Information management & computer security. 
Druckman, J. N., Green, D. P., Kuklinski, J. H. and Lupia, A., 2006. The growth and development of 
experimental research in political science. American Political Science Review, 100 (4), 627-
635. 
Dudovskiy, J., 2016. The Ultimate Guide to Writing a Dissertation in Business Studies: A Step-by-Step 
Assistance [Available from: http://research-methodology.net/about-us/ebook/ [Accessed 
20/05/2017]. 
Dunn, M., 2005. Centre for Security Studies, paper prepared for WSIS thematic Meeting on Cyber 
security: Geneva. 
Ehrenfeld, J. M., 2017. WannaCry, Cybersecurity and Health Information Technology: A Time to Act. 
Journal of Medical Systems, 41 (7), 104. 





Elgahwash, F. O., Freeman, M. B. and Freeman, A., 2014. Improving online banking quality in 
developing nations: A ;Libyan case: i6doc.com. 
ENISA, 2010. Baseline Capabilities of National/Governmental CERTs (Part 2 Policy 
Recommendations). 
ENISA, 2011. Inventory of Risk Management / Risk Assessment Methods  
ENISA, 2013. National-level Risk Assessments: An Analysis Report Panagiotis TRIMINTZIOS, ENISA, 
Razvan GAVRILA, ENISA.  
ENISA, 2015. National/governmental CERTs - ENISA's recommendations on baseline capabilities  
ENISA, 2016. NCSS Good Practice Guide,Designing and Implementing National Cyber Security 
Strategies. Available from: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ncss-good-practice-
guide [Accessed 10/08/2017]. 
ENISA, 2019. Standardisation In Support Of The Cybersecurity Certification.  
Eracar, Y. A. and Kokar, M. M., 2014. Using UML and OCL for representing multiobjective 
combinatorial optimization problems. Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, 25 (3), 555-569. 
European, 2018. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
Evans, K. and Reeder, F., 2010. A human capital crisis in cybersecurity: Technical proficiency matters. 
CSIS. 
Fakhoury, R. and Aubert, B., 2015. Citizenship, trust, and behavioural intentions to use public e-
services: The case of Lebanon. International Journal of Information Management, 35 (3), 
346-351. 
Farag, O. M. and Hilles, S. M., Evaluate the e-banking services on North Africa Bank: Case of Tripoli 
branch. 
Farrell, R. and Hooker, C., 2013. Design, science and wicked problems. Design studies, 34 (6), 681-
705. 
Finn, R. L., Wright, D. and Friedewald, M., 2013. Seven types of privacy.  European data protection: 
coming of age. Springer, 3-32. 
Forti, Y., Bechkoum, K., Turner, S. and Ajit, S., 2014. The adoption of e-government in Arab Countries-
The case of Libya, Proceedings of the 14th European conference on e-government: ECEG (pp. 
319-327). 







hrome..69i57j69i60.1544j0j8 [Accessed  
Gabriel, D., 2013. Inductive and deductive approaches to research  [Available from: 
http://deborahgabriel.com/2013/03/17/inductive-and-deductive-approaches-to-research/ 
[Accessed 30/06/2017]. 
Galley, P., 1996. „Computer terrorism: what are the risks?”. Science, Technology and Society Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology. 
Garlock, K., 2018. Maturity Based Cybersecurity Investment Decision Making in Developing Nations. 
The George Washington University. 
Gcaza, N., von Solms, R. and van Vuuren, J. J., 2015. An Ontology for a National Cyber-Security 
Culture Environment, HAISA (pp. 1-10). 
GCSCC, 2017. Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CMM) [online]. University of 
Oxford: Available from: https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-
capacity/system/files/CMM%20Version%201_2_0.pdf [Accessed 25/10/2016]. 
GCSCC, 2019. The Gambia: Cybersecurity Capacity Review 2018.  
Gerber, T., Theorin, A. and Johnsson, C., 2014. Towards a seamless integration between process 
modeling descriptions at business and production levels: work in progress. Journal of 
Intelligent Manufacturing, 25 (5), 1089-1099. 
Gercke, M., 2016. Understanding cybercrime: a guide for developing countries. 
Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E. and Chadwick, B., 2008. Methods of data collection in qualitative 
research: interviews and focus groups. British dental journal, 204 (6), 291. 
GLACY, 2014. Good practice study Cybercrime reporting mechanisms. France.  
Glock, C. Y. and Bennett, J., 1967. Survey research in the social sciences. Russell Sage Foundation. 
Goldman, H. G., 2010. Building secure, resilient architectures for cyber mission assurance. The MITRE 
Corporation. 
Goodman, R. M., Speers, M. A., McLeroy, K., Fawcett, S., Kegler, M., Parker, E., Smith, S. R., Sterling, 
T. D. and Wallerstein, N., 1998. Identifying and defining the dimensions of community 
capacity to provide a basis for measurement. Health education & behavior, 25 (3), 258-278. 
Goodwin, C. F. and Nicholas, J. P., 2013. Developing a National Strategy for Cybersecurity: Microsoft 
Press. 
Gordon, S. and Ford, R., 2006. On the definition and classification of cybercrime. Journal in Computer 
Virology, 2 (1), 13-20. 
250 
 
Graham, L., 2017. Cybercrime costs the global economy $450 billion: CEO [Available from: 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/07/cybercrime-costs-the-global-economy-450-billion-
ceo.html [Accessed 15/03/2017]. 
Gray, D., Allen, J., Cois, C., Connell, A., Ebel, E., Gulley, W., Riley, M., Stoddard, R., Vaughan, M. and 
Wisniewski, B. D., 2015. Improving Federal Cybersecurity Governance Through Data-Driven 
Decision Making and Execution. CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA PITTSBURGH 
United States.  
Greenwood, D. and Levin, M., 1998. An introduction to action research Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publication Inc). p. 
Grierson, J., 2017. UK hit by 188 high-level cyber-attacks in three months [Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/12/uk-cyber-attacks-ncsc-russia-china-
ciaran-martin [Accessed 23/08/2017]. 
GSF, 2020 The Government Security Profession career framework Government Security. 
Guiling, L. and Xiaojuan, Z., 2011. Research on the risk management of IT project, 2011 International 
Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). 
Gumperz, J. J., 1981. Conversational inference and classroom learning. Ethnography and language in 
educational settings, 3-23. 
Guo, S. and Stradiotto, G. A., 2014. Democratic transitions: Modes and outcomes. Routledge. 
Haller, J., Merrell, S. A., Butkovic, M. J. and Willke, B. J., 2010. Best practices for national cyber 
security: Building a national computer security incident management capability. CARNEGIE-
MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST.  
Hameed, F., Agrafiotis, I., Weisser, C., Goldsmith, M. and Creese, S., 2018. Analysing trends and 
success factors of international cybersecurity capacity-building initiatives. 
Hammarberg, K., Kirkman, M. and de Lacey, S., 2016. Qualitative research methods: when to use 
them and how to judge them. Human reproduction, 31 (3), 498-501. 
Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P., 1983. Ethnography principles in practice tavistock. London, 
England. 
Heath Kelly, C., 2013. Counter‐Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the ‘Radicalisation’
Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy. The British Journal of Politics & International 
Relations, 15 (3), 394-415. 
Herrera, V. V., Ramos, A. V. and Lastra, J. L. M., 2012. An agent-based system for orchestration 
support of web service-enabled devices in discrete manufacturing systems. Journal of 
Intelligent Manufacturing, 23 (6), 2681-2702. 
Herrington, L. and Aldrich, R., 2013. The future of cyber-resilience in an age of global complexity. 
Politics, 33 (4), 299-310. 
251 
 
Herzog, P., 2010. OSSTMM 3-The Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual: Contemporary 
Security Testing and Analysis. ISECOM-Institute for Security and Open Methodologies. 
Hevner, A. R., March, S. T., Park, J. and Ram, S., 2004. Design science in information systems 
research. MIS quarterly, 75-105. 
Hipp, V., 2017. Cyberattacks threaten our national security and economy [online]. Available from: 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/05/17/cyberattacks-threaten-our-national-security-
and-economy.html [Accessed  
HMG, 2009. Technical Risk Assessment. 
HMGovernment, 2016. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016-2021 HM Government 
  
Ho, J. K.-K., 2014. Formulation of a systemic PEST analysis for strategic analysis. 
Hohmann, M., Pirang, A. and Benner, T., 2017. Advancing Cybersecurity Capacity Building. Global 
Public Policy Institute (GPPI). 
Hu, C., Pazaki, H. and Velander, E., 2014. Evaluating global education at a regional university: A focus 
group research on faculty perspectives. Theory in Action, 7 (1), 65. 
Hult, F. and Sivanesan, G., 2014. What good cyber resilience looks like. Journal of business continuity 
& emergency planning, 7 (2), 112-125. 
Hussein, R., Mohamed, N., Ahlan, A. R., Mahmud, M. and Aditiawarman, U., 2010. An integrated 
model on online tax adoption in Malaysia, European, Mediterranean & Middle Eastern 
conference on information systems (pp. 12-13). 
IDEF0, 1993. Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0). Department of Commerce, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Systems Laboratory.  
infoDevWorldBank, 2009. e-GOVERNMENT PRIMER. Washington, DC: infoDev/World Bank.  
InternetWorldStats, 2017. Internet usage and Population Statistics [online]. Available from: 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#ly [Accessed 01/04/2017]. 
ISACA, 2013. Cybersecurity Nexus: Transforming Cybersecurity: Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA) Illinois, USA. 
ISO27002, 2005. BS ISO/IEC 27002: 2005 Information technology—Security techniques—Code of 
practice for information security management: ISO. 
ISO31000, 2009. Risk management — Principles and guidelines. Available from: 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:31000:ed-1:v1:en [Accessed 19-09-2019]. 
252 
 
ISO, 2012. ISO/IEC 27032:2012 Information technology — Security techniques — Guidelines for 
cybersecurity [Available from: http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27032.html 
[Accessed 05/06/2016]. 
ISO/IEC29147, 2018. Information technology — Security techniques — Vulnerability disclosure. 
Available from: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:29147:ed-2:v1:en [Accessed 12-
03-2019]. 
ITU, 2009. Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries. 
ITU, 2014. Global Cybersecurity Index [online]. Available from: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Cybersecurity/Documents/WP-GCI-101.pdf [Accessed 29-05-2017]. 
ITU, 2015. Global Cybersecurity Index & Cyberwellness Profiles [online]. Available from: 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-SECU-2015-PDF-E.pdf [Accessed 
10/03/2016]. 
ITU, 2017a. Global Cybersecurity Index [online]. Geneva: the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU). Available from: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-
E.pdf [Accessed 20-10-2018]. 
ITU, 2017b. Index of Cybersecurity Indices. Geneva: The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)  
ITU, 2018a. Global Cybersecurity Index 2018. Geneva: The International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU)  
ITU, 2018b. Guide to Developing a National Cybersecurity Strategy [online]. Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Available from: 
https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-CYB_GUIDE.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf [Accessed 
25/10/2019]. 
ITU, 2019. ITU Interregional Workshop for Africa and Arab regions on “National Cybersecurity 
Strategies” [online]. Available from: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/NCS-
GCI-workshop-AFR-ARB-2019.aspx [Accessed 10-11-2019]. 
Jackson, S. L., 2015. Research methods and statistics: A critical thinking approach. Cengage Learning. 
Jacobs, P. C., Von Solms, S. and Grobler, M. M., 2017. Towards a national cybersecurity capability 
development model. 
Jasper, S. and Wirtz, J., 2017. Cyber Security.  The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and 
Intelligence. Springer, 157-176. 
Johannesson, P. and Perjons, E., 2014. An introduction to design science. Springer. 
Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R., 2008. Exploring corporate strategy: text & cases. 
Pearson Education. 
Johnson, G. and Whittington, R., 2009. Fundamentals of strategy. Pearson Education. 
253 
 
Juell-Skielse, G. and Perjons, E., 2009. Improving E-government through benefit analysis and value 
modeling, 2009 33rd Annual IEEE International Computer Software and Applications 
Conference (Vol. 1, pp. 332-339): IEEE. 
Karaim, N. A. and Inal, Y., 2019. Usability and accessibility evaluation of Libyan government websites. 
Universal Access in the Information Society, 18 (1), 207-216. 
Kaspersky, 2017. IT threat evolution Q1 2017. Statistics [online]. Available from: 
https://securelist.com/analysis/quarterly-malware-reports/78475/it-threat-evolution-q1-
2017-statistics/ [Accessed 30-05-2017]. 
Kerbaj, R., 2017. Russia steps up cyber ‑ attacks on UK [Available from: 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russia-steps-up-cyber-attacks-on-uk-rl262pnlb 
[Accessed 23/08/2017]. 
Kim, D.-H., Ahn, B.-J., Kim, J.-H. and Kim, J.-J., 2009. The strategic approach using SWOT analysis to 
develop an intelligent program management information system (iPMIS) for urban renewal 
projects, Computer Sciences and Convergence Information Technology, 2009. ICCIT'09. 
Fourth International Conference on (pp. 320-324): IEEE. 
Kitchenham, B. A., 1996. Evaluating software engineering methods and tool part 1: The evaluation 
context and evaluation methods. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, 21 (1), 11-14. 
Kitzinger, J., 1995a. Qualitative research. Introducing focus groups. BMJ: British medical journal, 311 
(7000), 299. 
Kitzinger, J., 1995b. Qualitative research: introducing focus groups. Bmj, 311 (7000), 299-302. 
Klaver, M., Luiijf, H. and Nieuwenhuijsen, A., 2011. RECIPE: Good practices manual for CIP policies, 
for policy makers in Europe. 
Klimburg, A., 2012. National cyber security framework manual. 
Kortjan, N. and von Solms, R., 2012. Cyber security education in developing countries: A South 
African perspective, International conference on e-Infrastructure and e-Services for 
developing countries (pp. 289-297): Springer. 
Kortjan, N. and Von Solms, R., 2014. A conceptual framework for cyber-security awareness and 
education in SA. South African Computer Journal, 52 (1), 29-41. 
Kothari, C. R., 2004. Research methodology. [electronic resource] : methods & techniques 
[Bibliographies Non-fiction Computer File]. New Delhi : New Age International (P) Ltd., 
Publishers, c2004.2nd rev. ed. 
Kovács, G. and Spens, K. M., 2005. Abductive reasoning in logistics research. International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 35 (2), 132-144. 
254 
 
Kritzinger, E., Bada, M. and Nurse, J. R., 2017. A study into the cybersecurity awareness initiatives for 
school learners in South Africa and the UK, IFIP World Conference on Information Security 
Education (pp. 110-120): Springer. 
Krone, T., 2005. High tech crime brief. Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, Australia, ISSN, 
3413, 2005. 
Kshetri, N., 2019. Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in Africa: Taylor & Francis. 
Kumar, R., Dhanpathi, H., Basu, S., Rubello, D., Fanti, S. and Alavi, A., 2008. Oncologic PET tracers 
beyond [^ sup 18^ F] FDG and the novel quantitative approaches in PET imaging. The 
Quarterly Journal of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, 52 (1), 50. 
Kvale, S., 1994. Ten standard objections to qualitative research interviews. Journal of 
phenomenological psychology, 25 (2), 147-173. 
Lachaud, E., 2020. ISO/IEC 27701: Threats and opportunities for GDPR certification. Available at 
SSRN. 
LaFond, A. and Brown, L., 2003. A guide to monitoring and evaluation of capacity building 
interventions in the health sector in developing countries. 
Lawler , E. E., 1986. High-Involvement Management. Participative Strategies for Improving 
Organizational Performance. ERIC. 
Lewis, J. A. and Timlin, K., 2011. Cybersecurity and cyberwarfare: Preliminary assessment of national 
doctrine and organization. UNIDIR. 
Libicki, M. C., 2011. The strategic uses of ambiguity in cyberspace. Military and Strategic Affairs, 3 
(3), 3-10. 
libyaobserver, 2016. Hakers attack libya's civil registry database [Available from: 
https://www.libyaobserver.ly/tech/hackers-attack-libyas-civil-registry-database [Accessed 
20-02-2017]. 
Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G., 1985. Naturalistic inquiry.  Vol. 75. Sage. 
Luiijf, E. and Klaver, M., 2019. Resilience approach to critical information infrastructures.  Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience. Springer, 3-16. 
Luiijf, H. and van Schie, T., 2017. A Good Practice Guide on Critical Infor-mation Infrastructure 
Protection. European CIIP Newsletter, march-june, 1, 11, 21-22. 
Luiijf, H., van Schie, T., van Ruijven, T. and Huistra, A., 2016. The GFCE-MERIDIAN good practice guide 
on critical information infrastructure protection for governmental policy-makers. 
Lutz, F. W., 1981. Ethnography: The holistic approach to understanding schooling. Ethnography and 
language in educational settings, 51-63. 
255 
 
MacColl, I., Cooper, R., Rittenbruch, M. and Viller, S., 2005. Watching ourselves watching: ethical 
issues in ethnographic action research. Proceedings of the 17th Australia conference on 
Computer-Human Interaction: Citizens Online: Considerations for Today and the Future, 
Canberra, Australia. 1108447: Computer-Human Interaction Special Interest Group (CHISIG) 
of Australia. 1-4.  
Mack, L., 2010. The philosophical underpinnings of educational research. 
Mackay, R. and Horton, D., 2002. Capacity Development Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation: 
Results of an Evaluation. 
Manz, C. C. and Stewart, G. L., 1997. Attaining flexible stability by integrating total quality 
management and socio-technical systems theory. Organization Science, 8 (1), 59-70. 
Marshall, B., Cardon, P., Poddar, A. and Fontenot, R., 2013. Does sample size matter in qualitative 
research?: A review of qualitative interviews in IS research. Journal of Computer Information 
Systems, 54 (1), 11-22. 
Matania, E., Yoffe, L. and Goldstein, T., 2017. Structuring the national cyber defence: in evolution 
towards a Central Cyber Authority. Journal of Cyber Policy, 2 (1), 16-25. 
Matsubara, M., 2014. Countering Cyber-Espionage and Sabotage: The Next Steps for Japanese–UK 
Cyber-Security Co-operation. The RUSI Journal, 159 (1), 86-93. 
Mattioli, R. and Levy-Bencheton, C., 2014. Methodologies for the identification of Critical 
Information Infrastructure assets and services. ENISA Report. 
McCusker, K. and Gunaydin, S., 2015. Research using qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods and 
choice based on the research. Perfusion, 30 (7), 537-542 536p. 
McGettrick, A., 2013. Toward effective cybersecurity education. IEEE Security & Privacy, 11 (6), 66-
68. 
McGettrick, A., Cassel, L. N., Dark, M., Hawthorne, E. K. and Impagliazzo, J., 2014. Toward curricular 
guidelines for cybersecurity, Proceedings of the 45th ACM technical symposium on Computer 
science education (pp. 81-82). 
MCIT, 2013. Egypt ICT Strategy 2012-2017 [online]. Available from: 
http://www.mcit.gov.eg/Publication/Publication_Summary/660/ICT_ [Accessed  
Michie, S., Van Stralen, M. M. and West, R., 2011. The behaviour change wheel: a new method for 
characterising and designing behaviour change interventions. Implementation science, 6 (1), 
42. 
Microsoft, 2016. Microsoft Security Intelligence Report [online]. Available from: 
https://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/default.aspx [Accessed 30-05-2017]. 
256 
 
Minnameier, G., 2010. The logicality of abduction, deduction, and induction, Ideas in action: 
Proceedings of the applying peirce conference (pp. 239-251): Nordic Pragmatism Network 
Helsinki. 
Miron, W. and Muita, K., 2014. Cybersecurity capability maturity models for providers of critical 
infrastructure. Technology Innovation Management Review, 4 (10), 33. 
Moftah, A., Sheikh Abdullah, S. N. H. and Hawedi, H. S., 2012. CHALLENGES OF SECURITY, 
PROTECTION AND TRUST ON E-COMMERCE: A CASE OF ONLINE PURCHASING IN LIBYA. 
International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Communication Engineering, 1 
( 3), Moftah, AbdulghaderSheikh Abdullah, Siti Norul HudaHawedi, Hadya.S. 
Mohamed and Abdulmajid H, 2017. E-Government as a Tool for Stability and Socio-Economic 
development in Post-Conflict Libya. African Journal of information systems. 
MTMC, 2016. 2016-2019 National Cyber Security Strateg [online]. Ministry  of  Transportation,  
Maritime  and  Communication Available from: 
http://www.udhb.gov.tr/doc/siberg/UlusalSibereng.pdf [Accessed 15/10/2017]. 
Muegge, S. and Craigen, D., 2015. A design science approach to construct critical infrastructure and 
communicate cybersecurity risks. Technology Innovation Management Review, 5 (6), 6-16. 
Muller, L. P., 2015. Cyber security capacity building in developing countries: challenges and 
opportunities. 
Muniz, J., McIntyre, G. and AlFardan, N., 2015. Security Operations Center: Building, Operating, and 
Maintaining Your SOC. Cisco Press. 
Myers, M. D., 1997a. Qualitative research in information systems. Management Information Systems 
Quarterly, 21 (2), 241-242. 
Myers, M. D., 1997b. Qualitative Research in Information Systems. MIS Quarterly, 21 (2), 241-242. 
NCSA, 2013. National Cybersecurity Authority [online]. Available from: https://nissa.gov.ly/ [Accessed 
16/03/2016 
]. 
NCSC, 2016. Risk management guidance. National Cyber Security Centre 
  
NCSC, 2019. Introduction: Incident Response overview. 
Newhouse, W., Keith, S., Scribner, B. and Witte, G., 2017. National initiative for cybersecurity 
education (NICE) cybersecurity workforce framework. NIST Special Publication, 800, 181. 
Newmeyer, K. P., 2015. Elements of national cybersecurity strategy for developing nations. National 
Cybersecurity Institute Journal, 1 (3), 9-19. 
257 
 
NICE, 2016. NICE Framework, National Institute  of Standards  and Technology [online]. Available 
from: https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied-cybersecurity/nice/resources/nice-cybersecurity-
workforce-framework [Accessed 18-11-2019]. 
NISSA, 2013. The  National Information Security and Safety Authority (NISSA) [online]. Available from: 
http://en.nissa.gov.ly/ [Accessed 15/03/2016]. 
NIST, 2012. Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
NIST, 2014a. Framework for Improving  Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. Available from: 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf [Accessed 10/05/2016]. 
NIST, K. D., 2014b. Risk management framework overview: NIST, FISMA and RMF overview. 
Noran, O., 2003. UML vs IDEF: An ontology-based comparative study in view of business modelling, 
Proc. 6th In International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Porto, Portugal (Vol. 
3, pp. 674-682). 
Obama, B., 2013. Executive Order—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.[Online] The 
White House, February 12, 2013. 
Obama, B., 2015. Proclamation 9357--Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month, 2015. 
Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1-2. 
OECD, 2015. Digital Security Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity: OECD 
Recommendation and Companion Document. Available from: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264245471-en [Accessed 18/05/2016]. 
Olesen, V., 1994. Feminisms and models of qualitative research. Handbook of qualitative research, 
158, 174. 
Oltramari, A., Ben-Asher, N., Cranor, L., Bauer, L. and Christin, N., 2014. General requirements of a 
hybrid-modeling framework for cyber security, 2014 IEEE Military Communications 
Conference (pp. 129-135): IEEE. 
Onwuegbuzie, A. J. and Byers, V. T., 2014. An exemplar for combining the collection, analysis, and 
interpretations of verbal and nonverbal data in qualitative research. International Journal of 
Education, 6 (1), 183. 
Ormrod, D. and Turnbull, B., 2016. The cyber conceptual framework for developing military doctrine. 
Defence Studies, 16 (3), 270-298. 
Othman, A., Pislaru, C., Kenan, T. and Impes, A., 2013. Analysing the effectiveness of IT strategy in 
Libyan higher education institutes. International Journal of Digital Information and Wireless 
Communications (IJDIWC), 3 (3), 114-129. 
Ozanne, J. L. and Hudson, L. A., 1989. Exploring diversity in consumer research. ACR Special Volumes. 
258 
 
Pahl, N. and Richter, A., 2007. SWOT Analysis. Idea, Methodology And A Practical Approach. 
Passeri, P., 2017. Cyber Attacks Statistics [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hackmageddon.com/category/security/cyber-attacks-statistics/ [Accessed 
28/08/2017]. 
Patton, M. Q., 1990. Qualitative evaluation and research methods. SAGE Publications, inc. 
Paul Nicholas and Kaja Ciglic, 2017. Building an effective national cybersecurity agency. United State: 
Microsoft Corporation.  
Pawlak, Patryk Barmpaliou and Panagiota-Nayia, 2017. Politics of cybersecurity capacity building: 
conundrum and opportunity. Journal of Cyber Policy, 2 (1), 123-144. 
Pawlak, P., 2014. Riding the Digital Wave: The impact of cyber capacity building on human 
development. EU Institute for Security Studies. 
Pawlak, P., 2016. Capacity building in cyberspace as an instrument of foreign policy. Global Policy, 7 
(1), 83-92. 
Pernik, P., Wojtkowiak, J. and Verschoor-Kirss, A., 2016. National cyber security organisation: United 
States. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, Estonia. 
Petter, S., Khazanchi, D. and Murphy, J. D., 2010. A design science based evaluation framework for 
patterns. ACM SIGMIS Database: the DATABASE for Advances in Information Systems, 41 (3), 
9-26. 
Peursum, L., 2015. The building blocks for a cyber security strategy.  
Pinsonneault, A. and Kraemer, K., 1993. Survey research methodology in management information 
systems: an assessment. Journal of management information systems, 10 (2), 75-105. 
Prichard, J. J. and MacDonald, L. E., 2004. Cyber Terrorism: A Study of the Extent of Coverage in 
Computer Science Textbooks. Journal of Information Technology Education: Research, 3, 
279-289. 
Purdy, G., 2010. ISO 31000: 2009—setting a new standard for risk management. Risk Analysis: An 
International Journal, 30 (6), 881-886. 
Razzaq, A., Latif, K., Ahmad, H. F., Hur, A., Anwar, Z. and Bloodsworth, P. C., 2014. Semantic security 
against web application attacks. Information Sciences, 254, 19-38. 
Remenyi, D. and Williams, B., 1998. Doing research in business and management: an introduction to 
process and method. Sage. 




Roman, R., Alcaraz, C. and Lopez, J., 2007. The role of wireless sensor networks in the area of critical 
information infrastructure protection. Information Security Technical Report, 12 (1), 24-31. 
Rotenberg, M. and Jacobs, D., 2013. Updating the law of information privacy: the new framework of 
the European Union. Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y, 36, 605. 
Ruona, W. E., 2005. Analyzing qualitative data. Research in organizations: Foundations and methods 
of inquiry, 223, 263. 
Sabillon, R., Cavaller, V. and Cano, J., 2016. National Cyber Security Strategies: Global Trends in 
Cyberspace. 
Sahyoun, K., 2015. Cyber jihad and cyber terrorism: A real threat to governments [online]. SyndiGate 
Media Inc. Available from: 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsgin&AN=edsgcl.416951066&sit
e=eds-live&scope=site [Accessed  
Samarati, M., 2017. Cyber crime cost UK businesses £29 billion in 2016. Available from: 
https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/blog/2016-cyber-security-breaches-cost-uk-businesses-
almost-30-billion/ [Accessed 23/08/2017]. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A., 2009. Research methods for business students. Fifth edition. 
edition.: Harlow : Financial Times Prentice Hall,2009. 
Scarfone, K., Benigni, D. and Grance, T., 2008. Cyber security standards. Wiley Handbook of Science 
and Technology for Homeland Security, 1-10. 
Schell, C., 1992. The value of the case study as a research strategy. Manchester Business School, 2, 1-
15. 
Schjolberg, S. and Ghernaouti-Helie, S., 2011. A global treaty on cybersecurity and cybercrime. 
Cybercrime Law, 97. 
Schware, R., 2005. E-development: From excitement to effectiveness. The World Bank. 
SE-Institute, 2017. Skills Needed When Staffing Your CSIRT. Software -Engineering -Institute 
 
Segura-Serrano, A., 2015. Cybersecurity: Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures and 
Operators’ Obligations.  Vol. 6. 
Segura Serrano, A., 2015. Cybersecurity: towards a global standard in the protection of critical 
information infrastructures. European Journal of Law and Technology, 6 (3). 
Seuring, S. and Müller, M., 2008. From a literature review to a conceptual framework for sustainable 
supply chain management. Journal of cleaner production, 16 (15), 1699-1710. 
260 
 
Shackelford, S. J., Proia, A. A., Martell, B. and Craig, A. N., 2015. Toward a Global Cybersecurity 
Standard of Care: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on 
Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices. Tex. Int'l LJ, 50, 305. 
Shafqat, N. and Masood, A., 2016. Comparative Analysis of Various National Cyber Security 
Strategies. International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, 14 (1), 129. 
Shahabadkar, P., 2012. Deployment of interpretive structural modelling methodology in supply chain 
management–an overview. International Journal of Industrial Engineering & Production 
Research, 23 (3), 195-205. 
Shashi, J., 2016. State, Society and National Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st 
Century. World Scientific. 
Sims, J. W., 2011. Cybersecurity: The Next Threat to National Security. MARINE CORPS COMMAND 
AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA.  
Singer , P. W. and Friedman, A., 2014. Cybersecurity and cyberwar: what everyone needs to know 
[online]. Available from: 
https://news.asis.io/sites/default/files/Cybersecurity_and_Cyberwar.pdf [Accessed 19 Apr 
2016]. 
Smith, W., 2019. A Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework for Large Organizations. 
Sperber, A. D., 2004. Translation and validation of study instruments for cross-cultural research. 
Gastroenterology, 126, S124-S128. 
Stentoft Arlbjørn, J. and Halldorsson, A., 2002. Logistics knowledge creation: reflections on content, 
context and processes. International journal of physical distribution & logistics management, 
32 (1), 22-40. 
Stewart, D. W., Shamdasani, P. N. and Rook, D. W., 1990. Focus groups: Theory and practice. Applied 
social research methods series. Focus groups: theory and practice applied social research 
methods series. 
Strachan and Anna, 2017. Factors affecting success or failure of political transitions. K4D Helpdesk  
Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.  
Straub, D. W., 1989. Validating instruments in MIS research. MIS quarterly, 147-169. 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J., 1998. Basic of Qualitative Research; Technique and Procedures for 
Grounded Theory". Sage Publication. 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. M., 1997. Grounded theory in practice. Sage. 
Strauss, A. L., 1987. Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Cambridge University Press. 
261 
 
Švábenský, V., Vykopal, J. and Čeleda, P., 2020. What Are Cybersecurity Education Papers About? A 
Systematic Literature Review of SIGCSE and ITiCSE Conferences, Proceedings of the 51st ACM 
Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education (pp. 2-8). 
Svennevig, J., 2001. Abduction as a methodological approach to the study of spoken interaction. 
Norskrift, 103, 1-22. 
Symantec, 2016. Cyber crime and cyber security trends in Africa Report. Symantec.  
Symantec, 2017. Petya ransomware outbreak: Here’s what you need to know. Available from: 
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/petya-ransomware-outbreak-here-s-what-you-
need-know [Accessed 12/07/2017]. 
Tagert, A. C., 2010. Cybersecurity challenges in developing nations. 
Tikk, E., 2011. Ten rules for cyber security. Survival, 53 (3), 119-132. 
Tong, A., Sainsbury, P. and Craig, J., 2007. Consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research 
(COREQ): a 32-item checklist for interviews and focus groups. International journal for 
quality in health care, 19 (6), 349-357. 
Tongco, M. D. C., 2007. Purposive sampling as a tool for informant selection. Ethnobotany Research 
and applications, 5, 147-158. 
Trimintzios, P., 2017. Cybersecurity in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
Challenges and risks for the EU. Brussels: Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), European 
Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament. 
Trist, E., 1981. The socio-technical perspective: The evolution of socio-technical systems as a 
conceptual framework and as an action research paradigm: New York: Wiley & Sons. 
Tsironis, L., Gentsos, A. and Moustakis, V., 2008. Empowerment the IDEF0 modeling language. 
International Journal of Business and Management, 3 (5), 109-118. 
UK-CERT, 2015. Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP). 
Ullman, R. H., 1983. Redefining security. International security, 8 (1), 129-153. 
United-Nations, 2018. Capacity-building [online]. Available from: 
https://academicimpact.un.org/content/capacity-building [Accessed 19-09-2019]. 
UNODC, 2019. Legal Frameworks and Human Rights, the role of cybercrime law. 
US-CERT, 2016. Cyber Resilience Review (CRR).  
Vaismoradi, M., Jones, J., Turunen, H. and Snelgrove, S., 2016. Theme development in qualitative 
content analysis and thematic analysis. 
262 
 
Vaismoradi, M., Turunen, H. and Bondas, T., 2013. Content analysis and thematic analysis: 
Implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study. Nursing & health sciences, 15 (3), 
398-405. 
Von Solms, R. and Van Niekerk, J., 2013. From information security to cyber security. computers & 
security, 38, 97-102. 
Wahyuni, D., 2012. The research design maze: Understanding paradigms, cases, methods and 
methodologies. 
Walker, R., 1981. On the uses of fiction in educational research. Practising Evaluation, Driffield: 
Nafferton. 
Walsham, G., 1995. The emergence of interpretivism in IS research. Information systems research, 6 
(4), 376-394. 
Ward, J., Dogan, H., Apeh, E., Mylonas, A. and Katos, V., 2017. Using Human Factor Approaches to an 
Organisation’s Bring Your Own Device scheme, International Conference on Human Aspects 
of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust (pp. 396-413): Springer. 
Warfield, John N and Cárdenas, A. R., 2002. A handbook of interactive management. Iowa State 
Press. 
Warfield, J. N., 1974. Toward interpretation of complex structural models. IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, (5), 405-417. 
Warfield, J. N. and Cárdenas, A. R., 2002. A handbook of interactive management. Ames: Iowa State 
University Press. 
Weber, A. M., 2003. The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime. Berkeley technology law 
journal, 18 (1), 425-446. 
WEF, 2017. Guidance on Public-Private Information Sharing against Cybercrime. Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Economic Forum.  
Weforum, W. E. F., 2018. The Global Risks Report 2018. Geneva: World Economic ForumGeneva.  
Williams, M., 2003. Making sense of social research. Sage. 
Wilson, C., 2005. Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress. 
CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service-The Library of Congress. 
Wilson, M. and Hash, J., 2003. Building an information technology security awareness and training 
program. NIST Special publication, 800 (50), 1-39. 
Wong, L. P., 2008. Focus group discussion: a tool for health and medical research. Singapore Med J, 
49 (3), 256-260. 
263 
 
WorldBank, 2017. Combatting Cybercrime : Tools and Capacity Building for  Emerging Economies. 
1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC, 20433; USA; : The World  Bank, .  
Yang, S. C. and Wen, B., 2017. Toward a cybersecurity curriculum model for undergraduate business 
schools: A survey of AACSB-accredited institutions in the United States. Journal of Education 
for Business, 92 (1), 1-8. 
Yates, P. D., 1987. Figure and section: Ethnography and education in the multicultural state. 
Interpretive Ethnography of Education: at home and abroad. 
Yin, R. K., 2004. CASE STUDY METHODS [online]. 2004. Available from: 
http://www.cosmoscorp.com/Docs/AERAdraft.pdf [Accessed 10/05/2016]. 
Zager, R. Z., John, 2017. OODA loops in cyberspace: A new cyber-defense model. Journal Article| 
October, 20 (11), 33pm. 
Zareen, M. S., Akhlaq, M., Tariq, M. and Khalid, U., 2013. Cyber security challenges and wayforward 
for developing countries, 2013 2nd National Conference on Information Assurance (NCIA) 
(pp. 7-14): IEEE. 
 
10. Appendices 
Appendix (1): Participant Agreement Form to Confirm the Interactive Management workshop 
and Focus Group Meeting for contextualise the challenges of cybersecurity capacity in Spring 
Land and assess the its maturity levels.    
Full title of project: National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework for counties in a 
Transitional Phase (Using Spring Land as a case study). 
Name, position and contact details of researcher: Mohamed Ben Naseir, PhD Researcher, 
Bournemouth University. 
Name, position and contact details of supervisor Dr. Huseyin Dogan,  Dr. Edward Apeh and 
Professor Raian Ali 
Please Initial or Tick Here 
I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above research 
project. 
 
I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary.  
I understand that I am free to withdraw up to the point where the data is processed and 




During the interview, I am free to withdraw without giving reason and without there 
being any negative consequences. 
 
Should I not wish to answer any particular question(s), I am free to decline  
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised 
responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, 
and I will not be identified or identifiable in the outputs that result from the research. 
I give permission for members of the research team to use my identifiable information 
for the purposes of this research project. 
 
I agree to the audio recording that will be taken as part of the interview.  
I agree to take part in the above research project.   
 
Name of Participant                                                           Date Signature 
__________________ ______________ __________________________________ 
        Name of Researcher Date Signature…………………………………………………… 
 
This form should be signed and dated by all parties after the participant receives a copy of 
the participant information sheet and any other written information provided to the 
participants. A copy of the signed and dated participant agreement form should be kept with 
the project’s main documents which must be kept in a secure location. 
 
 
Appendix (2): Interviewer details 
1- Name: 
 
2- Contact details 
 
3- Under which category does your organisation belong? 
 
 
4- Under which sector does your organisation belong? 
 
Public             Private   
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5- Describe your position in your organisation? 
 
 







Appendix (3): Multi-Dimensional National Cybersecurity Question Set and Results of the 
Spring Land Security Posture 
Dimensions Rational for  Indicator Selection (Awareness & Assessment) 
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D1 Cyber security policy and strategy 
 
What is our current national strategy for cyber 
security?  
 
Who is driving Cyber Security in the Libyan 
Homeland Security program? [1] 
 
Are there any national incident response plans? 
  
Who is in charge of IM? 
 
Is there a coordination mechanism for incident 
response at the national level? [2] 
  
Are the critical national infrastructures defined? 
 
Is risk analysis used to determine potential threat 
impact to the national critical infrastructure? 
Can you ID any crisis management activities 
standards and/or guidelines? 
 
Have any been identified and implemented at the 
national level? 
 
Is there an existing framework for managing 
cyber defence at the national level?  
  
Is there a plan to organise assured system 
redundancy and communications among 
stakeholders?  
Can you ID any crisis management activities 
standards and/or guidelines? 
 
Have any been identified and implemented at the 
national level? 
 
Is there an existing framework for managing 
cyber defence at the national level?  
  
Is there a plan to organise assured system 




D2 Cyber culture and society 
Are we conducting cyber security awareness 
activities for the critical services? How?  
 
What are the cybersecurity issues currently been 
addressed and what is the degree of importance 
of each issue? 
 
Are there any standard, policies and security 
measures to promote trust in e-services 
 
Is there legislation or regulations detailing 
privacy protection? 
D3 Cyber security education, training 
and skills 
Are training needs been identified at a national 
level? 
 
Is there any education strategy to develop our  
Cybersecurity skills? 
 
Is there an adequate budget allocation? 
 
Is there a continuous training plan for our skills 
development? 
 
Do Enterprise Boards and their executives within 
private and state-owned companies understand 
the Spring Land cybersecurity issues? 
D4 Legal and regulatory frameworks 
Is there any cyber related legislation or 
regulation? 
 
What does the content of the regulation aim to 
achieve? 
 
How do we respond to challenges of anonymity 
and attribution? 
 
Do we differentiate the  sets of rules to protect 
systems and 
data types 
























D5 Standards, organisations, and 
technologies 
Are there any existing standards and practices do 
you adhere to?  
 
Do we have a Cyber Security Standards at the 
national level for: 




Is our national Infrastructure Technology 
effectively managed, monitored and evaluated 
based on international standard? 
 




Appendix (4): Transcription of focus group discussion 
1- Cybersecurity policy and strategy Indicators 




In 2016, a general strategy was adopted for the work of the National 
Authority for Information Security and Safety. The first objective 
was to build a national framework for cybersecurity and we have 
made great strides at the strategic level and technical level. 
Currently we are at the operational level and expectations during the 
year, the strategy will be ready .The work plan was divided into 
several stages: The study and the stages of consultation, both 
internal and external, and working with all stakeholders directly and 
indirectly targeted at all citizens levels of public and private sectors. 
We have classified all of the major sectors such as the banking 
sector, and we used for that the Central Bank of Spring Land, as a 
direct stakeholder and a coordinator for the banking sector in Spring 
Land as a whole. We also identified the General Authority for 
Communications and Information as it is an incubator of the main 
sector. As a whole, you can say that we have taken into account the 
organized sector of all parties. After that, the proposals will be taken 
from all parties, whether directly or indirectly. We will provide the 
strategy at the local level in the Arab countries and the international 
level in several international organizations. You can say we are in 
the START UP level 
INT: Who are the direct and indirect actors? Is it possible to get a 
copy of these bodies? 
For example: the direct is: the Council of the Prime Minister and 
currently involved in the government of reconciliation 
The banking sector is the Central Bank of Spring Land, and this 
does not prevent the bank from establishing a special sector task 
force to assist the Commission in studying the strategy. The 
telecommunications sector is represented by the General Authority 
for Communications and the Spring Land Holding Company for 
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Telecommunications because they are the main regulator for the 
telecommunications sector. NCSA operates under the General 
Authority for Communications. We have prepared a proposal for 
conducting work teams in all the telecommunications bodies and 
administrations to help us write the strategy and participate directly 
from some sectors to formulate and write strategy 
Another part is workshops to get suggestions and feedback from a 
particular sector. And for the energy and water (the National Oil 
Corporation, the General Company for Electricity and Water which 
come from the source called the industrial river project) and the rest 
of the government sectors and part of the tasks of the draft strategy 
to identify the remaining sectors that can be extracted in a stage of 
the stages, for example, the health sector in Spring Land is now 
depends on the paper system, and we will do a survey and examine 
these sectors to find out and that they can provide us with their 
opinions and, of course, their feedback is necessary as a strategic 
project. 
The private sector has been contacted with several civil society 
organizations including the Spring Land Internet Society, the 
Technical Society and some other civil bodies, but the country's 
security situation and political conditions affected their interaction 
with the authorities especially after 2014, where they were actively 
involved in reviewing the laws with government agencies and 
providing advice, but work was getting less dramatically. We have a 
security, military and intelligence sector that will have a direct role 
in writing the strategy. There is another part that has not been 
decided yet, is the proposed strategy to be the general security 
sector, the military, the intelligence, the civil or the work of a sub 
under our supervision, so it is a strategy for the security and military 
sector and a strategy for the civil bodies. The subject is still 
complex and decision is not taken yet, there are some differences 
because we are still in the data collection phase. This point is 
271 
 
postponed it to the next stage but you might be able to help us 
through the research you are working on and help us with your point 
of view. 
Who is driving 
Cybersecurity in 
the Spring Land 
National security 
program? 
NCSA leads the security of information and cybersecurity in Spring 
Land and there is no body or group related to cybersecurity in 
Spring Land, and the Authority has a decision to establish from the 
prime minister, it has the mandate of the Spring Land state at the 
international and regional level. But some sectors have no idea or 
awareness of dealing with this body In general we can say that we 
are in a strategic level with lack of financial support because of the 
political situation, it can be said that we are in a strategic level, but 
there is a weakness stopping all projects of the organisation. We 
need a higher status of cybersecurity. 
 
Are there any 
national incident 
response plans? 




There is a clear plan, but we are still in the process of gathering 
information and not doing the actual work. In general, the focus of 
the strategy will be to raise the level of awareness and the 
establishment of the network of relations for the exchange of 
information between the main sectors through the plan to respond to 
events at the level of the state and between the sectors will be the 
outline of the strategy and the proposed timetable between 3 and 5 
years, and it will be updated after the proposed period, and building 
up the Spring Land state's public and private institutions will and 
linked to the course and a general emergency response plan will be 
set up for the Spring Land state in full and will include everyone 
with the specification of the security sectors. The security and 
military sectors will be involved and take their security point of 
view, but cooperation at the moment is quite difficult due to lack of 
awareness and differences of opinion and mentality. 
We have meetings with some security agencies such as intelligence 
office, so that the strategy is general and the details do not belong to 
anyone and that the constitutional declaration of the state is the 
reference to write strategy We have a general strategy of the state 
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and a specific strategy for each sector such as the banking sector is 
different from other sectors as its priority is to protect the citizens 
data from the financial aspect, reversing the state strategy that is 
focused on raising awareness, especially in cybersecurity, and a 
strategy for each sector will be established after the completion of 
the overall strategy 
Director of Spring Land-CERT, We, currently, have a strategy of 
response at the level of the authority, but at the level of the state 
does not exist, and it is one of the objectives of the organisation, so 
we can say that we are in the start up stage, but because of the lack 
of a strategy of the state, it cannot be employed to other parties. 
Director of the awareness department: through meetings with all 
sectors, we found a difference in the structures, some have an 
information security unit and some others do not have, the only 
party is the Central Bank of Spring Land that has a special 
department on this thing, and its future leaders is the unification of 
the establishment of state institutions in relation to cybersecurity 
and administrative organization and to formulate the strategy to find 
who is implementing it. 
The Authority pays a great deal to set up a CERT team in each side 
to communicate with the authority directly to avoid administrative 
complications. 
Director of CERT, In general, we have a national accreditation to 
represent the Spring Land in the world, but there is no national plan, 
and also, the communication channel between the sectors is very 
weak due to the fear of dealing with each other for several reasons; 
including obstruction of administrative procedures suffer from lack 
of information sharing between all sectors, political orientations and 
poor awareness. As an organization we are in a strategic level, 
Moreover, Spring Land is a member of several international 
organizations such as the Organisation of The Islamic Cooperation 
– Computer Emergency Response Teams (OIC-CERT); Africa 
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CERT; and has pan to get a membership in the global Forum of 
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) by 2019. 
Furthermore, NCSA had a good corporation with Oman-CERT and 
Tunisia – CERT. 








There are some international work carried out by the Centre and we 
participated in the response and find solutions on a global level and 
there are reports with this regard, but at the national level, 
cooperation is weak, for example when you want to solve a problem 
within the state, there are complex and long procedures, for example 
we received a message from the State of Brazil because we are a 
member of OIC- CERT IN Malaysia and we were informed through 
it, we dealt with this matter and found a source of cyber-attack from 
an institution in Spring Land whose server was exploited as a source 
of phishing, and another example is a communication from the bank 
of America that there is a source of cyber-attack from inside an 
institution in Spring Land, and we dealt with it and solved. 
We can say generally that the international cooperation is high, due 
to the existence of international concerns to cyber risks, but at the 
national level, it is weak and cooperation is based on the personal 
relations between the authority and some other government sectors. 
Some incidents have been solved and dealt with by the cert team 
within Spring Land as well. 
For example, LTT was hacked and subscribers’ databases were 
hacked and published. The authority had a major role in dealing 
with this event, conducting RISK ASSESMENT analysis and 
detecting the gaps in their E-CARE SYSTEM, and Huawei was 
informed of the gaps. 
We have a plan in place, headed by the director of the CERT centre, 
the authority will become a member of the FIRST organization from 
the beginning of 2019 through an invitation from Africa Cert and 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. 









Head of internal auditor office: In the aspect of Critical National 
Infrastructure (CNI) Protection, Spring Land is extremely in low 
scale and the government has not issued a list of (CNI). In general, 
the physical security has a negative impact on CNI and there no 
clear processes to reveal who is in charge of protect all sectors, 
except the telecommunication sector. Here, there is a point, what do 
you mean by Critical national infrastructure? 
Spring Land has the problem that our communications are 
advanced, and at the same it is not. On the one hand, advanced in 
the Spring Land state 
The telecommunications critical infrastructures is good and even its 
protection is fairly good because it is supervised by some important 
companies such as Spring Land, Al-Madar and LTT. On the other 
hand, the other sectors, which have electricity and water, are 
isolated network so if there will be a risk, it would be internal, and 
there won’t be an external risk. 
In general, there is no provision or classification, and we seek to do 
it after the formulating a strategy and identifying and assessing 
risks. 
National strategy for risk assessment is currently unavailable and 
are not specified or rated, For example, in a certain period, 
specifically in the project of the Artificial River, we tried to do a 
similar thing, but there were not an awareness of the dangers of the 
Internet risks. This was in the previous regime. 
And finally, we tried to be more focused, and people are busy with 
workshops on SCADA security, and the authority gives some 
lectures on awareness of the subject of SCADA security. Then, The 
answer was unexpected, they told us that SCADA system is off for 
a year or more, because all the links and points of connection in 




In general, the physical security is very impressive, so there is no a 
view. The one I mentioned earlier the property of the sovereign 
systems backbone of Spring Land and the connections that are 
happening from the physical aspect, who is protecting them? I can 
say frankly that you can access the vital centres easily, because of 
the fact that it is supervised and leaded by untrained and not 
qualified people, and they have not got the sense of responsibility in 
terms of security and awareness, and they can be penetrated and you 
can enter using fake cards or a valid card and you can access and 
reach to the system and control it. For example, and the 
telecommunications sector, which is considered as the most 
important one, because they are considered as the main 
communications of the state, but with a little social engineering, you 
can find yourself inside the CERT or the sector. 
But there is a considerable interest within the telecommunications 
sector in the field of physical security to protect Spring Land's 
telecommunications infrastructure. But at the level of the state, we 
are in a start-up level. Director of Spring Land-CERT. 
Is risk analysis 
used to determine 
potential threat 
impact to the 
national critical 
infrastructure? 
There is no national framework for analysing and identifying risks 
and threats, we could say that we are still in the start-up-level. 







Currently, Crisis management is not related to the National 
authority for information security and safety. There are currently 
efforts to establish a centre, and we are working on it. The proposal 
is submitted to the Prime Ministers Council to build a homeland 
crisis centre (National Crisis Management Centre). This centre will 
use all the details of the issue of crisis management. It is possible to 
show you the proposal after we finish this workshop. 
This proposal was approved by the president and is supposed to be 
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issued in two or three months and the decision will be made about 
the centre and start work. But it is not in the tasks of NCSA. 
There is a plan, which in fact come out from the authority and we 
noticed its importance. But it is not in the establishing decision, and 
its subject is overlapped with many parties. We provided advice to 
some parties, so that they build an authority in Spring Land 
interested in this major and the plan covers all aspects, including 
cybersecurity in cooperation with the Crisis Management Centre at 
the Arab University. We can say we are in START-UP LEVEL. 
Have any been 
identified and 
implemented at 
the national level? 
There are some strategies to assess the current situation, but of 
course, now we are providing logistical support to the proposed 
crisis management centre and the important needs to get started. We 
are still in the stage of researching the administrative management 
and we are researching the subject of its work areas and how it 
works before we announce it and appear in the strategic work. There 
is nothing on the ground at the moment, so we can say we are in 
START-UP LEVEL 




defence at the 
national level? 
With regard to Cyber Defence, there is no national strategy, but 
there is a sort of high level cooperation between the authority and 
the Ministry of Defense, and at the personal level of the higher 
departments or senior leaders in both institutions. But there is no 
technical or strategic communication or joint workshops as a result 
of the status of the Ministry of Defense under the current situation 
and the war. We have a cyber defense plan for the Spring Landstate 
as a whole, and it has no relation with the army at that stage, later 
on, the army role will begin. As I told you, we haven’t had any 
cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of 
Interior, especially the Ministry of Defence because of the situation 
of the ministry itself and the conflict and problems are happening. 
And also that it has been long time with no a recognised ministry, so 
we could not do anything. But we are trying and in the process of 
thinking in a new vision that it is closer to reality, so we will be 
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having the National Operations Centre and merging with SOC. 
Moreover, there are several countries seemed to be starting heading 
to this direction. So as a summary, we can consider that CERT and 
cyber threat intelligence as one centre, and we are in the START-
UP LEVEL because we have no defence strategy.. 







As a part of the authority’s strategy is the business continuity plan, 
but has not yet started work, it means you can say as an existing 
vision and start simple work as a collection of information and data, 
but as a service in the project, still not started yet, and it is part of 
the authority’s strategy in 2017/2018, and it will be extended for 
two years, God willing. It is approved by the Commission and you 
can have a copy of the establishment decision. So you can say that 
we are in the START-UP LEVEL. 
We have held several meetings with some telecom companies to 
urge them to conduct business continuity recovery in each 
organization. The main telecommunications companies in Spring 
Land have responded and will make a plan in 2018 as a result of the 
awareness and pressure exerted by the Authority in this field and in 
absolute cooperation. 
We put forward the idea in principle and coordinated with them that 
they bring some of the international institutions that have been 
recommended by the state to help us in terms of complete and best 
continuity recovery plan. And of course the banking sector and 
commercial banks and the Central Bank of Spring Land have a 
business continuity recovery plan, but At the state level, there is not. 
Originally, e-services in Spring Land is weak, Therefore, how the 
business continuity plan works. For example, the national authority 
is acting freely in the telecommunications sector, acting in a way of 
simple freedom in the banking sector and acting more freely in the 
oil and gas sector. Thus, every sector we gain trust for a while, but 
the authority is considered as an umbrella for applying future plans, 
and we can say that we are in Formative LEVEL 
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2- Cyber Culture and Society Indicators 
Are we conducting 
Cybersecurity 
awareness activities 
for the critical 
services? How? 
Director of the Awareness Department: According to the strategies 
of the Commission, we are still in the planning stage, and we have 
two plans for awareness, including the national program to raise 
awareness of the dangers of information security and in general 
cybersecurity and it is ready, but there is a lack of financial 
resources allocated to this area. However, with voluntary initiatives 
and efforts by the Commission, we have carried out some programs 
with several parties targeting the general staff to spread the 
Cybersecurity culture. One of the things that have been focused on 
is the increase in the use of internet by citizens of all age groups, for 
example, social networking sites in Spring Land specifically. We 
have prepared a range of lectures to raise awareness from 8 to 10 
different topics such as social networking, cloud computing, 
information security, Internet stuff, personal computer security, 
spam, ransom viruses, how the terrorists hide their online activities, 
privacy protection in the digital community. Some of these lectures 
are processed in the form of posters and publications written in 
Arabic. Of course, providing material in Arabic language even on 
the level of our meeting and participation in some conferences held 
in cooperation with the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC). Most of the Arabic countries are having the lack of the 
providing the awareness materials in Arabic language, Oman is one 
of them. The Commission has written topics affecting everyday life 
in the Spring Land community and printing a number of topics. We 
have contacted many of them, some have agreed and welcomed the 
idea, and some have rejected the need for that, and pointed IT 
department to be responsible for awareness, as well as the lack of 
understanding of the risks and cyber-consequences of decision 
makers in most institutions. We cooperated extensively with the 
telecommunications and oil sector such as the Petroleum Training 
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Institute and some technical colleges in Tripoli such as Ben Ashour 
Institute for Electronics, Ghout Al-Shaal Institute, the Technical 
College of Tripoli University, and the National Number Project, and 
we have held several programs and events, including participation 
in the open week program or open month at universities by 
delivering lectures about awareness for the students. 
There is an initiative targeting the technical colleges, especially as 
they do not have specialized departments in this field to graduate 
specialists in the field of information security, and most of the 
departments are focusing on computer technologies such as 
programming and hardware, and there is no explicit interest in 
information security, and even if there is any, it would just be some 
educational materials giving an introduction about information 
security. The initiative’s idea is to create an interactive professional 
relationship between the mentors and students of graduate projects 
in universities and higher institutes (trainees) in order to guide them 
to the field of information security and safety in an early stage, and 
develop their skills to have suitable job opportunities. 
Some of the lectures were about searching what is information 
security and what are the main pillars of information security, and 
this initiative was continued for about two years. The first year was 
targeted 5 students from the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, 
University of Tripoli, and the second year from Ghoot Al-Shaal 
Institute and the Faculty of Information Technology at University of 
Tripoli due to lack of abilities and the political situation. The 
commission focused the work in the city of Tripoli with some 
initiatives and contributions from other areas, but they were very 
weak. Moreover, The commission used social networking sites such 
as Facebook to spread awareness. 
In general, the national awareness project has another part with a 5 
to 10 year time frame for the Global Child Protection Program, as 
well as there are contributions from civil society organizations on 
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education and some private companies such as a security company. 
A summary of the awareness project to be implemented by 
conducting lectures, workshops and meetings, not only for children 
but also for children, but for who is looking after them too. The 
authority is trying to apply international standards from ITU, and 
we have a written implementation plan to launch the program. We 
can say that we are in the star-up 
What are the 
cybersecurity issues 
currently been 
addressed and what 
is the degree of 
importance of each 
issue? 
Awareness programs focused on cybersecurity in general, including 
e-services such as letters to catch on the social network to increase 
the amount of the withdrawal of bank cards in foreign currency of $ 
50, a large number of citizens’ bank accounts have been hacked 
through suspicious and fake pages on the social networks due to 
lack of awareness. We have focused heavily on catching, spamming 
and the dangers of Android phone applications, which most of them 
are fake, such as the Caller ID app "Truecaller", which steals the 
balance of phone calls by making international calls from the user's 
phone without his knowledge and the use of mobile phones is a 
major target of malware attacks, and this a big problem in Spring 
Land. There was an investigation by a security body in cooperation 
with the Commission, and the result was discovered that a group of 
organized crime supported by external parties and for unknown 
reason, which is likely to be political, especially in Tripoli and the 
group is targeting certain individuals, and some of these group’s 
members are arrested. Other sources of attacks have been 
discovered, some institutions have signed beginners because of the 
low cost to prepare websites for the sectors suffering the design 
changes and gaps, and lack of awareness of institutions. For 
example, there is a Spring Land institution that I cannot mention its 
name due to the confidentiality of the subject has lost millions of 
dinars, and when they investigated that, that found that there is no 
log management system (LOG MANGMENT). There are no 
organisations that have CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS, LOG 
281 
 
AND EVENT MANGMENT, BATCH MANGMENT, and Disaster 
recovery plans apart from telecommunication companies. Most of 
the organisations suffer the security by design issues, and the 
attacks that it suffers from for this reason. The commission has the 
goal of educating citizens and raising awareness of the IT staff in 
the institutions because of the lack of skilled ones and the lack of 
the awareness, and paying attention to information security. Some 
institutions have huge budgets and rely on commercial programs. 
They are cracking some programs to save money, which opens 
several changes to the system. We found that one of the 
organisation part of botnet after the commission received a report 
from the Spam House and also some of the institutions of the 
international community to support Spring Land, they are providing 
some servers and systems for some institutions free programmer 
and equipped, but unfortunately, with a lack of knowledge and lack 
of awareness, it is used and causes the penetration of this institution 
without notifying, and they monitored several incidents of this kind 
for the data of the prime minister and the Supreme Commission for 
Elections in previously, but these problems were overcome and 
resolved. We can say that there are initiatives, and we are at the start 
up level. 
 
Are there any 
standard, policies 
and security 
measures to promote 
trust in e-services 
The level is very poor, there is no interest in applying international 
standards and we noticed through the workshops over-persistence in 
social networking sites such as Facebook. Spring Landsociety, 
whether technical or ordinary, does not have the awareness of the 
risks caused by the problem of the high level of trust in sites 
because of the lack of their awareness and not aware of the risks. 
Spring Land has been considered as a target of e-hunting, there are 
hackers inside and outside Spring Land. These hackers are creating 
fake pages for banks to register your data in foreign exchange 
services or activation of Visa card services or increasing the 
withdrawal limit. Most of these people, unfortunately, from within 
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the banking institutions in cooperation with people outside Spring 
Land and the reason there are no public key structure and digital 
certificates and there is no awareness on this matter. Creating the 
public key is one of the authority’s strategies, but due to the lack of 
the sources and potential, we have not started yet. Awareness is 
aiming to focus on citizens, leaders and communication engineers in 
the sectors. 
In addition, lack of awareness of information security within 
institutions. For example, when any organization provides an online 
service or social media, they are not interested in providing a clear 
picture to the user or citizen, the most important thing that it has a 
page on Facebook. The institutions are supposed to educate the user 
about these things and the authority can participate in that. 
Another question was asked: Is Spring Land subjected to attacks 
from other countries, especially you have been addressed the 
existence of internal and external threats? 
Yes, some countries use some institutions as a source of botnet. It 
has been dealt with after receiving communications from a 
cooperating state, and it is hacked while another penetration of a 
public entity will not be named because of their contract with a third 
party to design and implement its own system, which is the same 
one who penetrated them. We have the state of Nigeria, which is 
targeting Spring Land a lot, as well as China. In the past, there were 
two problems and most of the Internet providers in Spring Land are 
aware of that, and a commission of inquiry has been set up. Also, 
there was an electronic attack from Egypt, and the purpose of the 
attack is not known. 
It is also noted that most of the telecom companies rely on foreign 
companies as a third party, mostly Chinese, to prepare and supervise 
all services, and the Spring Landside does not do anything, except X 
company. There were several violations noticed, and after 
investigation, it has been found that the Spring Landside does not 
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have the ability to manage the records and they only be satisfied for 
keeping all records with third party. Sources of major threats from 
major countries such as China, America and Russia. 
Have you recorded any breakthroughs in the oil sector? 
Yes, especially ransom viruses. The biggest targeted sectors are oil, 
banks and telecommunications. We give the example of a bank in 
Spring Land, according to reports issued by them, exposed to more 
than 53 attacking attempts from America, it’s been found recently 
that an employee was working in the bank and moved to America 
and was identified. They communicated with the competent 
authorities in America. We also have service systems such as the 
national number system, the civil registry and the passports that 
provide online service, which suffers from loots of problems in 
design and hosting data without protection. 
Is there legislation or 
regulations detailing 
privacy protection? 
There are only initiatives, but due to the absence of the legislator, 
because of the political circumstances since year 2014, these laws 
are not issued. It is not specific about cybercrimes, it is for the 
electronic transactions include the Electronic Crimes Law in general 
and not detailed and it is close to the laws are being used in the 
Arab world. The Ministry of Justice, Spring Land Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Ministry of Interior concluded that only in the 
preparation stage. 
3- Cybersecurity education, training and skills Indicators 
Are training needs been 
identified at a national 
level? 
There are no plans at the state’s level in defining the required 
educational curricula in cybersecurity. 
Is there any education 
strategy to develop our 
Cybersecurity skills? 
There are no plans at the national level in the area of raising the 
efficiency of education in the field of cybersecurity, part of the 
of the authority’s strategies, but we have not started yet, and we 
require more cooperation with the Ministry of Education and 
we noticed that the replies are only from some colleges and 
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universities and they use in the teaching some of materials 
about an introduction to the definition of information security. 
The topic was discussed with some authorities to prepare 
detailed curricula in information security and the possibility of 
opening a new educational department in this field. The topic 
was discussed with the Dean of the Faculty of Information 
Technology, as it is known before Ghout Al-Shaal, the idea was 
welcomed. In an urgent manner to promote cybersecurity at 
higher institutes. We are in Start-Up level 
Is there an adequate 
budget allocation? 
There are no financial allocations for it at the state’s level 
Is there a continuous 
training plan for our 
skills development? 
 
There are no plans at the level of the state in the field of raising 
the efficiency of employees in public and private sectors, 
except some plans from the Authority to prepare a plan to train 
the staff and try to make it a reference to other parties, but most 
of the parties are not interested. The authority, participated in 
some workshops and international cyber drill and several 
international conference in Tunis, Qatar and the cyberspace 
evaluation’s conference in Amman and attending the annual 
meetings of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 
accompanied by training courses to improve the efficiency of 
our employees. 
Do Enterprise Boards 
and their executives 
within private and state-
owned companies 
understand the Spring 
Land cybersecurity 
issues? 
For public sector, telecom operators have an awareness of the 
seriousness of the subject. Some of them are seeking to issue a 
strategy for cybersecurity of the company led by some banking 
sectors, and it is considered In the private sector as a bit better 
one, but in general, it is not satisfactory in both sectors.The 
awareness is existing but there are no real initiatives and there 
is no plan in the field of raising the efficiency of employees in 
public and private sectors. 
4- Legal and regulatory frameworks Indicators 
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Is there any cyber 
related legislation or 
regulation? 
 
There is no legislation or regulation except an initiative to issue 
Electronic Transaction law and Electronic Crime law. This 
initiatives are not issued yet due to jurisdictional fragmentation 
due to political instability 
What does the content 
of the regulation aim to 
achieve? 
The e-Commerce Chamber of the Ministry of Economy in 
cooperation with some specialized companies from Korea 
prepare a proposal aims generally to issue an electronic crimes 
law to conduct electronic government transactions and services 
in cooperation with the authority and the participation of the 
former committee. Spring Land has signed on an international 
protocol for child with the Internet 




There is an electronic crimes unit in the Ministry of the Interior 
that deals with this type of crimes by applying other laws 
relating to that. 
Do we differentiate the 
sets of rules to protect 





• Personal Data 
There is no laws related to protect systems and data 
Do we have a problem 
of jurisdictional 
fragmentation? 
Yes, due to the political conflict, as we mentioned earlier. We 
can say we are still in a start-up level. 
5- Standards, organisations, and technologies Indicators 
Are there any existing 
standards and practices 
do you adhere to? 
There is an attempt to start the project of implementing 
international standards, but we have a lack of the resources and 
expertise in the public and private sectors, as well as the issues 
related to evaluation, which is problematic for the two sectors, 
but the Authority is seeking to qualify experts in this field and 
to grant licenses to some private entities by the Authority to 
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provide this service with the established policies. 
Do we have a 
Cybersecurity 
Standards at the 






There is no national framework or organisation to monitor the 
adaption of international standards. There is only an acceptable 
cooperation between some of the major sectors, such as 
petroleum, telecommunications, and banking. 




and evaluated based on 
international standard? 
Currently, there is no any organization, but there is some future 
plans of the authority. There is a lack of research centres in this 
field. However, there is a research centre that is not directly 
specialized in cybersecurity. It is preparing a technical research 
related to e-commerce, communication and information 
infrastructure related to the open market to be established in 
Benghazi city. In fact, there was a communication with the 
authority to participate in the preparation of the strategy, but 
due to the security and political situation, they stopped these 
attempts. 
Do we have any 
insurance practises or 
third party mitigation? 
There is a vision from the Authority for the participation of the 
private sector in this major, but unfortunately, even the private 
sector suffers from a lack of expertise, and it is not one of the 
authority priorities at the present time. 
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Appendix 5 the Mechanisms and controls template analysis for dimensions (2,3,4,and 5) of the NCCBF 
1. Mechanisms and controls template analysis for Dimension 2. 
Mechanism ID Rational Control ID Reference and Access 
M2.1.1 Behaviours change To influence the adoption of secure behaviour online.  
C2.1.1 Behavior Change 
Techniques ( behavior change 
wheel) 
Behaviors change wheel 




To help the country in achieving 
cybersecurity goals. 
C2.1.2 Guiding principles ( 
Outcome focused- Prioritised- 














M2.1.3 Promote information 
sharing  
To reduce the threats and 
vulnerabilities of cyber space.  
C2.1.3 Reporting mechanisms 
framework.  
Good practice study 
Cybercrime reporting  
mechanisms (GLACY 
2014).  
M2.1.4 Organise a national cyber-
security month, week or day 
To engage the public, and private- 
through events and initiatives 
C2.1.4 Provide a sufficient budget 
and human resources 
Global awareness raising 
campaign, 
STOP.THINK.CONNEC, 
US National Cyber 
Security Awareness Month 
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(NCSAM), open sources 
 
M2.2.1 Develop a strategic plan for 
e-government 
 
To implement e-government 
effectively. 
C2.2.1Governance, infrastructure, 
policy and outreach 
World bank (Schware 
2005), 
(infoDevWorldBank 
2009), open source  
M2.2.2 Launch and continuously 
develop government e-services 
To deliver the best online services 
for people.  
C2.2.1 Embed the application of 
security measures in their design 
and running  
(infoDevWorldBank 
2009), open source 
M2.2.3 Develop national privacy 
framework  
To protect information and personal 
data.  C2.2.2 Privacy framework 
ISO/IEC 27701:2019 
(Lachaud 2020), OECD. 
2013. The OECD Privacy 
Framework. Paris: OECD, 
General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) 
(European 2018) 
M2.3.1 Define benchmarks, 
success indicators for initiatives 
and publish periodically.  
To monitor and evaluate the 
initiatives. 
C2.3.1 Monitoring and Evaluation 
guidelines. 
Performance measurement 
and key performance 
indicators. 
2. Mechanisms and controls template analysis for Dimension 3. 
Mechanism ID Rational  Control ID  Reference and Access 
M3.1.1 Develop national 
cybersecurity education and 
cybersecurity modules in schools 
and universities. 
To form basic cyber skills into the 





M3.1.2 Foster research and 
development in cybersecurity 
To address emerging challenges 
of cyberspace and reinforce 
State’s research in the area of 
cybersecurity. 
C3.1.2 Provide a sufficient budget 
and other resources. National strategy  
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M3.1.3 Combine the education 
with practical training  
To close the cybersecurity skills 
gap among all organisations and 
preparing the future cybersecurity 
workforce.  
C3.1.3 Alignment of curricula and 
training with demand for skills.  
 CyberSeek, open source 
(CyberSeek 2016) 
M3.2.1 Set the professional 
standards for cyber practitioners  
 
To build the State cross-cutting 
knowledge, skills and power to 
boost all cybersecurity objectives. 
C3.2.1 professional certification 
bodies  
CIISec Skills Framework, 
open source. 
M3.2.3 Creating  the competences 
of the private sector  
To improve the competences of 
the private sector. 
C3.2.2 Frameworks and standards 
for private sector 
Cyber Essentials' - 
standards/ requirements and 
Certification for SME (UK) 
& 'Référent en 
cybersecurity' guide with 
standards by ANSSI 
(France), open sources 
M3.3.1 Establish a cybersecurity 
career awareness campaign 
targeting educators, students, 
parents, administrators, and 
counsellors 
 
 To increase career awareness and 
sustain young and public 
commitment  in cybersecurity 
activities  
 
C3.3.1 Knowledge frameworks, 
job descriptions and 
professionalisation 
National Cybersecurity 
Workforce Framework 2.0' 
by the National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education 
(US), open sources 
M3.3.2 Promote training for human 
resources already in the workforce  
To determine if the cybersecurity 
capabilities are satisfying the 
operations during cyber crises.   
C3.3.2 Conduct cyber drills and 
exercises ITU guidance. Open source 
3. Mechanisms and controls template analysis for Dimension 4. 
Mechanism ID Rational  Control ID  Reference and Access 
M4.1.1 Substantive law. 
Substantive law outlines the rights 
and responsibilities of legal 
subjects.  
C4.1.1 Balance security with 
privacy and data protection 






  cybercrime-law.html)  
( ITU Toolkit for 
Cybercrime Legislation) 
M4.1.2 Procedural law. To defines the process that followed to apply substantive law. 
C4.1.2 Law enforcement, 





(ITU Toolkit for 
Cybercrime Legislation), 
open source.  
M4.2.1 Law enforcement 
procedural powers. 
To ensure the effectiveness and 
fairness of criminal justice systems. 






(ITU Toolkit for 
Cybercrime Legislation), 
open source. 
M4.2.2 Procedures regarding 
electronic evidence. Enhance the forensic capabilities 
C4.2.2 national investigation and 
the prosecutor’s power. 
The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) 
guidelines, open source 
M4.3.1 Form national and an 
international cooperation. 
To ensure effective collaboration 
on cybersecurity in state and 
worldwide.  
C4.3.1 Information sharing 
platform (common, specific 
guidelines, Encourage information 
exchange). Mutual legal assistance 
treaties (MLATs).  
Information sharing in 
the international fight 
against cybercrime (WEF 




M4.3.2 Develop a cybersecurity 
policy  
To identify all obligatory 
cybersecurity requirements and C4.3.2 Cybersecurity standards. Standards for IT and 
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controls with which it must comply. cybersecurity from 






M4.3.3 Responsible disclosure 
To protect national assets and risk 
associated with exploiting 
vulnerabilities.  
C4.3.4 Responsible disclosure 
frameworks 
ISO/IEC 29147:2018. 
It is not free, the 
proprietary rights are 
from the International 
Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 
4. Mechanisms and controls template analysis for Dimension 5. 
Mechanism ID Rational  Control ID  Reference and Access 
M5.1.1 Create a national risk 
assessment, crisis management, and 
auditing framework 
To identify the key risks and their 
consequences.  
C5.1.1Establish a national risk 
management Centre. 
NIST Special Publication 
800-39, open source 
M5.1.2 Adopt cybersecurity and 
risk-management standards and 
promote their adoption across the 
public and private sectors. 
To identify baseline ICT security, C5.1.2 Apply International standards  
ISO 31000, Risk 
management. It is not 
free, the proprietary 






M5.1.3 Embed security-by-design, 
in buying technology or install 
software from overseas 
To ensure that technologies and 
systems are designed and fabricated 
securely. 
C5.1.3 Security architecture, 






open source  
M5.2.1 Internet infrastructure 
resilience plan 
To ensure the continuity of Internet 
infrastructure services against any 
destruction.  
C5.2.1 Standards for IT security 
and critical infrastructure 
Requirements for  
Network Resilience  




M5.2.2 Business continuity plan  
To deal with potential cyber threats 
to a state and enable operation of 
national systems before and during 
the execution of disaster recovery.  
C5.2.1 Resilience Frameworks 
ISO 22301:2019(en) 
Security and resilience -
Business continuity 
management systems — 
Requirements. It is not 
free, the proprietary 






M5.3.1 Technical security controls 
To avoid, detect, or minimise 
security risks to physical assets, 
information, computer systems, or 
other assets. 
C5.3.1 Security controls framework  
U.S. Federal Government 
information security 
standards (NIST Special 
Publication 800-53), 
open source. ISO 27001 
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Dimension  ID and description Factors ID and description  Mechanism ID and description Control ID and description  
D1Build strategic capacity 
D1.1 Establish a National Council 
for Cybersecurity. 
M1.1.1 Clear mandate and  
appropriate statutory powers 
C1.1.1 Regulatory and  corporate 
governance  compliance (  ITIL®, 
ISO 20000 and ISO 27001) 
M1.1.2 An organizational structure C1.1.2 Stakeholders approach ( Partnership and collaboration) 
M1.1.3 Human Capital C1.1.3  Cybersecurity Competency  program 
M1.1.4 Develop national 
Cybersecurity strategy. C1.1.4  Guiding principles 
D1.2 Building a Risk-Based 
Approach  
 
M1.2.1  Identify the   Critical 
National (CI) assets and  critical 
National Information infrastructure 
(CNI) 
C1.2.1 Good practices for the 
identification of CI sectors and  
CNI sectors 
M1.2.2  Identify the threats to 
national security on cyberspace 
C1.2.2 Risk assessment (including 
threat assessment, vulnerability 
assessment and impact analysis). 
M1.2.3   Develop Military 
capabilities  
C1.2.3 Cyber defence doctrine 
framework 
D1.3 Building a National Incident 
Response Capabilities 
M1.3.1 Establishment of a 
National CERT 
C1.3.1 The National CERT 
Structure. 
M1.3.2 Establish  Incident 
Registry  
Platform for reporting and sharing 
of incidents and Maintain Trust 
Relationships. 
C1.3.2  Relevant stakeholders and 
legal framework 
M1.3.3 Technical Excellence C1.3.3  Cybersecurity Workforce Framework 
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2. Dimension 2: Cyber culture and society 
Dimension  ID and description Factors ID and description Mechanism ID and description Control ID and description  
D2 Build cyber cultural and 
society capacity 
D2.1 
Develop a national awareness 
program that is compatible with the 
current situation. 
M2.1.1 Behaviors change  C1.1.1 Behavior  Change Techniques ( behavior change wheel) 
M2.1.2  cybersecurity awareness-raising 
campaigns C1.1.2   Guiding principles  
M2.1.3  Promote information sharing and 
Effectively communicate the benefits of 
paying attention to threats and 
vulnerabilities 
C1.1.3 Cooperation framework 
M2.1.4  Organise a national cyber-security 
month, week or day in order to engage the 
public, and private- and public-sector 
partners through events and initiatives 
C1.1.4 Provide a sufficient budget and human 
resources 
D2.2 Improve e-services, in order 
to promote the required level of 
trust. 
 
M2.2.1  Develop a strategic plan for  e-
government 
 
C1.2.1 Governance, infrastructure, policy and 
outreach 
M2.2.2  launch and continuously develop 
government e-services 
C1.2.1  Embed the application of security 
measures in their design and running  
M2.2.3  Protect information and personal 
data 
C1.2.2 Privacy policy 
 D2.3  Develop an evaluation 
criterion 
M2.3.1  Define benchmarks,  success 
indictors for initiatives and publish 
periodic 
C1.3.1 Monitoring and Evaluation  guidelines 
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Dimension  ID and  description Factors ID and description  Mechanism ID and description Control ID and description  
D3 Build  cybersecurity  Education, 
Training and skills  
D3.1 Develop national cyber 
security education program 
M2.1.1 Develop national cybersecurity 
education and cyber security modules in 
schools and universities. 
C2.1.1   Curriculum Guidelines ( 
https://www.acm.org/education/curricula-
recommendations) 
M2.1.2  Foster research and 
development  in cyber security 
 
C2.1.2   Provide a sufficient budget and other 
resources. 
M2.1.3   Combine the education with 
practical training and Preparing future 
cyber security workforce 
C2.1.3   Alignment of curricula and training 
with demand for skills. ( CyberSeek) 
D3.2 Creating a certificate for 
national needs 
M2.2.1   Set the professional standards 
for cyber practitioners  
 
C2.2.1   professional certification bodies ( 
NCSC Certified Cyber Professional (CCP) 
scheme) 
M2.2.3   Improving the competences of 
the private sector  
C2.2.2   Frameworks and standards for private 
sector Example: 'Cyber Essentials' - standards/ 
requirements and Certification for SME (UK) & 
'Référent en cybersecurity' guide with standards 
by ANSSI (France) 
D3.3 Defining tasks and 
required knowledge 
M2.3.1   Establish a cyber security 
career awareness campaign targeting 
educators, students, parents, 
administrators, and counsellors 
 
C2.3.1     Knowledge frameworks, job 
descriptions and professionalisation 
Example: 'National Cybersecurity Workforce 
Framework 2.0' by the National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education (US) 
M2.3.2    Promote training for human 
resources already in the workforce  Conduct cyber drills and exercises 
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4.Dimension 4: legal and regulations 
 
 
Dimension ID and description Factors ID and description  Mechanism ID and description Control ID and description  
D4 Build legal and regulations 
capacity 
D4.1 Development  and    
adoption    of    relevant    
legislation    supporting    the    
policy    that    would    enhance 
cybersecurity  
M4.1.1 Substantive law. 
C4.1.1 Balance security with privacy and data 
protection (Fundamental human rights) ( ITU 
Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation) 
Substantive law defines the rights and 
responsibilities of legal subjects, which include 
persons, organizations, and states. Sources of 
substantive law include statutes and ordinances 
enacted by city, state, and federal legislatures           




M4.1.2 Procedural law. C4.1.2 Law enforcement, prosecution and the courts. 
M4.1.3 Jurisdictional law C4.1.3Territoriality, nationality, protection and universality. 
D4.2  Develop Criminal justice 
power 
M4.2.1 Law  enforcement   procedural   
powers. C4.2.1 national capacity in law enforcement. 
M4.2.2 Procedures regarding  electronic 
evidence. 
C4.2.2 national investigation and prosecutor’s 
power. 
D4.3 Establish effective informal 
cooperation mechanisms. 
M4.3.1 Form national  and an 
international cooperation. 
C4.3.1 Information sharing platform (common, 
specific guidelines, Encourage information 
exchange) . Mutual legal assistance treaties 
(MLATs). Information sharing in the international 
fight against cybercrime (WEF (2017)). 
M4.3.2   Develop a cybersecurity policy  C4.3.2  cybersecurity standards. 
M4.3.3 Responsible disclosure C4.3.4 Responsible disclosure frameworks 
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5.Dimension 5: Standards, organisations, and technologies  
 
Dimension ID and description Factors ID and description  Aspects  Mechanism ID and description Control ID and description 
D5 Build technical capacity 
D5.1 All stakeholders to adapt 
and adopt international 
standards. 
M5.1.1 Create a national risk assessment, 
crisis management, and auditing framework C5.1.1Establish a national agency 
M5.1.2 Identify baseline ICT security, 
cybersecurity and risk-management 
standards and promote their adoption across 
the public and private sectors. 
C5.1.2 Apply International standards  
M5.1.3 Embed security-by-design, in buying 
technology or install software from overseas 
C5.1.3 Security architecture,  Security  by 




D5.2 Build national resilience 
plan 
M5.2.1 Internet infrastructure resilience plan C5.2.1 Standards for IT security and critical infrastructure 
M5.2.2 Business continuity plan  C5.2.1  Resilience Frameworks 
  
D5.3 Enhance physical security.  M5.3.1 Technical security controls C5.3.1 Accreditation  Authority   
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Appendix (6) A Letter sent to the Participants to invite them to participate in the 
Evaluation of the NCCBF. 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
My name is Mohamed Ben Naseir. I am a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Science and 
Technology, at Bournemouth University. As part of my PhD research at Bournemouth 
University, I am conducting an empirical study in the area of Cybersecurity focusing on 
National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) for countries in a 
transitional phase to facilitate a better understanding and representation of a real-world 
problem from an enterprise perspective. I would like to cordially invite you to participate in 
my study since your profile and background makes me interested in your views on the 
research topic, and any further insights would be greatly appreciated. 
Participation is anonymous, thus, no one will know what you have answered. This setting 
allows respondents to be free of any bias and hesitance when accepting to participate in the 
study. Your help is of high importance to provide a pragmatic view on Cybersecurity problem 
in different countries.  
If you agree to participate in my study, you are invited to join us in focus group meetings. 
There will be almost one meeting to demonstrate and evaluate the Cybersecurity focusing on 
National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Framework (NCCBF) for countries in a 
transitional phase against a set of requirements. 
For the detailed information about the research and participation, please find the attached file 
and confirm your participation by replying back to me for arranging further details, if 
necessary. 
Kind regards, 
Mohamed Ben Naseir 
PhD Candidate 
Faculty of Science and Technology, Bournemouth University 
Office number: Poole House, 521. 





Appendix 7: Interviewer details of the evaluation of the NCCBF 











3- Under which category does your organisation belong? 
 
           
   
 










6- How long have you worked in this position?  
 
 
Public    private 
 
Name: 






























Appendix 10- Sample of photos from the evaluation sessions of the NCCBF  
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